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## LOTZE'S THEORY OF REALITY





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BY THE

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TO MY PARENTS



## PREFATORY NOTE

THE influence of Lotze on present-day philosophical tendencies, and more especially on theological thought, is very widespread. In the following pages I have given a critical exposition of one side of his philosophy, namely, his theory of reality. His theory of thought has already been adequately dealt with by Sir Henry Jones, and I have only touched upon that side of Lotze's philosophy in so far as it bears upon his metaphysics. I wish to express my thanks to my teacher, Professor James Gibson, of the University College of North Wales, Bangor, who inspired the work and gave me his constant guidance; also to my wife, who wrote out in fair copy the whole of the manuscript.

LLANILLWOCHTARN,  
*August 2, 1921.*



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## INTRODUCTION

### I. *Lotze's Writings.*

The period of Lotze's work embraces the years from 1841 to 1881. His activity divides itself into three periods. The first extends to the year 1852, the second to the year 1868, and the third until the time of his death.

In the year 1841 he published a work on Metaphysics. This, together with a criticism of Herbart's 'Ontology,' published in 'Die Zeitschrift für Philosophie' in 1843, gives a draft of Lotze's fundamental points of view with regard to metaphysic and theory of knowledge, from which he never afterwards materially departed. During this early period Lotze published several shorter works dealing with the scientific interpretation of biological processes. In 1842 appeared 'Pathology and Therapy as Mechanistic Science'; in 1843 a long article in Wagner's 'Handbook of Physiology,' entitled 'Life and Life Force'; in 1851 a work on 'The Physiology of the Life of the Body'; the year 1852 saw the publication of an important work entitled 'Medical Psychology, or Physiology of the Soul.' In this work he sought to put on a scientific basis the interaction that takes place between body and soul; he also developed a most important theory of local signs as involved in the origin of our perception of space.

In the years 1845 and 1847 Lotze published two essays in the 'Göttingen Studies,' entitled 'The Idea of Beauty' and 'The Conditions of the Beautiful in Art.' These early essays are the clearest expression of his views on the beautiful.

First  
Period.

In the writings of this early period Lotze took up a definite point of view with regard to the nature of reality as it manifests itself in the material world. He also put forward his theory as to the nature and function of thought in reference to reality. In his scientific writings he was concerned to establish the view that all problems connected with the movements and forces of the material world, of the world of living beings, and also of the movements of mind in so far as they are psychological, must be solved by purely scientific methods, and on a thoroughly mechanistic basis. He did not put forward a mechanistic theory of the nature of reality; on the contrary, he did not hold such a theory. What he wanted to show is that mechanical laws rule over the whole of reality in so far as that reality is material and dependent upon what is thus material; and that these laws must have their full weight in any explanation of what takes place in the world. This does not exclude any deeper interpretation as to the ultimate meaning of what takes place.

The essays on the Beautiful are most important as showing Lotze's relation to the problems which exercised Kant in his final Critique. They also mark the main problem of Lotze's philosophy. 'The Critique of Pure Reason' had been directed to prove that reason reveals the world as a systematic whole bound down by laws which follow from the nature of reason itself. Faith, however, tells us that the purposes which we, as ultimate ends, strive to realise shall find a place within this systematic unity. Furthermore, feeling, or the recognition of the Beautiful, assures us that within this unity these ends are already being realised. Kant's later Critiques were concerned to give to faith and feeling their justification in regard to these claims. Lotze accepts this view of the Beautiful as mirroring moral principles moulding and shaping existence; not only so, but he makes this view the leading idea and the main

motive of his philosophy. The unfortunate part of Lotze's life is that he was not able to give a thorough-going and systematic account of the moral and æsthetic sides of our nature and of their relation to reality. His views on this most important side of his work are very largely limited to these two essays of the first period of his literary activity.

The second period of Lotze's literary activity extends to the year 1868, that is, it is the period during which the 'Mikrokosmos' was being written. Second Period. The work is a very large one, and in it Lotze took upon himself the task of setting forth in a popular form two principal contentions; first, how absolutely universal is the extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world; <sup>1</sup> secondly, that the system of truth is not an independent whole having value in and for itself, but a means through which man comes to the satisfaction of his highest aims and profoundest convictions. 'But taking truth as a whole, we are not justified in regarding it as a mere self-centred splendour, having no necessary connection with those stirrings of the soul from which, indeed, the impulse to seek it first proceeded. On the contrary, whenever any scientific revolution has driven out old modes of thought, the new views that take their place must justify themselves by the permanent or increasing satisfaction which they are capable of affording to those spiritual demands which cannot be put off or ignored.'<sup>2</sup> The tone and character of the work was very largely influenced by Herder's 'Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit.' Lotze deals with the basis of human life in the material world. He sets forth nature as being the mechanism of life, and he also treats of biology and psychology in the same way as a mechanical basis for the activities of the soul. The middle and later parts of the book deal with ethics,

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Introduction.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

logic, and metaphysics, interspersed with discussions on art, on religion, and on history. The work is not systematic, and while it contains a great deal that is of the utmost importance as regards Lotze's views on ethics and metaphysics, it may be best described as a treatise on culture.

Third  
Period.

During the last period of his literary activity Lotze wrote systematic treatises on logic and metaphysics. These works are characterised by a very great attention to detail, and are his most important works from a purely philosophical point of view. Pfleiderer gives a higher position and a greater value to the 'Mikrokosmos' than to the later systematic works, for in this work, he maintains, 'the structure of his system of reality, its inner unity, and the organic welding together of its central principles,'<sup>1</sup> more clearly come to light than in his systematic work. What Pfleiderer says is undoubtedly true, but the scientific analysis through which Lotze justifies his views is contained far more fully in these later works than in the 'Mikrokosmos.'

After Lotze's death the outlines of his lectures were published. Edward von Hartmann rightly attaches little importance to them. They were probably not intended for publication, and in any case did not represent a systematic account of his principles. They were rather indications of his views in these and those directions, and were suited to the minds of those beginning philosophical enquiries rather than to the critical minds of the narrower philosophical public.

## II. *Lotze's Place in the History of Philosophy.*

The point  
of view  
from  
which  
Lotze sets  
out.

We must now consider Lotze's place in the history of philosophy. It is impossible to class Lotze as a philosopher of this or that school. He gathers together tendencies which are involved in

<sup>1</sup> *Lotze's Philosophische Weltanschauung*, p. 10.

opposing schools of thought and seeks to harmonise them. Furthermore, he exercised powerful criticisms in respect of the fundamental points of view of some of these schools; not that he was a mere critic, but that the tendencies with which he himself was in sympathy forced him to question those starting points which, seemingly, disregarded the detailed contents of our everyday experience.

Another point of importance is this, namely, that Lotze was not a great system-maker. The characteristic of the great systematisers was that they had started with a few mighty principles and had sought to fit reality into the mould of these. Such a method as this did not appeal to Lotze. He wished to start with the detailed content of experience, and from an examination of this detail to move to the principles which would reveal to us its reality. Starting from this point of view it is exceedingly difficult to build up a system. Indeed, it would be true to say that Lotze's philosophy marks the beginning of that tendency in modern thought which disregards system, and sees the task of philosophy rather as that of solving definite problems which each of the many spheres of our experience sets before us.

The starting point of Lotze's philosophy, and also that which sets for him its problem, lies in Kant's philosophy. Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' was directed to the establishment of the view that the constitution of our experience as universal, and therefore of the world as we know it, is determined by certain fundamental principles following from the nature of intelligence as such. Kant saw, however, that our experience is not merely intellectual, and that the world contains moments deeper than that of merely objective existence. The moral side of our nature also desires satisfaction, and the world must be looked upon as a place in which moral endeavour can find room for activity. Accordingly, Kant asks the question in the 'Critique of Practical Reason,'

Lotze's  
starting  
point to  
be found  
in Kant.

What are the principles upon which the world must be ordered if it is to satisfy, in this case, not our intelligence, but our moral consciousness or our practical reason? The first principle revealed as an answer to this question is that each soul which can be considered as a centre of moral activity must be considered as an end in itself, never as a mere instrument. This at once postulates the existence of a plurality of souls as lying at the basis of existence, and exercising a freedom of activity in relation to it. We reason, and we see the world as a single whole bound down by abstract and intelligible principles. We act, and we see the world as a system of souls moulding existence to their own purposes. We have, on the one side, a hard-and-fast world, and, on the other side, a world that is being continuously shaped by a plurality of active souls. How is this gulf to be bridged? Kant answers that it is bridged in feeling. In feeling we come to the recognition of beauty as being involved in reality. Through beauty we see the world as bound down by principles which the intelligence postulates of it, and at the same time as organised in such a way that our purposes can be and are being fulfilled in it.

The  
questions  
which the  
Critical  
Philosophy  
sets

This solution, however, raises questions of the utmost importance for the critical philosophy. First come the questions as to the ultimate nature of the plurality of souls acting in relation to the world of existence, and also as to the nature of the ends which they set before themselves. Kant tells us that the Supreme Good is that of a community of souls all acting in accordance with what reason demands, and finding perfect happiness in this activity. This postulates the existence of the Divine Being and also the immortality of the soul. The perfect adjustment between virtue and happiness is an ideal which the conditions of life are not of themselves capable of bringing to realisation; hence the need for an infinite Being who shall bring about this

adjustment. Furthermore, this adjustment requires a progress to infinity before it can be accomplished ; therefore, the demand that it shall be accomplished postulates the immortality of the soul. These problems as to the nature and destiny of finite souls, and their relation to the Divine Being, are not capable of solution by the critical method. That method did not reveal, and was not intended to reveal the ultimate characteristics of being as such. It was directed to an investigation of the universal conditions under which alone anything can be known to us, whatever its ultimate character may be. But when the critical method was transferred from the sphere of knowledge to that of moral activity, the universal conditions which it revealed in this sphere as making moral activity possible could not be considered as merely logical ; they are, in fact, real principles, and must be considered as having metaphysical significance. The transcendental or pure self, as the ultimate condition of experience, is a logical implication of all knowledge, and not in any sense a real and universal self claiming existence. But the Divine Being and the soul as immortal, both of which are implied in moral activity, *do* claim real existence, else their whole significance and value are lost. This application, on the part of Kant, of the critical method to the sphere of moral endeavour was the justification for those who followed him, when they converted that method into a metaphysical principle or procedure for the investigation of the nature of ultimate reality. But this conversion of a logical into a real principle meant that the principles, upon which the manifestation of reality in our experience is based, are at the same time constitutive of reality as such. Logic or thought became the measure of the universe. Kant himself never took up this position. At the same time, however, his different applications of this method raised a problem of supreme importance. In the sphere of intelligence



this method revealed the structure of appearance, or phenomena; in the sphere of moral activity it revealed the fundamental characteristics of the ultimately real. The question that at once arose was as to the relation in which the world as phenomenal stands to moral activity as noumenal. It was this question which Fichte set himself to answer.

The  
position  
of Fichte.

Fichte started with the transcendental ego and converted it into an active principle. He held that this ego posited the world of phenomena as the sphere in which its activity could move. In thus positing nature it became self-conscious in the finite selves through which that activity became realised. This transcendental ego, however, was not considered by Fichte as a real self existing prior and external to the world of phenomena and the community of finite selves. Nor again was its positing activity, through which nature and selves come into being, considered as creative, in the sense of being a happening in time. Fichte held that the ego is a logical condition implied in all consciousness and all existence, and binding these two moments together into unity. But the difficulty lay in keeping it a logical presupposition revealing itself in all experience whatsoever. It continually tended to become a relatively independent reality. Furthermore, the creative activity of the ego, although described as moral, was considered as intellectual. Thought or logic was still the arbiter of being.

The  
views of  
Schelling.

Schelling was not satisfied with Fichte's derivation of nature from spirit. He refused to accept the position that the world of phenomena is a limitation which spirit sets itself in order to realise its own activity. He insists that nature possesses a certain form of existence in its own right. At the same time, however, he is forced to regard both nature and spirit as possessing an underlying unity, which manifests itself in all their differences. But now comes the difficult problem of determining the nature of

this unity. Schelling is not content to leave it as a bare identity; he strives to show it as an active principle revealing itself in a lower and inadequate way through the intellect, in a higher form through morality, and in its highest form through artistic appreciation. In all its forms its basic character is that of will. But he never succeeded in making this principle concrete.

The task which Hegel set himself was that of exhibiting the fundamental principle of reality as living in, as moving through, and as moulding phenomena. He identified this principle with spirit or self-consciousness; not, however, the abstract self-consciousness which is a mere logical condition of experience, but one which realises itself through the historical development of thought principles in conjunction with the detail of experience. Although thought is thus historical in its movement it is nevertheless, Hegel insisted, logical in its structure. It is constituted by a system of categories or notions which imply one another. If any notion is taken by itself and reflected upon in connection with the content of experience, then it can be seen that that notion is not adequate as constitutive or constructive of experience; it requires another notion to complete it, and this other notion reveals itself as an opposite. If we start with the barest principle, it can be developed through this logical process of implication until the whole system of reality stands revealed to us.

Hegel's  
task.

The obvious criticism against Hegel is that this implication is not altogether logical. Being, considered as a merely logical principle, does not imply Non-Being as necessary to its completion; nor again does the unity of being and non-being logically result in becoming. In the content of reality there must be a moment of contingency, which is not of thought, but yet which determines to some extent, at all events, the character of the principles rendering that content a unity. Hegel had striven to resolve all

Criticism  
of Hegel.

reality into elements or moments in a thought movement. But thus to exhaust reality in thought was to deprive it of some of its most essential elements. The characteristics of contingency and of definite nature, which are involved in the content of experience, demand some form of existence for self other than that which thought gives to this content. Furthermore, because the content of experience thus demands existence for self independent of thought, thought is not capable of penetrating into its being and exhausting its nature. But nevertheless its nature and being are exhausted in a deeper insight which we have into it. The development of Idealism had made this latter position unassailable.

Lotze's  
return  
from  
Hegel  
to the  
position  
of Kant

It was from the point of view of the above criticism that Lotze made a return to the final problems which Kant's philosophy had set. Kant saw that our moral consciousness sees further into the nature of reality than does thought; for it sees reality as organic to moral endeavour. Our feeling sees even further than does our moral consciousness; for it views reality as *moulded* through moral endeavour. The deepest insight into the nature of reality is not therefore given by the intelligence, but by another side of our nature. This at once raises the question as to the relation between intelligence and the moral and æsthetic sides of our nature. Thought may give us a certain structure as belonging to reality, but it does not reveal to us its deepest meaning. It must therefore take a subordinate place in relation to that which does reveal to us the deepest meaning of the world. It is in these problems, which the final phases of 'Kant's Critical Philosophy' set, that Lotze's starting-point is to be found. His early essays on the Conception of Beauty and on the conditions of the Beautiful in Art are most important as setting forth his point of view in this respect. They make it quite clear that his first interest centres mainly in Kant's problem as to how feeling

mediates to us the assurance that our highest ideals find their realisation in the world of reality.

Now it was from this starting-point that Lotze was forced to question the high pretensions which the 'Critical Philosophy' had assigned to thought. Lotze interpreted the thought, which Hegel had made creative of reality, as formal thought. He did not see thought or logic as containing a real principle that could penetrate into the heart of that which is real. Hegel had developed his system of notions or categories from the point of view of formal logic. As formal or abstract these notions are not reality, and Hegel himself saw that this was the case. But he held that these notions become concrete, and by thus becoming concrete, determine the nature of the real; that they are therefore constitutive and creative of it. It was impossible for Hegel, however, to give a satisfactory account of this process whereby the abstract notion becomes a living principle existing within the texture of the objectively real. He could not change, at one fell stroke, the abstract character of thought and convert it into real existence. Lotze, therefore, disregards Hegel's attempt to make formal thought real. He considers thought as remaining throughout purely formal. What he does is to give us an examination of the nature of thought, this examination being intended to show thought's failure, at every step of its development, to contain, or to hold, or to be identical with, the nature of the real. As far as formal logic is concerned he proves his case. Formal logic must have the nature of the real given to it in the first place; then it can build around that which is thus given so as to give us a more comprehensive view of it. But now comes a difficulty. How is thought enabled to approach the real so as to give us this more comprehensive view? Lotze comes very near to falling back into the Idealist's position. He maintains that, besides formal thought, there is an intuitive thought through the medium

Lotze as  
criticising  
the high  
pretensions  
of thought.

of which the plurality of sense contents going to the structure of an object is gripped in one act or in one span of thought content. But this is to introduce thought into the very structure of reality and to make it the revealing principle of all existence. Lotze never proceeds any further with the nature of intuitive thought and its relation to formal thought. One would have expected him to have made formal thought take its criteria from intuitive thought. He does not do so, but maintains that formal thought is given its task, and therefore must be judged, by reference to the ideals and purposes which the active and appreciative sides of our nature set up for us in relation to reality.

Roots of  
the view  
that the  
æsthetic  
side of our  
nature is  
of more  
importance  
than the  
intellectual.

The setting up of the æsthetic side of our consciousness as being of more importance than the intellectual side had been given very great impetus by the Romantic School, and more especially in the cultural movement emanating from Schiller. Schiller defines beauty as 'freedom in phenomenal appearance.'<sup>1</sup> He seeks to show that in the beautiful we have an apprehension of the object which reveals it as free or creative. This led the members of this school to subordinate both intellect and morality to the artistic side of life, and to maintain that the highest aim of a person was to order his life so that it should appear a thing of beauty; hence the vogue of what was then known as 'The Beautiful Soul.' Herbart took the same view as regards the moral and æsthetic consciousness, and for him morals became an affair of taste. To seek for the deepest side of reality and conduct in beauty is to throw over the intelligence as capable of revealing the full nature of reality. Herbart expressly does this. He maintains that logic is purely formal, and in doing so he denies to thought any real significance. It is from this line of development that we have Lotze's theory as to the purely formal character of thought.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Windleband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 600.

## IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY   xxiii

The task that awaited Lotze after having thrown over thought as a real principle was to find some other real principle. Logically, it would seem that he should have turned first to the will and finally to the feelings as revealing this principle in greater and greater clearness. Both Schelling, in his later doctrine, and Schopenhauer turned to the will in this respect. In all these points of view, however, the transcendental method is involved, which seeks for principles of reality on the high *a priori* way. Lotze refuses to take the view that the principles which reveal to us the nature of the real within our experience, and also the nature of the bonds which hold this real together, are to be found in the nature of either the intelligence, or the will, or feeling as such. He considers that to adopt this point of view is to seek to deduce the concrete from the abstract—an altogether impossible procedure. In his lectures on the History of German Philosophy since Kant, writing against the position of Schelling, he says, 'When Schelling seeks nevertheless to deduce from this principle (namely that of the absolute) the real nature, the forms of its creations and the occurrences following from this nature, then it is clear from the very first that the attempt must fail. From such abstract conceptions, which up to the present we possess concerning the absolute, we can at the most deduce as postulates only certain general forms of existence and occurrence, which must be realised in any world, whatever its constitution, so that the purpose of self-objectivication may be attained.'<sup>1</sup> 'If one considers philosophy as a deduction then it will be found full of surreptitions, and what it concludes will not be found to follow from its premises or starting point.'<sup>2</sup>

Lotze's search for a real principle in place of thought.

We must seek for the roots of Lotze's scepticism as to the real function of thought. In all our experience there is a double moment. Every content contains an aspect of necessity which can be revealed

Lotze's scepticism as to thought finds its justification in Leibnitz.

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophie*, p. 54.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 55.

by analysis, and it also contains a moment of contingency which is traced through the relations in which that content stands to other contents. Leibnitz had brought out this double moment in our knowledge. He had laid it down as a fundamental principle that a thing must be self-consistent before it can be considered as real, its self-consistency being the ground of its possibility. Logical analysis not only reveals this non-contradiction as being involved in the reality of an object, but it also shows us why such non-contradiction is thus involved, in that it brings out certain fundamental and necessary truths in accordance with which all existence must be constituted. These truths are eternal, and are dependent upon the understanding of God. At the same time, however, our knowledge presents to us another side. We may give expression to a truth about the content of reality, and fail to find its ground in self-consistency or non-contradiction. We may say, for instance, grass is green. If we consider such a truth there is no contradiction involved in its opposite. The ground of this truth is determined by referring its content to other contents beyond itself, and is not fully revealed until all the content of reality is finally set forth as a single system. The nature of this system is not determined by eternal or necessary truth, but by the principle of the Good, which constitutes itself the sufficient reason for all that is thus determined. Things exist in just this system because by so doing they realise the best of all possible worlds, and God wills that this world shall come into existence. Undoubtedly, there is difficulty in understanding how these principles of non-contradiction and of sufficient reason are related. True, both have their source in God, but Leibnitz never tried to find out how God's will and His understanding are moments in the unity of His nature. What the Post-Kantian Idealistic school tried to do was to render both these principles one by main-

taining that all unity follows from the structure of reality. They dropped Leibnitz's conception of the contingent as determining to some extent the nature of the fundamental unity of reality. But Kant himself had failed to get rid of contingency. In his 'Critique of Pure Reason' the material of sense pushes itself into mind or into the structure of reason from an outside source. In his 'Critique of Practical Reason' individual souls assert their freedom, and demand to be unified in a community of souls. Kant asserted that the principles which render such a community possible are those of reason; but by doing so he only stated what was essentially a new problem, namely, as to the form which reason or thought could take when it is considered not as logical or intellectual, but as ethical. The development through Fichte and Hegel had neglected this side of Kant's philosophy. The aim of these thinkers had been to get rid of the contingency in the world of existence and occurrence rather than in the world of moral activity. The reinsistence upon personality as creative of its own life at least, and as also being effective in shaping the world of existence, led back to Kant's problem as to how the reason that manifests itself in moral activity is related to the reason that manifests itself in mere existence. This was the problem of the relation between Leibnitz's law of contradiction and law of sufficient reason, and Lotze follows Leibnitz in maintaining that these principles are different and not to be reduced to one and the same principle. Once having admitted that there is involved within existence itself a creative principle, which is not that of thought or intelligence, but of morality, the way is opened to pluralism. It is impossible to view the ethical principles as on a par with the intellectual principles involved in reality. Through the medium of moral principles reality is shaped so as to be organic to moral endeavour. Such principles, therefore, must proceed from



centres of creative activity, and must be the expression of the souls of these centres. The development from Kant, through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel, had gone to show the impossibility of conceiving intellectual principles as constitutive of reality, without taking into account a supreme intelligence of which these principles are the manifestation. In the light of this development it would be impossible to admit moral principles, except as being borne by, and set into activity through the medium of, either a real or reals which are of the nature of souls. The task before Lotze, then, is that of finding such real principles in opposition to what he regards as the abstract principles of the Idealistic School.

Lotze and  
Herbart.

Now Herbart had dealt with the same problem. He held that reality is shaped through the medium of real agents acting in relation one to another. Lotze, therefore, turns to the philosophy of Herbart in order to find the ultimate reals from which and to which all activity proceeds.

Von Hartmann maintains that 'Lotze seeks the task of philosophy as that of finding a synthesis between the thesis of Hegelian Idealism and the antithesis of Herbartian Realism, a synthesis, however, which in most points stands nearer the thesis than the antithesis.'<sup>1</sup> Herbart's metaphysics centre round the Kantian problem of the Thing in Itself. Kant's philosophy commenced with the Thing in Itself as an unconditioned something exercising a casual activity in relation to ourselves, and through this activity giving rise to the moment of sense in our experience. In the course of his thought, however, he came to regard the Thing in Itself as an ideal, the realisation of which in the content of our experience was an end which our consciousness sets before itself. The Thing in Itself was thus a condition of our experience in the first instance, and also something to the perfection of which our experience moved.

<sup>1</sup> *Lotze's Philosophie*, p. 35.

It became the Transcendental object, that is the object as fully and adequately determined by the conditions which self-consciousness imposes upon our knowledge of it. The conditions, however, were considered by the Idealists as emanating from a single principle determined by the nature of the Transcendental ego, or the self-consciousness, involved in all experience whatsoever. They held that while the objects, although fully determined, are considered by us as real, yet their reality is but phenomenal. At the same time, that which determines these conditions is real; hence the development in their systems towards the theory of the Absolute as the only real. Furthermore, Hegel's Dialectic had given prominence to the logical principle of non-contradiction. In the Absolute, according to him, all contradictions are lost; the logical development from being to non-being and to becoming, and so on, is directed towards the setting aside of the contradictions that reveal themselves in inadequate views of the nature of our experience. It may be said that Hegel made the principle of non-contradiction the ultimate principle of reality. The result of this was that the Absolute, in which this principle centred, became unknowable. Herbart takes this principle of non-contradiction and interprets it in a pluralistic manner after the fashion of Leibnitz. Leibnitz had held that this principle is the condition of the essence or the possibility of a thing. The reality of a thing, however, he held to be determined by that thing's relations to other things in the systematic unity characteristic of the best of all possible worlds; that is to say, by the principle of sufficient reason. Herbart drops the principle of sufficient reason as being determinant of the ultimate nature of that which is real, and keeps the principle of non-contradiction. But with this principle alone the same fate overtakes him as overtook Hegel, namely, that every real determined by it becomes at once unknowable. Herbart

therefore has to bring back the principle of sufficient reason. He makes it the principle determining the manifestation which reality assumes when it appears in our experience.

Herbart's  
theory of  
the nature  
of reality.

We must now take a nearer view of Herbart's position. He maintains that every object which manifests itself in our experience has its ground in a real determined by the principle of non-contradiction. 'Wieviel Schein, soviel Hindeutung auf Sein,'—that is to say, wherever there is an appearance, there is a real behind it. He contends also that the plurality which manifests itself in experience points to a plurality of reals as lying at the basis of experience. In our experience we have the appearances of things each of which comes before us as a unity, and as nevertheless possessing a plurality of properties; furthermore, we have the appearances of things each of which remains the same while its properties undergo change. These are the great contradictions which our experience sets us to solve. The task of metaphysics, therefore, is that of determining how the real, which underlies all phenomena, manifests itself of necessity as a contradiction of this or that kind. No single real, Herbart contends, could thus issue in a manifestation or appearance in which there is such contradiction, because from a single real we could not understand how a multiplicity of states and changes could issue. If that which is one were of itself to become a manifold it would, he maintains, become contradictory within itself, and this would be a contradiction. There must therefore be a plurality of reals, and it must be from the relations in which they stand to one another that the contradictions, which the manifestation of each reveals to us, must issue.

Lotze's  
criti-  
cism of  
Herbart's  
views.

There are two points of fundamental importance in connection with Herbart's theory; the first is as to the nature of these fundamental reals which are at the back of all phenomena, the second is as to the

nature of the relations between them, which relations give rise to the varied play of phenomena. The unconditioned being of the Hegelian Absolute is predicted of each of these reals. Each is considered as being independent both of us and of every other; indeed we ourselves, in the last resort, are each such an independent real; again, each of these reals rests within itself. Each real therefore is what it is, out of relation to everything else. This conception, however, at once makes the real unknown and unknowable; it makes it a mere absolute position capable of carrying qualities but which itself is not a quality, nor is its being determined by qualities. Lotze fastens upon this aspect of Herbart's theory and criticises it very severely. Herbart maintained that Being could never be known except through a qualitative content; we can never know a 'that' without a 'what.' But now argues Lotze, 'When anyone asks, what is the being of that which exists, he expects to be told that it is a content which can only be understood as substantial, which can be thought of only as a subject never as a predicate. If we answer him that the being of that which exists consists of quality, then he has only received an answer to the question as to *how* being exists, and this answer consists in giving us a content which can be thought of only as a predicate, never as a subject. Between the "What" which has been asked for and the "How" which has been given in reply there stands a great gulf, which the older metaphysic pointed to through the difference between Quiddity and Quality, and sought to bridge through the supposition of a substantial in the substance, which should dispense with the real subject, this first point of relationship for the mere relation conception of quality.'<sup>1</sup>

'If this "What" is no more than the "How" of quality, then we have no content which, according to Herbart's own demands, can carry absolute position,

<sup>1</sup> Herbart's 'Ontologie,' *Kleine Schriften*, vol. i. pp. 114, 115.

and quality will always seek a something upon which to fasten, and a something which it will everywhere fail to find.'<sup>1</sup> Lotze takes it as self-evident that there must be a real within our experience which will explain its phenomenal character. He considers also, with Herbart, that this real must be, in the first instance at all events, of the nature of a plurality. He maintains further, quite as Herbart had done, that this real must rest in itself. But he will not hold with Herbart's view that this ultimately real is an unknowable something behind experience. He seeks to correct Herbart's view in this respect by maintaining that a thing is what it *becomes*; that is, a thing is what it manifests itself as being in the manifold of relations in which it finds itself. To be, he maintains, is to stand in relations, and these relations enter into their terms and constitute their being. Here Lotze moves away from Herbart's crude realism towards the position of Leibnitz, making the principle of sufficient reason determinant of the nature of the real itself. He also approaches Kant's position—namely, that the full reality of an object is what that object is as fully and adequately determined.

Lotze as  
finding  
his real  
principle  
in the  
Leibnitzian  
monad.

Since all the determinations of an object are constitutive of its reality there must be, Lotze maintains, a moment of unity which can hold all determinations within itself so as to constitute it a real object. Neither the absolute position of Herbart nor the logical necessity of Kant is adequate to this function of unity. Lotze therefore turns again to the philosophy of Leibnitz and finds what he is seeking in Leibnitz's theory that the monad is of the nature of a soul. The Leibnitzian monad possessed what the Herbartian real did not possess, namely, the power of holding together plurality in unity; it also possessed the impulse to activity and change, which are quite inexplicable in respect of

<sup>1</sup> Herbart's 'Ontologie,' *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 1 pp. 114, 115.

Herbart's reals. It was further considered as the subject of states, these states being predicates of the subject. The logical activity of the Kantian school had directed attention to the fundamental conditions under which alone unity within the content of experience is possible. Now on this idealistic view it was held that the relation between a subject and its predicates must be logically determined, and that the principle of non-contradiction must be the determining factor in the relationship. This view had undoubtedly influenced Herbart when he maintained that only what is non-contradictory can be real, a view which led him to banish from his ultimate reals all that made them knowable. Lotze makes the logical subject identical with a psychological subject, and abandons the principle of non-contradiction as the ruling principle in effecting the unity in plurality that is involved in the relation between the subject and its states. Consciousness itself, he maintains, can and does hold together in unity a plurality, irrespective of contradiction or non-contradiction. Logical principles are at once abandoned as being fundamental principles of reality. Herbart's interpretation of the Kantian logic as being ruled by a principle of non-contradiction or identity, which reveals itself through analysis, had meant an entire breakdown of the Idealistic logic as being adequate to reality. Such an interpretation made the Kantian *a posteriori* truth depend entirely upon the *a priori* truth, and at the same time never revealed the *a priori* as being synthetic in relation to the *a posteriori*. Undoubtedly, it is an exceedingly difficult matter to understand how the contingent material of sense is related to the structural principles which render that material a systematic whole. Thought, as ruled by the principle of non-contradiction, does not enable us to understand this relation; hence Lotze's contention that wherever there is a unity in plurality, or a systematic whole of content,

there is always a ground of unity which thought strives to reveal, though it always fails to do so. It is but a step from this to the position that thought has nothing to do with the constitution of reality; and Lotze takes this step. Undoubtedly, he had been prepared for it by the development in the Kantian philosophy upon which he fastened, namely, that the creative side of our nature as manifested in morality and art has the last word in constituting the full systematisation of our experience. Once having separated thought from reality Lotze has the very difficult task of showing what exactly is the relationship that exists between them. The content of reality shows itself as capable of being represented under logical forms, of admitting of comparison through logical activity on our part, and its structure admits of being expressed through the medium of a corresponding logical structure in our mediate knowledge of it. Lotze holds that this relationship between thought and reality is ultimate and inexplicable. He characterises it as an ultimate validity which belongs to thought. Things exist, he maintains, and ideas are valid of what exists. He hints that there must be some final unity in which both existence and validity are one because the source of thought and the source of existence must be the same. But he never seeks for this source. Once having converted the logical subject into a psychological soul, and having postulated a plurality of such souls as lying at the basis of reality, thought becomes a mere subjective method by means of which the individual soul adjusts itself to the sphere of reality in which it finds itself. But the whole success of such adjustment depends upon this, namely, that the principles of thought are the principles by means of which reality, through our activity, constitutes itself a systematic whole. Undoubtedly the development of Idealism had led to the view that there is one thought and therefore one thinker, namely, the

## IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY xxxiii

Absolute. Lotze revolted against this, and while he could not dispense with the oneness of thought, he considered that the plurality of thinkers necessitated the abandonment of thought as constitutive of reality. That which became constitutive of reality was the relations in which individual souls stand to one another, and these are not thought relations.

Lotze's task is now that of determining how souls are related to one another so as to form the whole of ultimate reality. The first problem that faces him is as to where within the content of reality, as it manifests itself in our experience, we are to find the souls which are constitutive of that reality. Leibnitz had had to face the same problem. He tried to solve it by maintaining that we have to divide extended matter to infinity; having done so, we shall find that we have certain unextended points which, by their resistance to one another, prescribe places for each other, and so give rise to extended matter. Herbart's absolute positions, or reals, are the same thing over again. Lotze himself follows Leibnitz in seeking souls at the back of extended matter. At the same time he is somewhat aware that such a procedure is doomed to failure. Such souls can possess no content and no life which can give them any fullness of being; they are mere empty points, and indeed it is impossible to see how they can even be points. Lotze therefore modifies this position somewhat, maintaining that what our ordinary perception reveals to us as things are objects, each of which is a unity of sense qualities, and as such a soul. But here again the difficulty arises of marking off what are qualitative wholes and what are not, and Lotze never really solves the difficulty.

Lotze as concerned with the problem of the union of souls.

Another great problem now presents itself. Having started with a plurality the task is set of determining how each member of that plurality comes to a knowledge of the whole, or how the whole comes to live, however inadequately, in the experience

Starting with a plurality the problem of knowledge becomes insistent.



of each member of the plurality. Leibnitz had sought to solve this problem by maintaining that each monad represents, from its own point of view and in its own degree of adequacy, the whole system of monads. The lower monads are capable of only a vague and confused representation, the higher of a clearer and more adequate representation. The degree of adequacy of representation fixes the place of each monad in the system. Furthermore, the nature of this system is determined by the different degrees in which each member represents the whole. Thus the whole is dependent upon the parts, and the parts are dependent upon the whole. The best way of illustrating this relationship is by taking the number series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, &c. Here we have an infinite whole. If we perform any operation upon these numbers, for example, if we double them, we have a series 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, &c., which is contained as part of the first series and which is itself infinite. We can have any number of such series as part of the first number series. Each will represent the whole, each is part of the whole, and the whole is constituted by an infinity of such series. Now Leibnitz's theory of the relation between the monads and the whole represented by each of the monads demanded a very close interdependence between the whole and its constitutive monads. But Leibnitz made each monad develop its own life independently of the other monads. This, however, is to make the monads exist independently and prior to the whole which they represent. At the same time, the fact that their whole existence is bound up with their representation of the whole makes that whole prior to the parts. The whole system of monads does not exert any real influence upon each individual monad. The whole, therefore, cannot determine the place of each individual monad within it; nor can the individual monad act in the whole so as to have a direct influence in fixing the place of other

monads in relation to itself as a member of the whole. In order to solve this difficulty Leibnitz postulates the existence of the Divine Being as the highest of all monads. It is His life which all monads represent in different degrees of adequacy, and it is He who is directly responsible for the continuity that exists throughout these differing degrees, thus rendering the world a systematic whole.

Now Herbart saw that the monads, which are constitutive of ultimate reality, must be related to one another so as to form a system, the parts of which are dependent upon the whole and the whole upon the parts. He saw, also, that the relations between the monads must be the determining factor in the nature, the unity, and the degree of adequacy in representation with which each monad represents the whole. We have seen Herbart postulating the existence of a plurality of reals as lying at the basis of existence. We have seen further how he denies to them all determinations by which we can know them. He holds, however, that in the relations in which the reals stand to one another, each real is disturbed by the others that exist together with it; it must, therefore, maintain itself against disturbance, and in so doing give rise to difference and change.

Herbart's  
advance  
upon  
Leibnitz.

Where the real that is disturbed is a soul, the difference and change that take place within it as a result of an act of self-maintenance, manifest themselves as a presentation or idea. The multiplicity and the order and unity in these ideas is the mirror of the multiplicity and order in the relations existing in the real world which acts upon the soul so as to cause it to produce these presentations. But all this involves an order in the relations between the reals which has been imposed upon them, and is in its nature purposive. Herbart calls in the Divine Being as the source of this order. He really falls back upon Leibnitz's highest monad as that which, from its will, orders the whole of reality. Starting

with a plurality Lotze has the same problem to solve, and he tries to solve it in the same way as Herbart and Leibnitz had done. His views on this point are most clearly expressed in his theory as to the nature of space. He holds that only what is individual is real. Space does not present itself to us as an individual; it only claims to be a principle of systematisation or combination existing amongst the various elements that are in space. Further, he holds that between the real but non-spacial world and the spacial world there is a point-to-point correspondence. The ground of every spacial relation existing between the objects of our perception consists of an intellectual relation existing between realities themselves. 'We regard a system of relations between the realities, unspacial, inaccessible to perception, and purely intelligible, as the fact which lies at the root of our spacial perceptions. When these objective relations are translated into the subjective language of our consciousness, each of them finds its counterpart in one definite spacial image to the exclusion of all others.'<sup>1</sup>

Lotze's account of the way in which the relations between the members of an ultimate plurality give rise to knowledge.

We have now to ask how this intelligible world gives rise to this representation of itself in each soul. The world of reality, Lotze maintains, consists of minds or souls, which are in reciprocal action with one another; this interaction of all upon each produces in each soul a series of images and impressions. The soul organises these images in a spacial order, and thus the whole produces in each soul a spacial representation of itself. Each soul, however, is not merely representative of the whole which affects it, but it is also a part of that whole and has a unique place in it. It is this uniqueness of position in the whole which gives to each thing its position in the spacial whole in which it is represented, and which causes each soul to see the world somewhat differently

<sup>1</sup> *System of Metaphysics*, Bk. ii Chap. i. sec. 116 (Eng. trans., 2nd edit., vol. i p. 203).

from others. Furthermore, these intellectual relations which belong to reality are continually changing, and their changes are manifested in the space world as movement in space. The only difference between this view and that of Herbart is that Lotze interprets the Herbartian 'together' as active reciprocal action.

But yet when Lotze comes to consider what these intellectual relations are which bring unity to that which lies at the basis of the content of experience, he is thrown back upon principles of unity involved in our actual experience as it presents itself to us. All relations, he maintains, are states of their terms. This must be the case with those intellectual relations existing between the realities lying at the basis of experience. Relations are in reality 'direct reactions which things are subject to from each other and (which they) experience as inner states of themselves.' These our perception 'spins out into a semblance of extension,' when the things which react upon one another at the same time react upon ourselves so as to call forth our perception. But, and here is the important point, these direct reactions or reciprocal actions are the basis of the unity of law which characterises the content of our experience and are a moment in this experience as phenomenal. Leibnitz, Herbart, and Lotze fail to get behind experience in their search for ultimate realities of the nature of souls, and they fail in the same way and for the same reason. They all sought to show that the individual builds up in his own soul an experience which is representative of that which is beyond him, and which merely indicates the nature of that reality lying thus beyond him. But experience refuses to be representative of reality; it claims to be reality.

Lotze saw the necessity for finding some form of unity for the pluralism with which he started. This pluralism was essentially Leibnitzian, and the problem of its unity is therefore for Lotze, as for Leibnitz,

Lotze's  
conception  
of God  
and His  
relation to  
the world.

the problem as to the nature of God and His relation to the world. Von Hartmann lays particular stress upon this side of Lotze's philosophy, maintaining that Lotze is to be considered as the thinker who, more than anyone else, propounded a theory of knowledge that would fit in with the Theism of the school of Schleiermacher, Weisse, J. H. Fichte, Fechner, Ulrici, and so on. In his introduction to the 'Mikrokosmos' Lotze sets out to defend the validity of our religious consciousness, and to demand that the ideas of God, of freedom, and also the principles of religious faith shall be given their due place in any construction of reality. Undoubtedly the Idealistic development had banished God as He was conceived by religious minds. By no stretch of faith could one worship the Idealists' Absolute as a personal God who can stand in communion with us His children. Another sphere of thought which had banished God was the scientific. Science could find no room for God. Lotze therefore asks the question as to whether or not there is within our experience an aspect with which science cannot deal, but which is the proper sphere of faith. Lotze had made law universal, but at the same time comparatively superficial. Beneath law, Lotze holds, and therefore beneath scientific constructions, there are hidden depths which reveal themselves in our moral consciousness and in feeling. From the needs of our moral consciousness and from our feeling of the worth of life we arrive at a knowledge of God which makes Him 'that will, whose content and modes of procedure are comprehended in our reflection as the intrinsically Good.'<sup>1</sup> We also see individual finite spirits as children of God; and actuality, not as a mere course of the world, but as a kingdom of God. Lotze has sought to refute science as against faith, not by limiting science to a certain part of reality, but by giving science full sway over the whole of it,

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, sec. 80 (Eng. trans., p. 137).

yet at the same time revealing a deeper side or meaning as belonging to that reality over which science can only make a partial pronouncement. This point of view of Lotze is really an appeal backwards to Kant's 'Practical Reason' as revealing to us a side of reality with which our theoretical reason cannot deal. The justification for God and for our faith in regard to Him is made through an appeal to reason as universal, and as welling up not merely in intellect but in morality and art. But when it comes to determining God's nature, and His relation to the material world and to ourselves, Lotze turns from this point of view, and connects himself with the speculative demands which are made by pluralism. Here the development of Lotze's thought is carried out through the Leibnitzian philosophy.

Leibnitz sought to harmonise the unity of the world with the existence of a plurality of substantial beings. He does not maintain that this unity is God, but that its source is in God. He tells us that God is the source of possibility or of the eternal truths, and that he is also the source of what is real in the possible. The realm of possibility, or the system of eternal truths, is a system of laws which governs the actual world in so far as it does not involve a reference to time. The course of events thus involves a unity of existence and a unity of law, and by the side of these there is also required a plurality of substances.

The Leibnitzian unity of all things in reference to God.

How, then, can these be harmonised? Leibnitz seeks to avoid Spinozism by maintaining that the monads do not exist *in* God. This seems to imply that the unity is outside of that which it is intended to unify, and that God is a *Deus ex machina*. Thus we find him saying: 'I admit that there is no Platonic soul of the world, for God is beyond the world, *extra-mundana intelligentia*, or rather *supra-mundana*.'<sup>1</sup> At the same time he holds that God

<sup>1</sup> *New Essays* (Eng. trans. by Langley), p. 382.

is everywhere. 'God alone has a distinct knowledge of all, for He is the source of all. It has been very well said that as a centre He is everywhere, but His circumference is nowhere, for everything is immediately present to Him without any distance from His centre.'<sup>1</sup> Yet he seeks to make it quite clear that all these monads which are present to God are yet distinct from Him. He speaks of 'Some erring Quietists, who imagine an absorption of the soul and its reunion with the ocean of Divinity, a notion which perhaps my system alone shows to be clearly impossible.'<sup>2</sup> It is by His presence to each of the monads that God is considered as being the source of their unity. What then, we must ask, is the nature of this presence? Leibnitz tells us that each monad is a mirror of God in that it has a content and organisation of the same kind as God's, but with a lesser degree of perfection. Again, he maintains that God stands to bare monads or to the material world as an engineer to his machine, and that he stands to souls as a prince to his subjects, or a father to his children. There is also another relation between God and the monads which has to be taken into consideration. God is conceived of as the creator of the life of the monads; His power is the source of all; His knowledge is the source of those principles of organisation which exist in the world and are expressed in the eternal truths; through His will he produces changes in the world according to the principle of the Best. God therefore acts upon each monad, and in doing so throws His nature, or His personality, into that monad according to the degree of perfection which He wishes realised there. By adapting each monad to Himself He indirectly adapts every monad to every other monad, and so system is realised in the world. Leibnitz says, 'It is He (God) alone who determines them (monads)

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Nature and of Grace* (Eng. trans. by Latta), p. 420.

<sup>2</sup> *New Essays* (Eng. trans. by Latta), p. 383

*from without* by His influence, and if to act is to determine directly, it may be said that God alone acts upon me, and He alone causes me to do good or ill, other substances contributing only because of His determinations; because God, who takes all things into consideration, distributes His bounties and compels created beings to accommodate themselves to one another. Thus God alone constitutes the relation or communication between substances. It is through Him that the phenomena of the one meet and accord with the phenomena of the other, so that these may be a reality in our perceptions.' <sup>1</sup>

There are several points of very great difficulty in Leibnitz's idea of God and of His relation to the world. In the first place, God possesses will, power, and knowledge. His knowledge is the system of eternal law; His power is the force and activity through which these laws are realised in the actual world; His will is the source of events as constituting the world of finite things and movements which realises the Best. To maintain that each of the monads has power and will and understanding, and that God, by acting upon the monads, gives to each the degree of perfection which its power and will and understanding are called upon to realise, is to make God's life come to realisation and fullness in the monads; it is also to deprive the monads of all life and of all content apart from God. In the second place, in giving to each monad the characteristics of power, will, and knowledge, and also the activity with which it organises its own life, Leibnitz gives to it a freedom which he at once takes from it when he makes God responsible for its degree of perfection, responsible for the laws according to which it must move, and for the particular best which it is called upon to realise. Leibnitz cannot clearly define the relation between God and the monads. He wishes to make God all in all, yet at the same time to give

The diff-  
culty of  
Leibnitz's  
theory.

<sup>1</sup> *Discourse on Metaphysics* (Eng. trans.), pp. 54 and 55.



each of the monads absolute freedom and self-sufficiency. He defines this relationship by metaphors which continually break down. He is driven time after time to sink the monads in the life of God, only to withdraw this view as soon as it breaks out.

Lotze's  
solution  
of these  
difficulties.

What Lotze does is to try to harmonise these two movements in Leibnitz's idea of God, namely, of God as the highest of monads, and also as the unity pervading all things. Lotze substitutes in the place of a correspondence between monads the conception of reciprocal action. He maintains that this reciprocal action requires a unity in which all things exist. He further holds that this unity is the life of a single substantial being. Having made his unity substantial he is in danger of losing the individuality of each of the plurality of substances constituting the unity. To avoid this he gives to this unity, which he identifies with God, a personal existence which is not shared by the finite selves, and the finite selves an inner life which is not shared by the Divine Being. One of his arguments for the Personality of God is drawn from the implications of acting and suffering. A dead, lifeless, and impersonal thing cannot be said either to act or to suffer. When we say that a thing acts we imply that its changes are the result of its own nature; when it suffers, that its nature wards off a change which the action of something else strives to produce in it. We can only think of such action and suffering as desire and aversion followed by felt efforts, and hence as the action and suffering of a self. The ultimate, real Being, which is the ground of all things, is essentially active, and in its single activity is to be found the ground for the multiplicity of change which takes place in finite beings. Lotz concludes, therefore, that this Being must have a personal existence in that its action demands a living experience of itself. But this God is in reality nothing more than the whole of material existence. True, this whole has been

given personality, but the personality involved is not that which our religious consciousness demands of God; something far deeper than this is required. Lotze therefore carries the argument a step further, and maintains that there is an ultimate goodness, beauty, and wisdom which pervade all things. These attributes, he maintains, have no existence of their own in some kind of isolated splendour, neither do they belong to what is dead and lifeless. Furthermore, they are one in their existence. Coupling these premises he arrives at the conclusion that their existence takes form in the life of a Personal Being, which is the ground of all that is. The Personal Being which is the unity of the material universe is identified with the Personal Being in whose life the highest Good takes form. This identification is carried out on the tacit assumption that the material universe is subject, throughout its length and breadth, to the play of moral forces. But having arrived at the view, through the implications of the Good, that God is present in the world, Lotze now proceeds to separate God from the world. This separation is to some extent seen in his criticisms of the view that God is an eternal world order, an infinite substance, and a self-developing idea. His objection to the first conception turns upon the view that an order is not separable from the ordered material in which it is realised; further, a mere order cannot precede its material as a conditioning and creative force; hence the conception of a world order is not sufficient to give us the idea of an ordering Being possessing personality. He objects to the second view, according to which the Highest Good is adequately conceived as an infinite substance, on the ground that it leads to Pantheism. With Pantheism there would go the denial of an ultimate spirituality as belonging to things, and all freedom and spontaneity would be lost to them. Furthermore, the only properties that would belong to God

would be the merely formal ones of unity, immensity, eternity, and inexhaustible fullness. These attributes, Lotze maintains, do not give us that personality which religion seeks. Against the theory that the Highest Good is a self-developing Idea Lotze maintains that an Idea can only exist as the thought of a Personal Being; hence any ultimate or Highest Idea can only be the most comprehensive thought which the Divine Being as a personality applies to Himself. This criticism seriously misinterprets the Idealists' theory of objective reason, for they did not consider this reason as coming to fruition in the ideas which a mind psychologically presents to itself. From these criticisms it can be seen that Lotze is seeking for a conception of God which will enable us to regard Him as standing beyond, or above, or outside of the world, and ruling it from that vantage point. But Lotze cannot place God in this position as regards the material world. He therefore seeks to place God in this position in reference to the world of souls. Each soul, he maintains, that experiences itself as an individual, possesses by this experience a relative independence, 'which we designate when we say that it is *outside* of God.' This freedom of self-feeling, however, is not enough to ensure for the soul a real freedom. Religious sentiment requires 'that something new also must happen in the world,—something that is not a mere consequence of what has gone before; and that there must exist in individual spirits just this capacity to initiate a new series of events; and therefore, in brief, a freedom of acting or primarily of willing, by which they separate themselves from the universal substance in a still more decided manner than by their mere "Being for Self" as relatively independent beings.'<sup>1</sup>

Each new series of events that is initiated through freedom has to find its place in an ordered world bound down by the laws of nature; hence the

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Religion*, sec 58 (Eng. trans.), pp. 98 and 99

idea of God as a governor both in respect of what takes place in the material world and also of what movements are initiated in the world of spirits. Through the activity of spirits God seeks to realise a certain plan of the world—here we have echoes of Leibnitz's 'Best of all possible worlds.' God therefore induces spirits, by interfering primarily in their inner life, to choose what is of most value, and by so doing to initiate events that will bring His plan to realisation. At the same time God has to see that the laws of nature are not turned aside by the freedom of individual spirits.

This conception of God as ruling the world of events through the world of spirits is not to be reconciled with Lotze's first view of God as the all-embracing substance and the source of all movement in the material world. He maintains that every individual action of every individual thing is carried out in reference to the action of every other thing until finally it is seen to proceed from the whole of reality considered as a single Being. Every event therefore is adequately explained on purely mechanical grounds by reference to the material system. The spiritual interference in the course of the material world is unnecessary and indeed unaccountable. The unity of the material world has given to Lotze a God that is all-comprehensive and all-powerful. The world of spirits has given to him a God who is individual, ruling, and the governor of all that is. But the two Gods cannot be identified as one and the same.

Lotze's insistence that the basis of matter is constituted by a plurality of souls did not raise the material to the spiritual, for the souls of matter do not hold intercourse with the world of spirits. His view that spirits freely act in reference to events so as to guide them to the realisation of a Divine Plan has not really given to the world a spiritual activity, for this guidance of events exists side by side with

the guidance by law and is really unintelligible; law leaves no place for such external guidance. Lotze never investigated the relation between the material and the spiritual, but places one, as it were, on the top of the other. His God as ruling in matter is the Absolute over again. His God as ruling in spirit is Leibnitz's highest of monads. He holds to both, but he cannot make them one.

The roots  
of Lotze's  
theory as  
to the  
univer-  
sality of  
mechanism.

Another point of importance in the philosophy of Lotze is his insistence that mechanism has universal sway and extends even over the course of our mental life. He explains mechanism as including 'every case in which effects are produced by the reciprocal action of different elements, of whatever kind, working in accordance with universal laws.'<sup>1</sup> He illustrates this explanation as follows: 'At every moment, therefore, at which two beings "a" and "b" occur in a certain combination C, this circumstance furnishes the sufficient reason for one, and only one consequence X; and, throughout, if either "a" or "b" or C, or all together, is altered, the alteration of the consequence X into Z, which is necessarily connected therewith, admits of being calculated according to an invariable law.'<sup>2</sup> In inorganic changes the primary elements which interact with one another, and whose interactions can be quantitatively determined according to invariable laws, are the atoms. In the organic world the interacting elements are the parts which go to make up an organism. In our mental life it is undoubtedly difficult to discover what exactly are the interacting elements. Lotze recognises within our mental life a flow of ideas, emotions, and desires. But it is impossible to give to an idea, or an emotion, or a desire, as we give to an atom or a part of an organism, a particular and constant nature, which expresses itself as the same in all the interactions

<sup>1</sup> *System of Metaphysics*, Bk. II. Chap. viii. sec. 227 (Eng. trans., vol. II. p. 188).

<sup>2</sup> *Outlines of Metaphysics* (Eng. trans.), p. 116.

into which it enters. Herbart had tried to do so, and indeed had sought to give to every idea a mathematical value expressive of this constancy of nature. He held that the soul as an ultimate real is disturbed by other ultimate reals. The soul seeks to preserve itself against this disturbance and the result of this preservation is an idea. Ideas which thus arise in the soul disturb and inhibit one another. The course of our mental life is to be explained by the way in which this mutual disturbance and inhibition form themselves into a systematic structure. The soul itself is a mere stage upon which the mutual activities of ideas take place. Furthermore, consciousness arises only when this disturbance reaches a certain degree of intensity. Herbart continually speaks of the strength of ideas, of ideas as pushing one another out of consciousness. Not only so, but he maintains that these degrees of strength ought to be mathematically determined. By means of such mathematical determination and calculation the course of our mental life, he holds, can be fully explained.

In extending mechanism to mental life Lotze was not merely influenced by his own scientific studies in medicine, but also by Herbart's philosophical position as regards this point. At the same time, however, Lotze criticises Herbart in such a way that, as a result of the criticism, his own views concerning the application of mechanism to mental life lose their validity. He holds, as against Herbart, that the soul, as the principle of unity of life, is not a mere stage upon which the reciprocal action between the elements of mental life takes place. The soul is aware of the course of the flow of ideas, and reacts upon it in various ways, the nature of these reactions being determined by the nature of the soul. He says, 'For these elements (i.e. the elements of psychic life) are not independent atoms, but mere states of a single being from which they cannot detach them-

selves. Hence they have not an independent stage, on which to give themselves up undisturbed to their reciprocal actions, subject to nought save the might of a universal mechanism. On the contrary, the very field of their action is even itself capable of stimulation with reference to their subsequent relations. . . . (The soul) feels every moment of the train of ideas, and is roused by this now and then to act itself, and to introduce into its apparently arbitrary play new elements, which cannot be explained from itself alone. This is not absence of order, but that order of a more complicated kind which we have already indicated as possible in general, and which only experience would assure us does not in this form occur in the material world.' <sup>1</sup> By reducing the train of ideas to states of the soul, and by allowing the soul, as a whole, to guide the course of these ideas, in whatever way the guidance may take place, Lotze has virtually given up the principle of mechanism. The essence of the mechanical view consists in reducing the plan of the whole to a result of the reciprocal action of the parts. Lotze recognises this in his arguments against the view that the activity in the organic world is guided by an Idea or a plan of the whole working as an operative principle. He points out that if the reciprocal actions of any of the elements of the whole are destroyed, then the harmony of the whole is at once deranged. Further, speaking of the existence of such an Idea or plan working as a vital force, he says, 'It is not obvious where such a force could be inherent, unless in the sum of living parts and their systematic combinations; it is not obvious how it should come to alter its mode of operation and at each moment to effect what is necessary, so long as we do not suppose that, by regular necessity, it becomes different, and works differently, under altered circumstances, like every force which is the

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. ii. Chap. ii. (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 183).

result of a variety of changeable parts.'<sup>1</sup> Lotze's arguments here point to the conclusion that, in mechanism, the parts determine the whole rather than the whole the parts.

Lotze, however, cannot reduce activity, even in the material world, to the merely mechanical. He is forced to recognise the activity of the whole, as a whole, in reference to the parts. He maintains that the mutual actions of a many can only result in a many, and not in a unity. It is only when there is already a one in the many that the action of a one can be said to arise in the action of a many. This, he says, is seen in mechanics, where many motions or forces give rise to a single resultant force or motion; it is only because the many forces or motions form a single system, and act as a system, that they can produce a single resultant. When we come to mental life the importance of the activity of the whole is still more manifest. 'Thus all the operations of a joint plurality either remain a plurality of separate operations, or become truly fused into one only when transferred to the unity of a being as its states. Of consciousness we can say that, as the energy of an indivisible being, it does render possible the composition of the many into one, but that the unity of consciousness never does spring solely from the mutual action of the many.'<sup>2</sup> This unitary activity does not consist of a compounding into a single whole of the various elements of mental life, just as velocities or forces are compounded into a single velocity or force. It consists rather of an activity which gives to each element its full value, keeping it quite distinct from the other elements which go to make up the course of mental life, and yet at the same time relating it to those other elements. This higher mechanism consists, therefore, in allowing every element of our life to act

<sup>1</sup> *Microkosmos*, Bk i. Chap. 11 (Eng. trans., vol. 1 p. 74).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk ii. Chap. 1. (Eng. trans., vol. 1 p. 161)



## 1 LOTZE'S PLACE IN PHILOSOPHY

fully and adequately from its own nature and relating natures through their harmony into a separate whole. But the whole problem now assumes a different complexion, for the soul is that which seeks to discover harmony and to rule affairs through harmony. It at once becomes clear that the principles of harmony are the unitary principles; and also that that moment which is directed to discovering harmony, and bringing harmonious nature to harmonious nature, is the active element. Lotze is driven back to find the force and meaning of this harmony as the fullness and significance which things have for a Divine Life. God therefore becomes the ruler of the universe, and mechanism comes to play a very subordinate part indeed.

# LOTZE'S THEORY OF REALITY

## CHAPTER I

### REALITY AS LAW

PHILOSOPHY certainly begins with the question 'What is reality?' But the various answers which have been given to this question in the course of philosophical speculation make it impossible for anyone to ask it in its simplicity. We arrive upon different forms of it, each form carrying within itself philosophical points of view which are the results of speculative theories already worked out. The two main forms which this question as to the nature of reality has taken are—'What is reality in and for itself?' and 'What is reality as it exists for us'? When we ask as to the nature of reality in itself, then we seek to construct reality; when we ask as to the nature of reality as it manifests itself to us, then we seek merely to define reality. The first question deals with the thing in itself or the noumenal, whereas the second question deals with what is known as the phenomenal. Since Kant it has been customary to leave the thing in itself alone and to maintain that philosophy cannot construct reality as it is for itself, but that its task begins and ends with reality as it is for us, that is, with the phenomenal. Lotze adopts this point of view, maintaining that what he seeks to do, in his theory of reality, is to define and not to construct reality. Believing that we experience reality, or that reality manifests itself in our experience, whether as it exists

(a) Questions as to the nature of Reality.

for itself or not, matters not—believing this, he seeks to show that what we have to do in order to know it is to be able to point to it. He maintains that when he constructs a theory of reality all he does is to give us a definition of it as it exists in our experience, so that we shall be able to point to it there. Whether or not he keeps to this point of view is a matter which will be seen in the sequel.

(2) Reality  
as made up  
of three  
ultimate  
aspects.

He tells us that in our experience reality is seen to be made up of three sides; we think of things as existing, of events as taking place, and of truths as being valid; neither of these sides can be reduced to the other, nor are they spheres cut off from one another. This inter-dependence is easily seen in the case of existence and occurrence; or, as it is sometimes called, of being and becoming. We see that an object exists, and that yet in its very existence it is the subject of continual change. It is more difficult to see how validity is bound up with the reality of an object; indeed, Lotze does not definitely say that a thing in order to be real must possess some measure of validity; yet his contention that reality is not separate in these three spheres or divisions implies that a thing must possess validity or truth of some kind before it can be considered as real. We, as outsiders, make certain judgments about things, and in our judgments is to be found truth or falsity; further, the contents of these judgments become formed into a systematic whole which we call the system of truth, and it is in this system that validity, which is seemingly independent of existence, rests. If, however, validity is a constitutive moment of the reality of an object, then somehow or another something of the nature of judgment must belong to the nature of the object itself. This problem as to how judgment enters into the nature of a thing and becomes constitutive of its reality concerns itself with the relations in which a thing stands to other things, and more especially in its

relation to ourselves, for it is in these relations that the thing comes to possess validity. However, we must leave this problem to be worked out later.

It is in the material world that reality first manifests itself to us ; indeed it is often the case that we think of this world as real even if nothing else is real. Lotze therefore commences his analysis of the nature of reality by an examination of the nature of the material world. In this material world, he tells us, we come into contact with reality through the medium of sensation, a real thing consisting of the grouping of a plurality of sense qualities. The sense contents which go to make up the constitution of a thing are continually changing, one content, seemingly, being exchanged for another ; this change takes place in a regular way, thus giving us the idea that it is a change according to law. It is this existence of a principle of change amongst a group of sense qualities which gives rise to the conception of a thing as something having permanence ; the thing is now considered as the subject of change, and the sense qualities taking part in the change are considered as the attributes of this subject. Each particular subject has its own particular series of changes taking place in a form of regularity peculiar to that subject alone and thus being governed by the particular law of the subject's being. The nature of a real thing is thus seen to consist in this regularity of change within a certain range of sense qualities. Lotze says, ' Thus it may be stated as a general truth, that our idea of that which makes a thing what it is consists only in the thought of a certain regularity with which it changes to and fro within a limited circle of states whether spontaneously or under visible external conditions, without passing out of this circle, and without ever having an existence on its own account and apart from any one of the forms which within this circle it can assume.'<sup>1</sup> It is

Reality as manifesting itself in the material world.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, Bk. i. Chap. iii. sec. 26.

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not that a thing has some underlying reality which makes it real, but that it is what we call real only as it manifests this characteristic of regularity of change taking place in the grouping of its sense qualities as a closed system. We see then that the reality of a thing combines together being and becoming—for the law of change constitutes the abiding element and serves to give unity, permanence, and identity to the thing, and it is in these that we find the being or existence of the thing. The fact of change as entering into the nature of the thing shows us this existence in a continual state of becoming; indeed only through this idea of becoming can existence be defined.

The nature  
of law as  
a principle  
of Reality.

From what has been said, it can be seen that the constitution of what we call a real thing implies, on the one hand, a changing content, and on the other hand a law which regulates this change; and it is this law of change that gives to the thing its reality. The question now arises as to how we are to understand this term 'law' in order that it may be intelligible as a principle of reality. Now this term is used both in the positive sciences and in morals, jurisprudence, and religion. The positive sciences have to do with the discovery and formulation of laws, whereas morals, jurisprudence, and religion have to do with the laying down of them. The positive sciences seek to bring all reality under the conception of law; in doing this they have a certain aim or purpose, and it is from this aim that the term law, as used by them, takes its meaning. We are told that it is the aim of science to know reality; that is to say, it seeks to bring it within the grasp of the human intelligence; now the characteristic of our intelligence is that it seeks to find order in things, and as soon as it does this it professes to understand that in which the order is seen to exist. Laws are the abstract expressions used by the intelligence in order to hold in its grasp the order which it finds in reality.

A law thus combines within itself a subjective and an objective moment; for it contains an element derived from ourselves as standing, to a certain extent, independent of reality and seeing it as an ordered whole, and also an element from reality itself, as being ordered. For the purpose of summing up the order which holds in reality we use what we call a generalisation.<sup>1</sup> This consists of an enunciation of the facts which are to come under the law; in this form 'a law is always a universal hypothetical judgment, which states that whenever C is, or holds good, E is, or holds good, and that, whenever C undergoes a definite change into C' through a variation of itself dC, E also becomes E' through a definite variation of itself dE, which depends on dC.'<sup>2</sup> Here we see more than mere generalisation, but generalisation gives us the form in which the law is expressed, and as generalisation it gives an enunciation of the nature of the phenomena with which we have to deal.

The  
subjective  
element  
in law.

The next element over and above generalisation concerns the interpretation of the actual order that is seen to exist amongst the phenomena. There are many orders in the world. In the material world we have one kind of order, in the world of life another, and in human activity and institutions still another kind of order. This raises the question as to whether or not these various kinds of order can be interpreted in one and the same way, or given one and the same form of abstract, intellectual expression. For instance, the order in the material world, as material, calls for a mathematical interpretation; to be understood it demands that mathematical values shall be assigned to its various elements and that the relations between these elements, whether static or temporal, shall be expressed as mathematical proportions between the terms which stand in them. But the order in the living world seems to call for something

Law as  
mathe-  
matical.

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 265.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

more than a merely mathematical interpretation ; it calls for the ideas of development, of organic unity and so on, and it seems difficult to reduce the content of such ideas to mathematics. In the case of human life, the seeming inadequacy of a mathematical interpretation of the order existing there is still more pronounced. The order that exists in our social institutions, in history, and in individual character cannot be understood without reference to the idea of purpose ; here again it seems impossible to reduce the conception of purpose to mathematics. We must notice, too, that as we get further away from a mathematical interpretation of order the more difficult we find it to give clear generalisations or to formulate laws. Lotze maintains, however, that all order, of whatsoever kind it may be, can be expressed as a mathematical proportion between its terms. Speaking of law in the judicial sphere, he says that the aim of law is to establish a graduation in penalties that shall correspond to a graduation in offences, this graduation proceeding on a quantitative or mathematical basis. He says of these laws : ' Whether they prescribe actions or fix penalties, the predicate they attach to every case of the recurrence of what they bring under the general notion of any legal relation is not intended to be incapable of modification. Differences in quantity between various cases have a real significance in the eye of the law ; it is only the defectiveness of our standards for determining those differences which compels us in practice to be content with roughly graduating the scale of legal consequences, when we would far rather make it exactly proportionate to the individual differences on which those consequences depend.'<sup>1</sup> According to Lotze, then, law is bound up with this expression of a mathematical proportion as interpreting the order that exists amongst phenomena, of whatever kind those phenomena may be.

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 205

We must ask, however, as to the reason for this difficulty of applying law to the higher aspects of life ; is it due to an increasing degree of complexity in the material, and thus to an increasing degree of difficulty merely in finding out what mathematical proportions we shall apply to it, or is it due to this, that the order in the living and human world is so different from that found in the material world that it refuses to be expressed as mathematical ? Or again, is it due to the fact that we stand so far above the material world that we can contemplate it and grasp it easily in our intelligence, whereas in regard to life we ourselves are so much part of it, and share in it to such an extent that we fail to break ourselves loose from it—fail to get outside of it to contemplate and understand it ? If this is the case then we may say that wherever there is order there is law, but that there is something in the world which we cannot reduce to order from the nature of our relation to it, and not from the nature of this something itself, and which therefore we cannot be said to understand ; that therefore the world need not be wholly intelligible and science need not embrace the whole of reality. Lotze, indeed, takes this view, for he tells us that there are many people who come to a knowledge of that which is deepest in the world, not through intelligence, but through feeling, not through understanding, but through intuition. Thus there is, for them, a knowledge other than that given by the understanding, an interpretation of reality other than that given by the conception of order.

Order  
other than  
mathe-  
matical.

We come now to the objective factor in law ; we have said that a law gives abstract expression to an order as existing in phenomena ; that as such it is a product of our thought and therefore subjective. Now the order to which law gives expression is that which, according to Lotze, gives reality to phenomena ; for whenever a group of facts can be considered as changing amongst themselves in such

The  
objective  
factor in  
law.



a way that these changes can be formulated as law, then these facts constitute a real thing. Mere order, however, considered as a mathematical proportion, cannot serve as an adequate principle of reality, but points to something beyond itself.

What is the task which such a principle has to perform? Lotze has maintained that a thing consists of a plurality of sense qualities held together in unity through change; and further, he held that it is this holding together in unity through change that constitutes the reality of a thing. It is evident from this that the principle of reality must be in the phenomena holding them together, and since it must regulate change, having a determining influence upon that which it holds together. But order cannot perform these functions. There are many who maintain that order does not exist in the facts themselves, but that it is created by the intelligence and thrown round the facts so that our intelligence may have some means of grasping the facts; and when order is considered as mathematical a great deal of weight is given to this view. Mathematical quantities are finite, yet at the same time carry an infinity within themselves, and these two moments make the quantity a self-contradiction; if such quantities are real, then reality itself becomes the battle ground of a self-contradiction. Believing that reality cannot be such, many have maintained that mathematical order is merely our way of looking at facts. Again, order consists of a proportion as existing between facts, and a proportion cannot have a determining influence upon anything and cannot hold anything together; it merely attests the fact that these functions have been performed. Lotze himself is aware of this; if order does not hold together facts and has no determining influence upon them, what then does? Lotze tells us that it is an inner coherence or an inner relation as existing in the facts that performs these functions; he

Law as  
inner  
coherence  
in  
phenomena.

says it is 'An inward relation which exists between two facts and constitutes the ground at once of their conjunction and of the manner of this conjunction.'<sup>1</sup> It is on this account, he tells us further on, that a law which gives expression to this coherence claims objective truth. We have now to ask as to what this inner coherence is, and as to how it performs the functions demanded of it. To say that because facts cohere together, or are related to one another, therefore they have an inward coherence or inward relation as accounting for this, does not carry us very far. Lotze now goes further and tells us that this inward relation consists of a singleness or individuality of activity as running through, or being undertaken by, the plurality of qualities which are seen as cohering together; this singleness of activity he characterises as an individual law, and as constituting the essence or reality of a thing. By maintaining that this singleness of activity possessed by a plurality of sense qualities is an individual law he seeks to show that activity never does take place unless guided or determined through singleness or unity of principle, and that this unity of principle rests in the plurality of sense qualities as a whole. Further, we can and do think of the principle guiding activity as distinct from the activity itself, and we express this principle as consisting of an order in, or proportion between, the active elements, and therefore as a general law guiding them. It is in this fact of our expressing the principle of activity in the form of a general law, that makes Lotze identify individuality of activity with individuality of law.<sup>2</sup> But what is it that binds together the plurality of sense qualities and which regulates their changes in reference to one another—is it the activity or is it the individuality in activity? If we say it is the activity, then we have not solved the problem of change in unity and of regularity in change—for

Law as individual.

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 266.

<sup>2</sup> *Metaphysic*, sec. 38.

to say that a plurality of sense qualities changes in a regular way because it possesses a principle of activity is to say no more than that as a matter of fact the sense qualities do change. Does the principle of unity then lie in individuality? In order to answer this question we must ask as to the nature of individuality. Lotze himself does not seem clear about it, for he identifies it with particularity; he tells us that a law as individual is nothing more than the definite state of the facts when such a state calls for interpretation as coming under the sway of a general law.<sup>1</sup> But particularity merely states that such and such a thing is; it does not lead us into the nature of the thing, nor show us how the function of giving unity to the changing sense qualities which go to constitute the thing is performed,

Individuality like a melody.

In order to explain individuality, however, Lotze gives us an example; he tells us that we may compare a real thing, in so far as its individuality is concerned, to a melody; he does not work out the comparison, but leaves it for the reader to do. Now there are no two melodies exactly alike, for two such melodies would really be the same; each melody is a unique whole and its uniqueness is determined by the nature, arrangement, and sequence of its notes, and by the variations in time, pitch, and rhythm which belong to them; these notes thus form a whole or a system which is unique. It is this systematic wholeness, combined with the fact of uniqueness or particularity, that constitutes the melody's individuality. Thus by this comparison Lotze tries to insist upon the fact that a thing, before it can be called real, must possess a like individuality. But at this point we must notice a difference between the individuality of a melody and the individuality of a thing, which difference carries important consequences with it. The individuality belonging to a melody is not something which the melody has produced of itself and

Individuality as separate from its content.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 33

through its own activity. The melody has been composed; its individuality has been given to it from the outside. The composer has brought together the various notes, and he has given them unity by making them all moments in the working out of a single emotion. If the melody is to live again, it must be sung or played, and the singer or the player must give again to the notes the soul which the composer first gave to them. Thus we see in the case of a melody how an idea or an emotion, which is distinct from the notes, comes to hold these notes together in unity—comes to belong to them and to create out of them an individual whole; notes and ideas are separate, and we see them coming together in creative work.

And this brings us to an important issue:—We have seen that a real thing is like a melody; that it has its plurality of sense qualities, these qualities changing yet being held together in unity, so that they can be considered, like the melody, as having a unity of idea running through them.<sup>1</sup> Now comes the question—are we to consider a principle of unity as being introduced into sense and as then exercising a creative activity in relation to it and thereby producing real things? Lotze tells us that we cannot ask this question, for in so doing we are asking how being is made; we are asking why there should be something rather than nothing; and such questions are futile. We do not create being; we come into the world and find being already in existence, and the most ultimate question we can ask in relation to it is as to what it is and not as to how it comes to be. Many indeed have maintained that we create the world of being—that out of our minds, or out of some universal mind in whom we exist and have our being, we introduce into sense the individualising element and so exercise a creative activity in relation to the things which we perceive

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Metaphysics*, sec. 28.

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around us. Lotze tells us, however, that we do no such thing, but that the sense qualities themselves are the creators of their own individuality; that indeed sense qualities are the constitutive elements in a continuously creative activity, and that the individual whole which lives in and through such activity is what we understand by a real thing.

When, then, we ask for the principle of reality in a thing, and when we discover it to be an individual law, or when we say that a 'real thing is nothing but the realised individual law of its procedure,'<sup>1</sup> we do not ask to see how a law or a principle comes to order what is outside of it: all we ask is as to how we are to understand this term law; and we have seen that it is to be understood as living, creative, individuality, and that we cannot get further or deeper than this; experience presents this to us as constitutive of being.

Individuality and determinateness.

We are now brought to the question as to how the objective and subjective sides of law are brought together, or as to how law as general and universal is based upon law as individual and particular. We have seen Lotze maintaining that a thing is real in so far as the sense qualities which go to constitute it can be said to be mathematically determined or to change in accordance with a mathematical proportion. We have seen him also maintaining that a thing is real, in so far as it is formed of a plurality of sense qualities which, through their continuous self-creative activity, form a whole having a uniqueness or individuality of its own just as a work of art has an individuality of its own. This individuality can be regarded as an ideal content, that is to say, can be understood as an idea, or as that which has meaning for itself.<sup>2</sup> Now Lotze calls both of these principles of reality a law, and tells us that in the case of mathematical determination the law is subjective, and that in the case of individuality the

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 34.

<sup>2</sup> *Outlines of Metaphysics*, sec. 28.

law is objective. By this he must mean that mathematical proportion is our own way of regarding individuality, or that individuality demands from us an analysis according to mathematical proportion. Further than this Lotze does not go. It falls upon us, therefore, to see if we can bring closer together these two moments—namely, individuality and law—as a mathematical proportion. Let us take an example of this mathematical determination in individuality. In a piece of marble we have a grouping of the sense qualities—colour, hardness, temperature, shape, and so on. These sense qualities are permanent in the sense that marble always has some colour, some temperature, some shape; but they change their specific determinations under changing conditions; at one time the colour is greyer than at another, according to the variations of light which fall upon it; at one time it is colder than at another, according to the varying temperature of the atmosphere; in one liquid it sinks, in another it floats; further, these changes are mathematically determined, each change taking place according to a definite mathematical equation. Now this way of changing is so bound up with this particular unity of sense qualities that any alteration in it would wreck the individuality of the object and destroy it. If what we considered as marble were suddenly to float in water, or to change in the slightest its specific gravity, then we should no longer consider it as marble, but as something different. This shows us, then, that individuality can and does live through mathematical determination; yet it seems difficult to understand it, because the application of mathematics seems to be that which is meant to destroy all individuality, for when we have given a thing a number we seem to have put it into a class whose members are not systematically unified, but which merely lie side by side. How does it come about, then, that individuality can live in number

or can be understood through number? Lotze does not explain how mathematical formulæ can define individuality. At this point, then, we are advancing beyond Lotze in seeking to understand his point of view.

Can a  
mathe-  
matical  
formula  
represent  
individual-  
ality?

The question we have now to ask is as to whether or not a mathematical formula can perform this function. We can best explain this problem by taking concrete examples. Sodium oxide combines with water to form caustic soda, according to the equation  $\text{Na}_2\text{O} + \text{H}_2\text{O} = 2\text{NaOH}$ . Now what this law does is to draw attention, by means of certain formulæ, to certain particular substances. The particular structure which gives individuality to the substance is expressed in the formula representing that substance, and the particular relation between the two substances, which relation gives rise to the formation of a new substance, is represented in the equation. It is clear that the whole nature of each substance is not represented in its chemical formula; the facts that it has this or that colour, that it is of this particular weight, hardness, and so on, are not represented there; the formula draws attention to the substance, and represents its chemical structure—that is, the various elements and the number of atoms of each which enter into a molecule of the substance. Thus it is clear that, although the formula here leaves out certain characteristics, it does not do so in order that it might be general and applicable to an indefinite number of cases, but that it may the better concentrate attention on one aspect of the individuality of the substance. But it may be said that this chemical formula or equation is universal in that it can be applied to an infinite number of cases. If we look closer, however, we shall find that this is not really the case, but that what we consider as infinity of application is no more than the expression of an infinite range of possibilities of change along a given direction, and that change in this

direction does not in any way affect the individuality of the substance entering into the relation represented in the equation. This infinite range of possibilities runs in the direction of spatial magnitude—as regards the example we have taken, namely, where sodium oxide combines with water to form caustic soda, the sodium oxide may be of larger or smaller bulk, when the water will be of a correspondingly larger or smaller volume, and the resulting caustic soda will also be greater or smaller in proportion—the equation leaves open an infinite range of change in this direction. Thus we see that a law has two moments, the one representing individuality, or uniqueness of structure, the other, and what we may call the purely mathematical, representing an infinity of possible changes along a spatial direction. This spatial direction exists within the individual structure, and change along it does not destroy this structure. Now the mathematical aspect of law, in which infinity plays such a prominent part, is bound up with this spatial aspect of being, and it is through the fact that spatiality enters into the structure of all material existence that laws which can be expressed in mathematical formula came to claim universality or infinity of application. Pure spatiality, or space as such, is meaningless, as is also pure mathematics: to be real, space must belong to spatial objects, and to be true the formulæ of mathematics must have determinate contents;  $2 + 2 = 4$  is not true unless there are things which can be counted or placed in spatial order. Now the material world presents itself to us as a spatial whole, the structure of such a whole consisting in its capability of being subdivided into smaller wholes which are of the same nature and structure as the larger wholes. This structural subdivision, or this spatiality, enters into all that exists in the material world; it enters into the individuality of all existence here, but it does not affect that individuality. A law always

Law as  
having  
mathem-  
atical  
and indi-  
vidual  
sides.



gives expression to this peculiar union of a spatial infinity producing element with the individualising element in a thing's being; thus a law is never a mere mathematical formula; the mathematical side of the law only serves to say how far the individuality shall extend. If I say that the force with which a particular stone A of 'a' lbs. attracts another stone B of 'b' lbs., when at a distance of C feet from one another, is equal to a force of 20 ft.-lbs., then the mathematical side of the formula has only served to limit, or set bounds to, a certain spatial whole within which the individuality, as expressed in the law of gravitation, shall work. We must, however, be careful to note that Lotze does not give all these arguments to prove that a law is a summing-up of individuality, and not a mere generalisation from certain facts, in order that it may be applicable to an indefinite number of facts of the same kind. What we have tried to show is that when he tells us that the reality of a thing consists in its acting in such a way that its behaviour can be expressed in the form of a law, and when he again tells us that the reality of a thing is ideal, in the sense that it is to be understood as the realisation of a meaning, or of an idea, then from these it follows that a law must be expressive of individuality: we have gone further than Lotze in that we have tried to show how a law, especially where it is expressed in mathematical terms, can be expressive of individuality.

## CHAPTER II

### REALITY AS SUBSTANCE, AND AS BEING CONSTITUTED BY MIND

WE have seen that Lotze considers the world to be made up of real things, each thing being real in so far as it consists of a plurality of sense qualities changing in such a way that the thing in its changes can be seen to possess individuality, or to follow a law which can be expressed in mathematical terms. The law which sums up a thing's reality is that which constitutes what is permanent, as distinct from what is changing, in the being of a thing. On account of this permanence, which is characteristic of law, Lotze calls a thing a substance in so far as it can be seen to follow a law. Now substance had been considered as a permanent underlying something in which the changing sense content belonging to a thing could move. It was difficult, however, to see what this permanent element lying by the side of change was, and still more difficult to see how it could perform the function of holding in its being a changing multiplicity of sense. Hence it was not long before such a substance, remaining ever the same and holding together the changing contents of sense, was denied an existence. Nevertheless it was seen that changes in things took place and were somehow or another held in unity; hence the question as to how they were thus held together still called for an answer. The attempt was made to throw this unifying function on to the mind which knows the object. The object was considered as made up of sense qualities, these qualities being really nothing more than ideas in the mind of the

The real  
as sub-  
stance.

one who knows that object. It was held that the mind produces from itself unifying principles which it throws around its ideas, and thus constitutes them permanent groupings of changing sense qualities. This solution was suggested by Hume and developed by Kant. Such a view as this, however, tended to destroy the idea of substance altogether, for substance could no longer be considered as a something centring in the being of an object external to ourselves and giving that object a real permanence amidst the changing variety of its sense contents; substance became merely a logical category, merely a name for the way in which *we* unify our ideas. Instead of really solving the problem which the idea of substance was intended to solve, this view, that the mind performs those functions which substance was called upon to perform, intensifies it. The mind itself becomes divided into two parts, the one consisting of sense contents, and the other of logical contents. The sense contents have a merely temporal existence and the logical contents have an eternal validity, for only through such eternal validity could they give permanence to the changing multiplicity which they have to bring to unity. Further, there is not one mind having all the sense content of the world belonging to itself alone and unifying this to form one single world; there are only individual minds each unifying its own particular content, and the difficulty now arises of seeing how all these can work together so as to perceive one single world which is the same for all. Indeed for this view there cannot be one single material world, having an existence in and for itself, and standing outside of the minds of those who perceive it.

New interpretation  
of substance.

What Lotze does, however, is to take this material world as existing for itself outside of us, and to give to each object in it a principle of unity or of permanence in change, just as those who made use of the conception of substance had done previously.

But instead of making this principle of permanence a something existing by the side of the changing multiplicity which it has to unify, he makes this multiplicity contain within itself its own unity. He maintains that the changing grouping of sense qualities unifies itself, keeps itself to a distinct and permanent mode of behaviour, and thus performs for itself the functions which an underlying substance standing beside the changing multiplicity of sense content was supposed to perform for it. These characteristics of permanence in change are summed up in law as Lotze has defined it, and hence he says that law is the principle of substance, or that a thing is a substance when it consists of a group of sense qualities changing according to law under varying conditions.

Lotze now takes a further step and maintains that a thing can only be a substance if it is a mind. This view is based on two important considerations; the first of these is that unity involves consciousness and can only take place in or through the medium of consciousness; the second is that when we call a thing real we mean to give it an existence in and for itself outside and independent of the fact that we or anyone else perceives or can perceive it, and that this self-existence involves consciousness.

Substance  
as mind.

We will first deal with the view that unity involves consciousness. Lotze maintains that the holding together of a plurality of changing sense contents within the unity of law presupposes something deeper than the mere existence of these sense qualities. He maintains that unity and activity are only possible within the life of a being endowed with consciousness; unity, he tells us, must always be a felt unity, and activity a felt activity; if the actual experience of unity and the actual experience of activity are taken away, then the conceptions of unity and activity are barren. He further tells us that the conception of unity is based upon our own personal experience. We are conscious of the unity of our own being

The view  
that unity  
involves  
conscious-  
ness.

through the fact that our various states are held together in the medium of recollection or memory, and also through the fact that the various changes which take place in ourselves are all referred to ourselves through the activity and feeling of attention. Further, it is in this consciousness of our unity that we really are unity, for our being only exists in the consciousness which it has of itself. The unity which belongs to individual substances, he tells us, is essentially the same and thus requires a self-feeling on the part of each; each substance must feel its own states as belonging to itself, and must contrast itself as one with its states as many. He says, 'If there are to be things with the properties we demand of things, they must be more than things. Only by sharing this character of the spiritual nature can they fulfil the general requirements which must be fulfilled in order to constitute a thing. They can only be distinct from their states if they distinguish themselves from their states. They can only be unities if they oppose themselves, as such, to the multiplicity of their states.'<sup>1</sup>

Examina-  
tion of this  
view.

The view that mind brings to unity, and so to existence, all that exists, has played such an important part in philosophy that we must carefully examine Lotze's view, and try to see how far it is the same as, or different from, the other views which have maintained that mind effects existence in that which it becomes aware of and knows. Now we all make a distinction between what we call mind and what we call matter; this distinction was drawn very clearly by Descartes and his followers; matter they considered as that which is extended, mind as that which knows or thinks. Matter soon became the name for a something including all material objects as parts or determinations of itself, and mind the name for an entity in which all individual minds find their existence. This at once gave rise to the distinctions

Matter as  
distinct  
from  
material  
things;  
mind as  
distinct  
from  
minds.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, Bk. I. Chap. vii: sec. 96.

between matter and material things, and also between mind and mental beings. Matter did not become separated from material things, but those characteristics which belong to material things were formed into a distinct whole. This whole was given some kind of quasi-existence of its own over against the actualities which possess these characteristics. In the case of matter this comes to light in the discussions as to whether extension or space has an existence of its own distinct from the things that are in it. The same distinction came to be drawn between mind and minds. In the case of mind the distinction is brought to light where mind, as such, is thought of as giving unity to a sense content which is in some way or another foreign to it. Mind, as such, is thought of as possessing a reality, although not an existence, which is not to be confused with the reality belonging to a particular mind.

The development of philosophy had shown that material things are made up of sense qualities which have no existence of their own apart from that which they find in being perceived, and therefore as the content of individual minds. This development tended to obscure the distinction between mind and individual minds, and to give rise to the distinction between mind and its content; mind was considered as a logical reality containing principles of unity within itself with which it brings to unity, and so to reality, the changing multiplicity of sense which somehow stands in relation to it. Its being was not the same as the being of an individual object, nor the same as that of an individual mind; indeed, it could hardly be said to have being; yet at the same time it had some kind of reality. Individual minds were called in to serve as a medium through which this multiplicity of sense came to being, and also to bring this multiplicity in relation to mind as such; further, an external reality of unknowable nature was called in to interact with individual

The distinction between mind and its content.

minds, giving occasion to activity in these minds whereby they could produce within themselves the varied and changing multiplicity of sense. But the nature of mind, the kind of existence which it had, its unifying power, its relation to sense and to individual minds, all these questions remained unsolved problems. But Lotze insists upon this, namely: when we call an object real we assign to it an existence in and for itself outside and independent of our knowledge of it. Hence he was really bound to throw over the theory that a thing is real only in so far as it can be brought under a concept, or in so far as it is or can be known to mind. At the same time, however, he tells us that the unity necessary to existence is affected through consciousness or feeling; a plurality *a, b, c* exists together when it is felt together or when held in the same beat of consciousness; it is really only after the members of the plurality exist together in this way that they can be brought under a concept. Further, and this is the most important point of all, this consciousness which gives unity to a multiplicity of sense qualities is not that of a knower standing external to the object in which this multiplicity exists; the distinction between a knower and a something known as part of an objective world standing outside of the knower plays no part in this unifying consciousness which is necessary to existence; the consciousness which unifies belongs to the qualities themselves in so far as these are together. Thus this consciousness is not necessarily a knowing or perceiving consciousness, according to which a knowing self is opposed to an external object—it is rather a feeling consciousness in which all the elements constituting the being of an object are felt by that object in one and the same act of feeling or immediate experience.

How consciousness  
can perform this  
unifying  
function.

The question now arises as to how consciousness can perform this unifying function. Lotze tells us that this function is carried out through the medium

of recollection or memory; he develops this view when dealing with the self-consciousness which belongs to us as thinking and perceiving beings.<sup>1</sup> 'It is only because memory and recollection can range the past beside the present, only because a relating activity of attention can comprehend variety and produce in contrast to it the idea of the permanent Ego—in short, only because we *appear* to ourselves to be unity, that in truth we *are* unity.'<sup>2</sup> He maintains that the unity, and therefore the existence, of a thing is realised through an activity on the part of a thing the same as that exercised in our own case when coming to a knowledge of our own existence.

We must ask whether Lotze is justified in assigning to things the same kind of memory and imagination as that which belongs to persons, and deducing that it is through the possession on the part of a thing of such memory and imagination that the thing comes to reality. Lotze is arguing from the Kantian theory of the transcendental unity of apperception, which maintains that the mind is one in the unity which it effects in the reality known by it. He implies that memory and imagination are the activities which the mind uses for this purpose. The conclusion, therefore, that must be drawn from this position is that reality itself is dependent for its unity upon these activities.

But memory does not unify the actual things which are perceived or known; what memory does is to unify our ideas about these things; it only enables us, as subjects standing outside of the varied play of reality, to hold together in idea a picture, as it were, of the reality. Thus if reality is unified it is not unified through *our* memory. Nor, again, if reality itself has memory can this memory act as a unifying function amongst the variety of elements

Memory  
as not  
effecting  
the unity  
of real  
objects.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 96, and *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. ix. Chap. iii. sec. 1 (English trans., vol. ii. p. 634).

<sup>2</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. ix. Chap. iii. (Eng. trans., vol. ii. p. 634).



existing in reality. All that memory could do would be to unify the ideas which reality had of itself. Thus memory cannot be considered as the basis of unity in real things. There is, however, a further reason for denying that memory can be the medium of unity in real things. If memory must necessarily belong to objects before they can be real, then images or concepts must form a constitutive element in the reality of those objects. But when we think of an object as real we do not think of it as possessing ideas or concepts of itself or of anything outside itself. Ideas which a thing may have play no part whatever in our conception of the reality of that thing.

The pre-  
supposition  
under-  
lying  
Lotze's  
view that  
memory  
effects  
unity.

The presupposition underlying Lotze's contention, that it is through a ranging of the past beside the present in recollection and memory that unity is brought about, is that temporal relations, instead of uniting things, separate them one from another. This means either that before things can be a real unity they must somehow or another be taken out of the temporal relations in which they stand as real and placed in some non-temporal relations, or else that temporal relations must be interpreted as having their basis in some deeper timeless or eternal relations. But any attempts at taking things out of temporal relations and placing them in eternal relations allow the things to slip through our fingers, and we are left with only concepts or ideas of the things. These ideas, however, are no part of the being of the real things of which they are ideas. If unity is to exist in real things, then this unity must comprehend the time relations within itself. Thus we see that the changing multiplicity of sense in time is not unified through its being taken up into some aspect or moment of non-temporal being through the medium of memory, as Lotze maintains. What, however, we can gather and accept from Lotze's view is that this multiplicity is unified through its possessing a consciousness of its

own which extends and bridges over the temporal relations existing in it. Consciousness performs this function by holding in a single act or immediate experience all the members of the multiplicity. To give a more positive account of how this is done seems impossible, for this characteristic of consciousness is really constitutive of consciousness itself, and is of so ultimate a character that when we seek to describe it we really only end in pointing to it. Furthermore, this activity of consciousness is not that of memory, which ranges the past beside the present through the instrumentality of ideas.

We come now to the second reason which Lotze puts forward for maintaining that substances are minds. He tells us that reality means existence for self; when we say that a thing is real, we imply that it possesses its reality in and for itself, independently as to whether its reality is known or perceived by anyone who may contemplate the thing. He maintains further that this self-possession of its own being on the part of a real object can only take place through the object feeling, or experiencing, or having a consciousness of itself. He bases his conception upon the experiences which we, as human beings, have of ourselves. This argument is really part of that by which he seeks to show that unity must always be a felt or self-experiencing unity. He asks, 'What manner of being, however, could we consistently predicate of that from which we had expressly excluded the universal characteristics of animate existence, every active relation of itself, every active distinction from everything else? Of that which had no consciousness of its own nature and qualities, no feeling of its states, which in no way possessed itself as a Self?'<sup>1</sup> We are real in that we possess our reality in self-consciousness: if we destroy our self-consciousness then we destroy ourselves; so with things. 'Precisely what we want

That substances in order to be real must be minds

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec 98

is this : that the things shall really enjoy these states of their own, and not merely be thought of as existing in them ; *Reality is being for self.*'<sup>1</sup> But Lotze makes it clear that the self-consciousness, or perhaps we had better say, the consciousness, or experience, or feeling of self, possessed by things is not so intense, nor so high, as that possessed by human beings ; our self-consciousness is mediated not merely through self-experience, but through self-knowledge in ideas, whereas we are not justified in attributing such a high degree of consciousness to things.<sup>2</sup>

Idealism  
and Lotze's  
theory of  
substance

Now in forming his conception of substance, and in using it as a principle of reality, Lotze was guided by his efforts to get away from the conclusions to which he thought Kantian Idealism led. He thought of Idealism as making the world of perceptual experience nothing more than the content of the mind which perceives it. The world of objects in space and time was reduced to the position of subjective phenomena, having no existence in and for itself. Lotze strove to get away from this position and to give to things an existence on their own account apart from the mind which perceives them.

It is undoubtedly true that everyday experience does assign to things an existence of their own outside and independent of our human consciousness which knows these things. But at the same time the being of things, in so far as they are objects of experience, or indeed objects at all, is determined by the sense qualities which belong to them. These sense qualities only exist in, and are only unified through, the unity of the consciousness which experiences them. The development of English Idealism through Locke, Berkeley, and Hume had shown that colours only exist in being seen, cold and heat in being felt, and so on with the whole range of sense qualities. The Idealism of Kant had made a further advance upon

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Metaphysics*, sec. 82.

<sup>2</sup> *Microcosmos*, Bk. ix. Chap. iii sec. 2 (Eng trans, pp 646-7)

this, and had shown that the uniting together of these sense qualities to form a whole, which we call an object of perception, is only possible in consciousness, through the fact of these sense qualities existing as part of the systematic unity belonging to the content of a perceiving mind. This perceiving mind is a unity in itself, and therefore brings to unity all that comes to form part of its content. But while Kant held that the unity which belongs to objects of perception, and to the whole world of these objects, is given to them through the unity of the mind which experiences them, he did not consider that this unifying function belonged to the individual mind as individual; it was performed by the individual mind through the fact that it was mind at all. But how mind, because it was mind, came to perform this definite and specific function remained a difficulty. Two courses lay open to solve this difficulty. The one, to lay all stress upon the individual mind; the other, to lay stress upon an all-embracing mind, or absolute. If the first course is taken, and it is considered that the sense content belonging to an individual mind is unified through that mind as individual, then there would be no single material world known by all minds, but as many material worlds as minds. A further development along these lines would lead to the conclusion that all existence is centred in the individual mind, and this would give to the individual no justification for regarding anything as existing except himself. Such a view as this is absurd, and the Idealists themselves could not accept it. If we take the second view, however—namely, that of regarding the function of unity which is performed in relation to the world of sense as being carried out by a single, all-embracing mind—we fall into another equally fallacious view. If the function of unity in relation to sense is performed by the absolute, then there is no activity for, and hence no existence as belonging to, individual minds. The

existence of individual minds is disregarded; indeed, on such a view as this individual minds having an existence in and for themselves could not exist.

How Lotze  
seeks to  
avoid the  
pitfalls of  
Idealism.

Lotze had to accept the Idealist conclusions that the sense content which belongs to objects of perception is an experienced content, and that the unity and content which belong to such objects are bound together and exist only in the mind which experiences them. But this content and unity constituting the being of objects of perception exist in *our* consciousness, and go to make up part of the content of *our* experience. The nature and constitution of things as thus existing in *our* consciousness seem to prevent those things from existing except as elements in the experience of those who know them. But at the same time, the meaning or reference which we give to things demands for them an existence entirely outside and independent of this same knowing consciousness. This at once introduces what seems to be a contradiction into the very being of things. As we have seen, Lotze sought to solve this contradiction by making things themselves the experiencers of their own being. By thus making things minds or souls he has avoided each of the two extremes into which Idealism tends to fall, namely, the one extreme according to which the individual has no justification for regarding anything as existing except the content of his own individual mind, and the other extreme according to which everything is swallowed up in an absolute. In Lotze's view objects of experience are given an existence of their own, and individual minds are considered as not being swallowed up in an Infinite or absolute mind.

## CHAPTER III

### MINDS OF THINGS AND MINDS OF PERSONS

Now the lesson that Idealism had taught was that the reality of a thing, if we are to know it, must live in our experience of that thing. This position may be regarded as unassailable. Lotze, however, adds to it by maintaining that a thing possesses and feels its reality in its own right. Now comes the problem of bringing together these two sides or moments in the reality of an object, namely, that which lives in the being of the thing itself, and that which lives in our experience of the object. The reality of a thing cannot be described or pointed to by a person otherwise than as that thing exists in his experience. In that person's experience the thing reveals all the reality which he will ever know of it. Whether or not the thing possesses any reality outside of that which, as an object of his experience, it reveals to him is a matter which from the content of his experience he cannot answer. Thus the reality of a thing as experienced by that thing must be the same, if we are to know it, as the reality of the thing as experienced by us. Lotze really takes up this position in his starting point, where he tells us that the task of his philosophy is not to construct, but to describe, or point to the reality which belongs to things.

Statement of the problem of the relation between the consciousness which a thing has of itself and our consciousness.

Dealing with the question as to the existence of things as objects of experience, Lotze asks what would happen if our consciousness of these objects were banished from the universe. It is in our consciousness of them that objects are cognisable, and in which, for us, at all events, they exist. He asks,

'What remains to be understood by the Being of things when we have got rid of the sole condition under which it is cognisable by us? It was as objects of our feeling that things were presented to us. In this alone consisted, as far as we could see, what we called their Being. What can be left of Being when we abstract from our feeling? What exactly is it that we suppose ourselves to have predicated of things, in saying that they *are* without being felt? Or what is it that for the things themselves, by way of proof, confirmation, and significance of their being, takes the place of that sensation which for us formed the proof, confirmation, and significance of their being?'<sup>1</sup> He takes the answer which the natural (i.e. every-day) theory of the world gives to this question, namely, that even if consciousness is banished out of the universe, things 'will continue to stand in those relations to each other in which they stood when they were objects of perception. Each will have its place in space or will change it. Each will continue to exercise influence on others or to be affected by their influence. These reciprocal agencies will constitute that in which the things possess their being independent of all observation.'<sup>2</sup> Lotze does not suppose that our consciousness of things can be banished from the universe, but he considers that the being of objects, as those objects exist for themselves, is determined by those relations in which things stand to one another as objects of perception. He puts forward this argument to show that a thing cannot be real as isolated, but that it finds its existence in a systematic unity of objects standing in various relations to one another. He says, 'For not to be at any place, not to have any position in the complex of other things, not to undergo any operation from anything nor to display itself by the exercise of any activity upon anything; to be thus void of relation

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, Vol. i. Chap. i. seq. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

is just that in which we should find the nonentity of a thing if it was our purpose to define it.'<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless the argument clearly shows that Lotze regarded the nature of a thing as that thing exists for itself as identical with the nature of the thing as it exists in our experience. Here the fact that a thing exists for itself through the medium of its experience or consciousness of itself is left out of account, and it is maintained that the reality which can live both in the being of the thing and in our experience of that thing consists of sense content, the unity of this content, and the relations existing amongst the various objects constituted by unified groupings of sense contents. But if consciousness or experience of itself on the part of a thing is that in and through which its reality comes to being, or in virtue of which it possesses reality at all, and if this reality is experienced by us, then the consciousness which a thing has of itself must somehow or another enter into our experience. If a thing is a mind, then we must experience its mind in perceiving the thing, just as we experience its sense qualities which go to constitute the content of its mind.

Lotze, however, denies that the self-experience possessed by an object can be entered into by an outside observer. He tells us that things are detached from the Infinite through this fact of possessing a consciousness of their own being.<sup>2</sup> Now this detachment from the Infinite can only mean that the Infinite does not share in, or enter into, this self-feeling which things have of themselves. Again, following Leibnitz, he seeks to explain the relation between soul and body, and eventually between mind and matter, as that of a ruling monad or soul to inferior monads or souls. He tells us here that the soul life of each being is closed and cut off from the soul life of every

Lotze's  
denial  
that one  
conscious-  
ness can  
be experi-  
enced by  
another.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, Chap. I, sec. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Microcosmos*, Bk. IX, Chap. III, sec. 2 (Eng. trans., vol. II, p. 645).



other being. He speaks of 'the one individual ruling soul (which) always remains facing, in an attitude of complete isolation, the homogeneous but intransigent monads, the joint multitude of which forms the living body.'<sup>1</sup> He says again, 'If the ruling monad is that soul which forms our ego, and whose internal motions we are seeking to understand, the interior of the other monads at least to us inquirers remains absolutely closed; we are acquainted only with the reciprocal actions in virtue of which they appear to us as matter, and only under that designation and with the claims founded upon it can we make use of them in the investigation of particular processes.'<sup>2</sup> If this is the case, then that which forms the fundamental reality of a thing, namely, its consciousness of itself, cannot enter into our experience of that thing. From this it follows that the view put forward by Lotze, to the effect that a thing is real in and through the fact that it possesses a consciousness of its own being, is based merely on an argument from analogy. The argument runs: We are real and our reality exists in and through the consciousness which we have of ourselves; things are real, hence they too must be real in and through a consciousness which they have of themselves. Lotze's argument does undoubtedly take this turn, and cannot therefore be accepted as the basis of metaphysical speculation; for how can we assign to things a reality which is altogether beyond our experience, and then seek to determine the nature of this reality by saying that it must be the same in nature as that which constitutes our being? In trying to see how our consciousness holds within itself the consciousness which other things possess of themselves it will be well if we first try to find out the reasons which led Lotze to the views that each thing possesses its own consciousness in its

<sup>1</sup> *Microkosmos*, Bk. ix. Chap. iii. sec. 5 (Eng. trans., pp. 162, 163).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk. ii. Chap. i. sec. 5 (Eng. trans., pp. 162, 163).

own right and that each consciousness excludes every other consciousness from itself.

By endowing things with consciousness Lotze sought to avoid the errors into which he considered a false realism or materialism had fallen. This materialism regarded things as having an existence and reality of their own outside and independent of their being objects of our experience. This reality was regarded as selfless and as consisting merely in the functions which things perform in the holding together of the fabric of a material world whose only value consists in the fact that it is known by us. Lotze says, that although we imagine the world of things to be thus merely material, yet, when we come to consider what we mean by reality or being, we are thrown back upon self-hood as that in which reality consists. He asks, 'What manner of being, however, could we consistently predicate of that from which we had expressly excluded the universal characteristics of animate existence, every active relative to itself, every active distinction from anything else? Of that which had no consciousness of its own nature and qualities, no feeling of its states, which in no way possessed itself as a Self?'<sup>1</sup> Further, he maintains that such a lifeless world of matter could have no real value and on this account could not be regarded as having reality; for when we say that a thing is real then we assign to that thing a value which the thing must possess for itself, and thus if the world is to be real its value must centre in itself. The only thing that has value or worth for itself is self-hood, hence a lifeless world would have no value. He says, 'Self-existence, or self-hood, is the only definition which expresses the essential content and worth of that which we, from accidental and ill-chosen standpoints, characterise formally as "Realness."'<sup>2</sup>

Lotze as  
endowing  
things with  
conscious-  
ness in  
order to  
escape  
from cer-  
tain errors  
of mate-  
rialism.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec 98

<sup>2</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Eng. trans, vol n p 645.

Reasons  
for believ-  
ing that  
our con-  
sciousness  
cannot  
include  
others  
within  
itself.

Two reasons led Lotze to regard souls as being exclusive of one another. He had regarded the development of Idealism from Kant to Hegel as tending in the direction of losing concrete existences in the life of an all-embracing absolute ; he definitely set himself the task of saving these concrete existences, and he tried to do this by making them something for themselves. In being something for themselves they were, according to Lotze, individual and independent minds or consciousnesses. But Lotze interprets existence for self, or independence, as exclusiveness. In contradiction to such a view as this, we may ask whether an object may preserve its independence in its enjoyment and experience of its own being, while at the same time sharing that being with others ; there seems to be no reason why this should not be the case, for if an object may share its being with others in so far as the content of that being is concerned there could be no logical reason for denying the same thing as regards the object's feeling, experience, or consciousness of itself.

Conscious-  
ness as  
being  
identified  
with  
feeling.

But there is another reason why Lotze held that one soul cannot share the conscious life of another soul. This second reason is based on the acceptance of the view that, as a matter of fact, one soul does not share in the sensated life of another soul. It is supposed that the feelings of one person cannot be shared by another ; A cannot feel B's toothache, nor B, A's headache ; A cannot feel the same startle which B feels when he hears a cannon fired. It is further supposed that whenever we come to perceive anything or to think about anything, what we perceive or what we think about comes to us in or through the medium of these sensations or feelings ; indeed, the content of our whole life seems to live in these sensations. Now it is with these feelings that Lotze identifies consciousness as distinct from that which lives in consciousness ; the element of sensation or feeling he characterises as pleasure, or

pain, and the content which lives in these feelings he designates as the content of ideas. He says, 'We are in general unable to think of any soul exclusively as a being active merely in the formation of ideas. Every soul is rather likewise capable of experiencing feelings of pleasure and pain, and of combining these feelings with the content of ideas. Simply by means of the fact that the idea of any state whatsoever is combined with a feeling of pleasure or pain, is such a state authenticated as *our own*, and no longer passes merely as the state of *some* being or other.'<sup>1</sup> Here he seems to connect feeling with ideas as they are produced in the medium of our thought; further on, however, he connects this same feeling with the animal's consciousness of itself, which consciousness cannot be said to be mediated by thought. He says, 'On the other hand, an animal of the lowest order, that has scarcely any cognition of itself at all, but has indeed feelings of pleasure and pain, will never confound itself with the external world. When it feels a smart, it will experience this state as one belonging to itself alone; and just by this means will it feel itself as an 'Ego' in opposition to the whole world, although it would not know at all how to specify precisely in what its own being consists.'<sup>2</sup> It is clear from the above passages that the consciousness which we have of ourselves is regarded as being mediated by, or as living in sensation as feeling; we will call this particular sensation, which has the character of pleasure or pain, *sensated feeling*.

If consciousness has thus to be identified with *sensated feelings*, then it is true as a matter of fact that the living experience, or the consciousness which a soul has of itself, cannot be experienced by or live in the consciousness of another soul. But we deny that consciousness can be thus identified with *sensated feelings*. Such feelings would have

Reasons  
for deny-  
ing that  
conscious-  
ness lives  
in *sensated*  
*feeling*

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, sec. 37.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

to perform a unifying function in reference to the sense contents which go to form the being of a thing. If the sense content belonging to a thing could be unified in the being of that thing through such sensated feelings, and if such feelings could only be felt by the thing itself, then we should never come to know the thing as a unity, because the principle of its unity would be for ever hidden from us. Secondly, this consciousness or feeling which a thing has of itself rises in the higher beings to a self-consciousness mediated by thought, emotion, and will, and carrying within itself a great variety and richness of content. Such self-consciousness could not develop out of, and ultimately consist of, mere sensated feelings. In the most intense self-consciousness sensated feeling takes such an unimportant place that it tends to be driven out of consciousness altogether. A person having a toothache will pay no attention to it if he can direct his energies into some work which absorbs his whole being; the toothache will almost if not quite cease to be felt when the person works in this way, but will at once be felt again when work is laid aside. A shot heard while one is passing in the street will startle one very much, but the shots on a battle-field will not startle the excited soldiers. A person may be sitting down at his desk working and the door bell may ring—he is busily engaged in work and in a few moments after the bell has rung, and when his attention to his work is for the moment relaxed he remembers that the bell rang; during his work, when the bell actually rang he did not hear it; the sound of the bell has come into his consciousness without, or at least with a minimum of, sensated feeling, through the fact that his consciousness has been so intense in another direction as to be able to disregard such sensated feeling. We must notice, however, that sometimes intensity of consciousness gives occasion for an increase in sensated feeling; if I am reading a book by the

fireside and a cinder drops from the fire I may be startled by what is really a very small noise.

What the illustrations have shown, however, is that intensity of consciousness does not necessarily go with intensity of sensated feeling, and that consciousness cannot be identified with such feeling. Thus we see it is not right to hold, as Lotze does, that one consciousness cannot live in another consciousness, because consciousness is to be identified with sensated feeling.

There are, however, reasons for dissenting from this view that the consciousness which a thing has of itself is altogether beyond our ken. It is clear that if consciousness is necessary to unity, then consciousness enters into or belongs to an object not only as that object exists in and for itself but also as it exists in our experience. But the question arises, Is it the same consciousness which constitutes an object a unity existing for itself, and which also constitutes it a unity existing in our experience? Lotze supposes that *our* consciousness brings unity to the object as it exists for us, and the consciousness of the object, which consciousness is distinct and separate from that of ours, brings unity to the thing as it exists for itself. But the unity belonging to a thing cannot be separated from the multiplicity of sense content of which it is the unity; unity and content live in and through one another. And the same applies as regards consciousness and unity; consciousness is unity and unity is consciousness. This is one of the things that Lotze has been insisting upon throughout. If, however, the consciousness which unifies a thing as it exists for us is *our* consciousness; and if our consciousness is excluded from that which unifies the thing as it exists for itself; then the content of the object as it exists for us must be distinct and separate from the content of the object as it exists for itself. This means that we can only experience a sense content belonging

Reasons  
for suppos-  
ing that  
one con-  
sciousness  
experiences  
the inner  
being of  
another  
conscious-  
ness.

to ourselves, which sense content does not belong to the real object as it exists for itself. He says: 'In all sensations and perceptions what enters consciousness . . . is invariably nothing but some inner state belonging to the spiritual being—the sensation or mental representation itself,—it is never the reality by means of which the state is brought about.'<sup>1</sup> Seeing, however, that this view must lead to the denial that we experience objects as they exist in and for themselves he seeks to get away from it. He asks: 'But why over and above this (i.e. the existence of things as monads and the unity of all monads in God) should there be a world of things, which themselves gain nothing by existing, but would only serve as a system of occasions or means for producing in spiritual subjects representations which after all have no likeness to their productive causes?'<sup>2</sup>

And Lotze goes so far as to draw this conclusion, that the world which each of us knows is merely a representation of a world of causes lying beyond our ken. He maintains that outside things act upon the body causing the body to act upon the soul; that the soul responds to this activity by producing within itself sensations which it organises into unities of sense qualities forming objects of experience; that these objects of experience represent the real objects which first acted upon the body.<sup>3</sup>

For the present, we need not go further into the problem as to how adequacy of representation and justification for knowledge of reality are to be accounted for on such a view as this. What we want to notice here is, that our experience of reality, and reality as it exists for itself, become separated realms.

This, however, is in direct contradiction to the

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, sec. 19 (Eng. trans., p. 64).

<sup>2</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 97.

<sup>3</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. iii. Chap. i. sec. 3 (Eng. trans., vol. i. pp. 282, 283).

view put forward by Lotze at the beginning of his metaphysical inquiries, to the effect that reality lives in our experience, and that it is the task of philosophy to describe reality as it exists there. If we are to keep to this starting point, then, as the argument has shown, we must recognise that the reality which belongs to an object, namely, its content, its unity, and its consciousness of itself, must live in our experience of that object; our consciousness must include within itself the consciousness belonging to that which it experiences.

We have seen Lotze reaching the point where, through a following up of his own principles, this view became the next step which ought necessarily to have been taken. But instead of taking it he drew back and accepted what were then, and indeed are more or less so now, regarded as axiomatic principles, namely, that consciousness centres in feeling, and that the consciousness belonging to one soul excludes from itself the consciousness belonging to another. This is to divide up the reality into a material world on the one side in which no soul or spirituality enters, and on the other side a kingdom of souls into which nothing of the reality of the material world can enter. This view was repellent to Lotze, but yet time after time he refused to follow the leading of his own thought, which was directed towards giving him a different and a deeper view of the unity of reality.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE WORLD AS A SYSTEMATIC UNITY OF THINGS

Reality as  
a complex  
or system-  
atic whole  
of real  
things

So far we have been dealing with objects as single things, disregarding their relations to other things. Lotze now tells us that a thing cannot be regarded as real when considered as standing by itself and out of relation to other things. He tells us that we consider an object as real when we can give it a definite place in a complex of other things.<sup>1</sup> He further tells us that when we perceive a thing we are only entering into one of the many relations to that thing into which it is possible for us to enter. He says, '*To be means to stand in relations, and being perceived is itself only one such relation beside other relations.*'<sup>2</sup>

Relations  
as deter-  
mining the  
being of a  
thing.

It is easy to see that the being of a thing is penetrated through and through with the relations in which it stands to other things. Its extent, for example, is determined by its spatial relations to other things; its weight by its attraction to, and repulsion from them; its density by its contact with other things whereby other things seek to penetrate into it. Again, modifications of colour and of light and shade are determined by the varying degrees of light falling upon the object and by juxtaposition to other coloured objects.

We must notice, however, that it is not altogether possible to reduce the properties of a thing to mere relations in which the thing stands to other things. For instance, we think of a thing as possessing some colour of its own which serves as the basis for all the modifications which that colour may undergo by being

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, Chap i. sec 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Outlines of Metaphysics*, sec 10.

brought near other coloured objects. We think the same thing as regards the other properties of a thing. Although we cannot determine a thing's movement except in relation to other objects, and although the fact that all objects thus move in relation to one another makes movement in a thing as we know it penetrated through and through with relations, we yet think of a thing as having some absolute movement of its own which serves as the basis of the relative movement possessed by the object.

Nevertheless, although we consider a thing as having a something of its own which serves as the basis for all the modifications which the nature of a thing undergoes in being brought into relation with other things, yet we cannot determine what this something is ; for the full reality of a thing is that in which the thing lives and finds its being, and this reality is that which exists in, and is determined by, the thing's relations to other things.

We must, however, distinguish between these relations which enter into the being of a thing and modify its nature, and those relations in which we mentally place a thing in order that we may the better describe it or know it. For instance, we say that sugar stands in a certain position amongst the carbon compounds, or that a certain orchid has a certain place in the orchid family, or that man stands in a certain place amongst the mammals. It is undoubtedly a matter of very great importance to determine whether or not the systematic unity which we give to classes of this kind is one which exists merely for our own knowledge, or one which also exists in the outside world amongst things and having a determining influence in the movement of reality. But it is clear that these relations are not those which we consider as entering into and modifying the nature of a thing and as therefore being necessary to the reality of the thing. If all the animals in the universe were to go out of existence and leave man, it would not

Relations which do not enter into the being of a thing.

destroy man's reality or existence; but if a man were taken out of all spatial relations, if he were taken out of all his social relations, he would cease to be at all.

Unique-  
ness of the  
perceptual  
relation

We have seen fairly clearly that the relations in which a thing stands to the outside world enter into the being of a thing and give character to it. With regard to the perceptive relation it seems as though its success depends upon this, namely, that the relation shall not enter into the being of the thing which is perceived, so as to determine it or modify it in any way different from its nature previous to being perceived. It is demanded that this relation shall carry the object into the being of the one who knows it, making the subject a partaker, for the time being, in the being of the object known; furthermore, this relation must not in any way alter that object, but must only enrich the being of the subject with the content of the object known. This raises the question as to whether or not the perceptual relation is, like other relations, a condition of the reality of that which stands in it. It seems as though the perceptual relation is not a condition of the reality of that which is perceived, but that it is a condition of the reality of us who perceive. Our life would seem to be a bare nothing if all power of perception were taken from it, for it is on the basis of perception that this life is built up. It may, of course, be maintained that the perceptual life is only the starting point, and indeed the essential starting point, for the development of a spiritual life which is not perceptual; and that when the human body, as that which enables us to enter into perceptual relations with things, dies, then the spiritual life proceeds in a further development of its own. This may or may not be the case. What we have to notice, however, is that the perceptual relation enters into the being and determines the nature of our present life here and now, and is a necessary condition of that life, for it is only through

this relation that the content which forms the basis of our life is brought into it.

If the perceptual relation, however, is thus one-sided in its determining influence, the world must be split up into two realms by this relation, namely, that containing those things whose being, or whose reality, is determined by the fact that they perceive other things, and that containing those things whose reality exists independently of the fact that they perceive or are perceived. Whatever consciousness of themselves we may give to things as a condition of their reality, yet we do not consider that this consciousness includes perception on the part of these things of other things which exist outside of them. We come to have a world of subjects on the one side, and a world of objects on the other side, objects having an existence in and for themselves through the fact that they feel their own being, subjects having an existence through the fact that they perceive or know the being of objects which stand outside of them. At this point we only indicate the fact that this question of the determining influence of the perceptual relationship is one very different in nature from the question as to the determining influences of the other relationships, and carries very much larger metaphysical issues with it. Later we shall have to go thoroughly into the problems involved in this question. Lotze, however, treats the perceptual relation as being on the same level as other relations, and when we give an account of his analysis of the nature of relations the perceptual relation must be taken as included amongst the others.

The one-sidedness of the perceptual relation as splitting the world into two.

We have seen how relations enter into the being of things, determining the nature of the content constituting that being, and we have also seen that relations determine the changes which that content undergoes. Now it is to this function of relations in determining the changes of one thing in reference to another that Lotze directs his attention ; his examina-

Analysis of the nature of relations.

tion of the nature of relations proceeds somewhat on the following lines: He tells us that the ordinary meaning attributed to the term 'relation' is that it is something which exists between things, and serves as a medium through which they can act and react on one another, and thus produce changes in each other's being; e.g. the relation of contact in space between a lighted match and gunpowder acts as a 'bridge' between the match and the gunpowder whereby each is rendered susceptible and receptive<sup>1</sup> to the influences which can now pass over from the one to the other so as to produce an explosion. The relation, thus considered, is a kind of thread along which influences can pass from one object to another. Attributes cannot detach themselves from a substance, float in a formless void, and then attach themselves to other substances; and the same applies to events, impulses, and influences. This conception of a 'Between' may be considered as solving the difficulty by constituting itself a medium which does away with the void between things in which no attribute, or influence, or event, can exist, and as thus allowing influences to pass from one thing to another. But the same difficulty arises here again, since the attribute or influence must detach itself from the object and attach itself to the 'Between,' and thus there arises the necessity for the existence of another 'Between,' between the first 'Between' and the object from which the attribute or influence is to come; and this difficulty is carried on *ad infinitum*. It is clear, then, that if a relation is a something which exists 'between' its terms it cannot solve the difficulty which it is intended to solve, namely, that of explaining how one thing comes to change in reference to another. Lotze now considers whether or not some other meaning can be given to the term 'relation' which will enable us to understand how it performs the function we assign to it. He proceeds somewhat as follows:

Relations  
as states  
of their  
terms.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 54 (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 134).

A relation is considered as setting its terms in a certain attitude towards each other, or as giving them a certain point of view, as it were, from which they can change in reference to one another. This change Lotze describes as reciprocal action. Since a relation is not outside its terms as a 'Between' connecting them together, and since the terms are to a certain extent determined in their activity towards one another by the nature of the relation in which they stand to one another, it follows that a relation is something in the terms themselves. But each of these terms is a substance, and substance consists only of the unity of a plurality of qualities changing according to a unique and individual law. There is in a substance nothing of the nature of a 'force' distinct from the attributes of that substance and necessitating it to act upon other substances. A relation, therefore, as existing within its terms cannot be distinct from the qualitative content of these terms. A relation is, in fact, nothing but its terms when these terms are in certain states of themselves. When substances are in certain states of themselves they change in reference to one another, or act and react upon one another, and those states which render such change possible constitute a relation between the changing substances. Lotze says, 'Let us admit that there is no such thing as this interval between things, in which, as its various possible modifications, we sought a place for these relations C, that we supposed to form the ground of the changing action of things upon each other. That which we sought under this name of an objective relation between things can only subsist if it is more than mere relation, and if it subsists not between things but immediately in them as the mutual action which they exercise upon each other and the mutual effects which they sustain from each other.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, Bk. 1. Chap. vi. sec. 81.

How we  
come to  
give to  
relations  
the  
character  
of a  
'Between.'

It has to be explained, however, how it is that we come to give to objective relations this character of a 'Between,' which, in reality, they do not possess. Lotze maintains that a relation, when considered as a 'Between,' is in reality a product of our thought, which in passing from the idea of one subject to that of another has a definite experience of the transition. This experience of a transition in thought is not unlike an idea; now the object to which an idea has reference has an independent existence of its own, and hence the product of thought arising from the transition of thought from the idea of one object to that of another is interpreted as having reference to an entitative existence like the objects to which ideas refer.<sup>1</sup>

Thus relations as existing between things, and as entering into their being, and as connecting them together in their changes, so that they shall attain to the reality which we recognise as belonging to them, do not exist. They are merely intellectual interpretations of the reciprocal actions between things. It is these actions which really perform the functions we had previously ascribed to relations.

Reciprocal  
action as  
involving  
the unity  
of all  
things.

Lotze now takes a further step. He first universalises the conception of reciprocal action, maintaining that there is a constant interdependence between all that exists, by which the states and changes of one thing are conditioned by the states and changes of all others. He tells us, further, that the assumption of this interconnectedness lies at the basis of all scientific reasoning; that a world in which this reciprocal action between all things did not take place would be one about which no scientific conclusion could be established, and in which no event could be anticipated. This means that a thing in order to be real must not merely change in reference to *some* other things or stand in relation to *some* other things, but that it must find a place as a recipro-

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 338.

cally acting element in a world which includes all things within itself. He now proceeds to show that such reciprocal action can only take place if things not merely exist in a single world but are states or parts of a single Being, which Being is identical with the world as a whole. The reasoning by which he seeks to establish this conclusion is as follows: When reciprocal action takes place between two objects A and B, what really happens is that A changes into a state of itself 'a,' and in consequence of this B changes into a state of itself 'b.' This means that a change of A into 'a' is also a change of B into 'b,' and a change of B into 'b' is also a change of A into 'a.' Thus the state 'a' of A must be regarded as also a state of B, and the state 'b' of B as also a state of A, because it is impossible for either A or B to be affected by something entirely external to itself. But how is it possible for a state of one thing A to be at the same time a state of another thing B? It is only possible if A and B are parts of a larger whole M which, through its own activity, produces or finds within itself a variety of states corresponding to the variety, or rather constituted by the variety of these objects which find their existence within it. Further, if all things act reciprocally with one another, it is clear that all things must find their existence as parts or states of a single being M which includes within itself all that exists.

Thus when things act in relation to one another, we have, not the actions of single wholes which are isolated from one another, but the single action of a single being holding within itself the many elements acting and reacting upon one another. Further, the activity of the whole takes place through the entirety of its being, so that a change in one part means a change in all parts. This change, however, will manifest itself in different ways in the different parts according to the different natures of the parts, so that the one change taking place in the whole will



manifest itself as many changes which are connected with one another.

Criticism  
of Lotze's  
views

We must now examine very carefully the views which Lotze has put forward in order to try to establish the conclusion that things find their existence and reality in being connected together as parts of a single existence 'M' which includes everything within itself. First, as to his views of the nature of relations. The following are the steps of the argument—activity means standing in relations; standing in relations means existing in certain states of themselves on the part of those things which stand in relations; existing in certain states of themselves means acting and reacting upon one another on the part of those same things.

But neither of these steps in the argument enables us to understand any the better how change in one thing comes to take place when change in another thing takes place. Lotze has shown that relations as existing between things do not enable us to understand how change takes place in these things—but his next step, consisting of the interpretation of relations as consisting of certain states of their terms, is in no better position. Let us take an example. Sulphur and iron filings when brought into contact with one another, and when both are at a low temperature, only act physically upon one another; if, however, they are heated to a high temperature and kept in contact with one another they combine to form a new substance entirely different from either iron or sulphur. But the actual movement from heated sulphur and iron filings to sulphide of iron escapes us altogether; we see heated sulphur and heated iron, and afterwards we see iron sulphide. The passing out of existence of the properties of iron and sulphur, and the coming into existence of the properties of iron sulphide, take place in front of our eyes; we see the yellow colour of the sulphur changing to brown; we see the iron filings penetrating

into the sulphur, becoming diffused there, and then losing themselves in the differently constituted mass of molten iron sulphide—but we fail to see any connection between these various changes; we fail to see how the yellow colour of sulphur is so connected with heat that heat changes it to brown; we fail to see how the magnetic properties of iron are so connected with sulphur that when sulphur penetrates the iron these magnetic properties pass out of existence. Could we do this, then we could understand how it is that cold sulphur will not combine with cold iron. As it is, what we see is one object A in a state of itself 'a,' another object B in a state of itself 'b,' and then a new object C; we see again the object A in a state of itself 'a<sub>2</sub>,' and the object B in a state of itself 'b<sub>2</sub>,' but instead of seeing C<sub>2</sub>, we only see A + B. Lotze himself gives the example of gunpowder and a lighted match.<sup>1</sup> To say, then, that when objects are in certain states of themselves they change in certain ways in reference to one another does not help us to understand or explain this change, for it does not show us *how* these states *contribute* to these changes, and that is just what we want to know. Thus Lotze's interpretation of relations as states of their terms constitutes no advance as an explanation of how one thing comes to change in reference to another; all that it really does is to tell us that sometimes change takes place and sometimes it does not take place.

The next step that Lotze takes is to maintain that when things are in certain states of themselves, and in consequence change in certain ways in reference to one another, this change consists of action and reaction, or, as he often calls it, 'reciprocal action.' Now, does this conception of reciprocal action add to our conception of change? Is there anything new in the conception of reciprocal action which will serve to explain how change takes place? We

Change as  
reciprocal  
action.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 52.

Difference  
between  
activity  
and change.

certainly think of action as being different from change; we consider ourselves active when the changes that take place in our being are consciously brought about by us in order to realise some end which we set before ourselves, or in order to stand in subordination to, or in conformity with, some ideal or principle which we consider as constitutive of our being; we merely change when what takes place in our life is not thus consciously subordinate to some principle with which we identify ourselves: for instance, we change in that we become old and our bodies decay, and so on; we act when we take exercise to make ourselves strong and healthy. The same is true of a thing: we cannot, of course, say that a thing consciously sets before itself an end which it seeks to realise, or consciously identifies itself with some ideal or principle, and that when it does this it acts. But we can and do say that a thing acts when its changes proceed from what we recognise as its being, or when the thing manifests its whole nature in the changes which it produces in itself. On the other hand, the thing merely changes when the alterations which take place in it are due to outside circumstances, over which the thing has, as it were, no control. A thing standing in the rain changes from dry to wet; it changes its colour when left in the sun, or when varying degrees of light fall upon it; sodium acts when it comes in contact with water; radium acts in continually giving out rays. Lotze recognises this difference; it is true he only recognises it in a passing kind of way, and that he makes very little of it; nevertheless the difference is noticed by him. He takes the case where a moist body, A, by becoming dry, makes a dry body, B, wet; he recognises that a change has taken place in both A and B, and that this change is effected by the moisture; but he tells us that this change is not one brought about by an active cause existing in A or B, or both together—that is to say,

the change in A and B is not one which we can describe as consisting of, or as living in, the activity of A and B, or of both A and B.<sup>1</sup> It is undoubtedly very difficult, in the case of a thing, to determine exactly the difference between change as brought about by activity on the part of that in which the change takes place, and mere change brought about in the thing by external circumstances ; but we see that even in ordinary language a difference is implied by these different conceptions.

In activity alterations in a thing's nature seem to spring from some initiative or from some moving principle existing in the thing itself, whereas in mere change the alterations in the thing do not spring from such a principle.

Now we have seen that when a thing acts, although acting from itself, it yet acts in reference to other things ; it is this fact of a thing's activity in reference to other things which constitutes one of the characteristics of the reality of a thing, and makes the thing real only in so far as it exists in a complex of other things. Lotze maintains that it follows from this that all change (and henceforward we will use the term 'change' as meaning active change, or change brought about through an active principle existing in that in which the change takes place) consists of reciprocal action between the objects involved in the change. He tells us that if the activity of one thing in relation to another consisted of activity on the one side and passivity on the other, then since the active element A would find several passive elements, C, D, E, standing along with it in the world, it would really have no way of choosing which passive element it should act in reference to ; hence it would not act at all in reference to other things. When, therefore, one thing acts in reference to others all the things taking place in the change involved in such activity are active in relation to one another.<sup>2</sup>

All action  
is reciprocal  
action.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 55.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, end sec. 50.

Meaning of  
the term  
reciprocal  
action.

In maintaining that one thing acts in reference to another we have continually used the phrase 'to act upon.' In reciprocal action we say that there is a mutual action and reaction of one thing upon another. Such a phrase certainly calls up visions of spatial relations, or of spatial juxtaposition, as being that in which such action consists, or, rather, as the necessary form under which it takes place. Lotze definitely rejects this view. For him the problem as to the conditions under which reciprocal action takes place involves the view that when things act upon one another, the one thing enters into the very being of the other, and by so doing brings that being to exert itself so as to produce changes in itself. In order to see how such changes take place it is necessary to understand how the being of one thing can enter into the being of another and bring it to activity. Spatial juxtaposition and spatial separation do not in any way show us how this can or cannot take place.

How  
reciprocal  
action  
takes  
place.

Lotze now puts forward suggestions as to how this reciprocal action takes place; he supposes two objects A and B to act upon one another; the problem is to ascertain how A comes to change the nature of B, and B to change the nature of A; he puts forward as an attempted solution of the problem the supposition that such activity takes place by means of an influence, or state, or event passing over from A, entering into the being of B and producing changes there; the same thing also happening where B acts upon A. Against this view he brings certain objections which lead him to reject it. First, he tells us that no influence, or state, or event can pass over from A to B, and from B to A, and exist in the interval of nonentity between these two, as it must do if such passage is really to take place. Secondly, he tells us that if an influence could detach itself from A in order to find its way to B, then in thus detaching itself in order to go to B, A must be already

influenced by B; but before B can influence A in order to cause A to send an influence to it, B must already be influenced by A, for if A were indifferent how could B single out A from a multitude of equally indifferent objects? Hence the conclusion that if the activity of one thing A upon another B is brought about by the passing of an influence from the one object to the other, then the object A must already influence B before it can start to influence it, which is absurd. Thirdly, he tells us that if an influence from A came to B, it would have to find a home there as it did in A, and it could only do this if A and B are homogeneous, or alike in nature. If this were the case, then all variety of reciprocal action would be destroyed, and we should be limited to one activity of the same kind running through all things. Further, likeness is no ground of activity between things, for in their likeness lies no determining principle which shall cause things to act upon one another in this way rather than in that. He says, 'For our minds, no doubt "a" and "a" form the sum "2 a" when coming together, but how they would behave in reality—whether one would add itself to the other, whether they could fuse with each other, would cancel, or in some way alter each other—is what no one can conjecture on the ground of this precise likeness between them.'<sup>1</sup>

Lotze then rejects the view that a ready-made effect can pass over from one thing to another and produce change in that to which it passes over.

Lotze's  
efforts fail  
to catch  
hold of  
activity.

Let us notice the result we have arrived at so far. We have seen that when an object A is in a certain state of itself 'a,' and B in a certain state of itself 'b,' A and B change in certain ways in reference to one another, which changes are of such a nature that they can be described as activities taking place in A and B. Further, we have seen that the activity of A in reference to B is such that it

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 59.

must be considered as carrying itself over to, or entering into, the nature of B, causing B itself to become active; and this activity of B also enters in the same way into the nature of A. Lotze tried to explain how the being, or nature, or activity of one thing could enter into the being of another thing, while holding to the view that the things taking part in such a process are separate from and independent of one another. He showed that if things are thus separate from one another they can only enter into each other's being through the medium of an influence of some kind passing from the one to the other; then he showed that such a passing is impossible, and that therefore things in their reciprocal action cannot be separate from and independent of one another.

## CHAPTER V

### THE DEEPER UNITY UNDERLYING THE SYSTEMATIC UNITY EFFECTED THROUGH RECIPROCAL ACTION

LOTZE'S argument now takes a new turn. He has failed to show how activity is the bond of union between things, because he has not been able to see how the activity of one thing *enters into* the being of another, thereby bringing reality to both interacting things and at the same time rendering them a unity. The problem which he set before himself to solve was as to how Reciprocal Action could give unity to the world of things, thereby making real all things taking part in it. Having failed in this, he seeks to find a unity deeper than that given by activity as such; a unity upon which activity is based, and which therefore renders this activity possible. He seeks a solution to this problem in three different directions. In the first place he bases activity upon a necessary logical unity; secondly, upon a real unity effected through the all-inclusive existence of the Divine Being; and thirdly, upon the unity involved in Substance.

Unity  
underlying  
that  
effected  
through  
activity.

In basing the unity of reciprocal action upon a deeper logical unity he asks, what is it that makes it possible that when objects are in certain states of themselves they take note of one another, become susceptible and receptive towards each other, so that they shall be able to change in certain ways in reference to one another? Instead of trying to catch hold of the actual activity of one thing in relation to another, he asks, how is it that things can come to adopt certain attitudes towards one another,

The  
logical  
unity  
underlying  
activity



which we call the relations existing between these things ; and how is it that these relations constitute an adaptation between the things standing in them, making it possible that these things shall become active in reference to one another ? Thus it is the fact of adaptation rather than the fact of activity that renders things objects.<sup>1</sup> Lotze considers this problem as logical, as one centring in the conceptions of ground and consequent, and not in those of cause and effect.<sup>2</sup> Here, however, arises a serious difficulty for Lotze. As we have previously seen, the logical relations into which we put a thing are not those relations which we consider as entering into the being of a thing and determining its nature ; logical relations are for the purpose of introducing unity into our mediate knowledge of reality. It would seem, then, that the driving back of the attitudes which things take up in reference to one another, and through which they are able to act upon one another, to the logical unity of ground and consequent, could not lead us to any real unity in the things themselves, but merely to unity in our knowledge of the things. Lotze recognises this very clearly. He supposes the logical relations of reason and consequent to be summed up in the form of general laws (not laws as principles of reality or as constitutive of substance). He maintains that when we derive one law from another through a process of syllogistic reasoning we proceed analytically. We arrive at last at a body of laws which can no longer be brought to unity through such reasoning, for they possess a real synthesis, which mere logic cannot give them. He holds that the unity belonging to this body of laws is determined by an aesthetic necessity and justice, and not by logic. He says, ' while undoubtedly a conception of the individual admits of being derived analytically from the general, the most general laws are given synthetic relations of reason and consequent,

Logical  
unity as  
being  
based  
upon an  
aesthetic  
and ethical  
necessity.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 53.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, secs. 58 and 69.

which we have simply to recognise without in turn making their condition dependent on the fulfilment of any condition whatever. No doubt, in the plan of the world as a whole, these given relations are not isolated, unconnected data. Anyone who was able to express this highest idea would find them bound together, not indeed necessarily by a logical connection but by an aesthetic necessity and justice.<sup>1</sup> He tells us, however, in the same section that this aesthetically necessary unity is one hidden for ever from us, and that the reason why to 'a + b' a consequence 'f' is attached, and to  $a_1 + b_1$  no consequence is attached, can never be known to us. The only unity we can ever know is that as a matter of fact these consequences are attached to these antecedents. If, then, this is the case, what meaning, we ask, can be assigned to the statement that the unity of things involved in the fact that they change in certain ways in reference to one another, when in certain states of themselves, is one of aesthetic necessity and justice?

Now Lotze's view that the underlying unity of the world is to be understood as a logical unity, although he eventually twists this logical unity into a synthetic unity determined according to certain aesthetic principles of justice, is really an expression of the view that the world of changing being, and of new existences as coming into being, is based upon an eternal foundation out of the reach of change. This raises difficult and important problems. As to how aesthetic unity and logical unity are connected with one another Lotze gives us very little information—indeed, aesthetic unity seems to be only the name for a unity possessing the logical characteristics of timelessness and eternal validity together with an unexplained synthesis not possessed by logical unity. The real problem, however, turns upon this question as to how that unity which is out of the reach of

Connection  
between  
the logical  
and the  
actual  
unity.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 50.

change comes to determine the unity which is involved in our world of things acting reciprocally with one another. Lotze now tells us that this eternal unity does not stand outside of, or beside, the living unity of the changing world, and acting upon it or influencing it just as we suppose one object to influence another, but that the eternal validity of a law connecting together eternally valid necessary truths lives in the law as being in process of fulfilment in reality. That is to say, the necessity of the fact that 'a' and 'b' are adapted eternally to one another, so that a result 'c' always follows from 'a' and 'b' coming together, is not something apart from the actual action of 'a' and 'b' on one another but lives in it. Lotze, however, is continually driven from this view to maintain that the primary unity is different from the living unity of reciprocal action. He maintains that before action can take place a commensurability on the part of the elements that are to act is necessary. Whether these elements act or do not act as a matter of fact, this commensurability nevertheless exists. Such commensurability then involves a unity somewhere which is independent of the fact that things do act upon one another. But Lotze cannot give form to this unity of commensurability or adaptability, for since it is a unity of validity merely, it cannot be considered a unity of existence, or a unity centring in the life of a single active existence; hence he tends to deny its reality altogether. Speaking of things which come to act upon one another he says, 'Between their qualities there would have had to be throughout a commensurability of some kind which rendered them, not indeed members of a single series, but members of a system in which various series are in some way related to each other. All, however, that this primary unity necessarily implied on the part of the elements of the world was simply this commensurability. Their origin from a single root, or their

permanent immanence in one Being, it only rendered probable. It is not till we come to the consideration of cause and effect that we find any necessity to adopt this further view—to hold that Things can only exist as parts of a single Being, separate relatively to our apprehension, but not actually independent.<sup>1</sup>

Lotze, further, gives a very clear argument for rejecting the view that the unity involved in adaptation or commensurability has any influence upon things as they actually exist and act upon one another; the argument arises out of his criticism of Leibnitz's theory of Pre-established Harmony. Lotze tells us that if all things are harmonised in God's understanding, before those things come to existence or reality in our world, then God really gains nothing by calling the world from idea into existence; for the whole history of the world, in consequence of this Pre-established Harmony, is predetermined down to the minutest detail in God's understanding. But an idea, when it becomes realised in the actual world, gains through this, that it becomes enriched with a new content given to it by real processes which create much more that is new and which was not previously contained in the idea even as ideal. If, then, Pre-established Harmony influences the course of our world, then nothing new, in the sense of being unknown, or unthought of, or unexperienced, could come into being. But, he tells us (and here he supposes that all things real are a unity and find their existence within the life of a single being), reality has no value if it does not bring forward new experiences. If nothing new ever came into our consciousness, then our life would have no value for us; and in the world as a whole, if nothing absolutely new and unthought of came into being, then the world could not enjoy itself and live in the consciousness which it has of itself. Lotze brings exactly the same criticism against the determinism involved in natural science.<sup>2</sup>

Lotze's criticism of Leibnitz in this respect as showing that the unity of validity exercises no influence on the unity of reality.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 69.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, secs. 63-5.

It is clear that this same criticism can be applied to any attempt to give Lotze's commensurability of all things a real unity determining the course of events, for if it be maintained that commensurable things act and react upon one another and produce something entirely new, it is clear that this something new must also be commensurable, or enter into this scheme of commensurability, else it could never take its place in the real world as a reciprocally acting element amongst others of its kind.

Impossibility of bringing unity of validity to bear upon unity of actuality.

Another difficulty which presents itself at this point is as to how the eternal unity of nature, or adaptation, or commensurability can be brought to exercise a determining influence upon the actual unity which things have when they come to interact. Reciprocal action is always definite and particular, coming into being at a particular point in time, and passing out of being at a particular point in time; taking place between this particular object and that particular object belonging to classes that are adapted to one another, and leaving numbers of other objects of these classes outside the actual interaction. This particular piece of sodium acts with this particular volume of water; in this activity new substances are formed which no longer act in the way in which sodium and water act. The formation of these new substances will bring the activity between sodium and water to an end, and the new substances may or may not enter into new reciprocal actions. If eternal validity brings actual unity to existence, then why should it choose this particular point in time rather than that, and limit itself to these particular members of adapted classes rather than those? If the circumstances in which things find themselves are responsible for their acting reciprocally with one another, then the eternity of adaptation or commensurability never reaches down to time, and it would be incumbent upon us to seek for the grounds of adaptability, not in an

eternal order, but in temporal existence. Lotze, indeed, tells us that the eternal adaptation does not exist in such a way that it can influence things as one thing influences another; on the contrary, it lives in the actual reciprocal action which things undergo, and finds in this action a continual process of fulfilment. But this is to reduplicate as an order of validity the unity of actuality. If we say that sodium acts with water to form sodium oxide and hydrogen, and that they must always so act because their natures are eternally adapted to one another in this particular way, this *must* of eternal adaptability in this respect is in reality nothing more than an abstract statement, made on the basis of the principle of identity, of what actually takes place. In the world of fact we find individual wholes of various kinds, each possessing a unique nature of its own, and consisting of an inexplicable unity of sense qualities; e.g. we find that coal is black, brittle, shining, and possesses a certain specific gravity. Why the particular shade of blackness and the particular degree of brittleness and the particular specific gravity should be so connected is a matter beyond our ken. That this degree of blackness and brittleness, and this specific gravity are adapted to one another through an eternal necessity is a view which we could not hold. To maintain that coal must possess this unity is no more than an abstract statement derived from the fact that we have chosen to call this particular unity by the name of coal, and is made on the assumption that coal is coal, i.e. on the principle of identity. The case is no otherwise when we come to consider wider unities of factual existence, the nature of which can be expressed in the form of law. In the case of the action of sodium on water to form sodium oxide and hydrogen two wholes come together and form another whole through an individual and unique process. To say that the properties of sodium and those of water are so

adapted to one another that they must of necessity form a new combination of properties distributed between two new individual wholes, namely, sodium oxide and water, is in principle the same as to say that the particular blackness of coal, and its particular brittleness, and its particular specific gravity are of necessity so adapted to one another that they must come together to form coal. Between these natures there is no necessity but that of fact. Having isolated our whole from the facts of experience, and having given it a name, or a number of names, we are forced to predicate to it for all time and all eternity the peculiar unity which it possesses. How then comes it, it may be asked, that not one particular piece of sodium, but pieces of sodium time after time, and always in the same way, come to unite with water to produce the same result? Necessity must lie somewhere here, else sodium may at one time not unite with water. The answer to this question is that different pieces of sodium are not different wholes but merely parts of the same whole, namely, all the sodium that exists. The plurality arrived at by considering particular pieces of sodium as individual or unique wholes is not a plurality of nature but of aggregation. The same applies as regards particular volumes of water. To maintain that what is true of sodium is true of all pieces of sodium is not to refer to an eternal principle of validity carrying necessity with it, and therefore possessing a nature different from fact, but to refer to the principle of identity which enables us to build up a system of reference to fact. When we say that sodium acts with water in a certain way, and that because it always and invariably does this it must do so on account of a law possessing universal necessity and validity; and when we proceed further to attribute to this law a validity different in nature from fact, we are really making each particular piece of sodium a whole different in nature from the

whole consisting of all the sodium in the world, and calling in this eternal validity to heal the plurality of nature which we ourselves have wrongly created. The nature of validity must not be sought in any eternal system standing over against the world of fact, but in the relation of thinking beings to reality whereby these beings are able to build up a system of ideas referring to reality. Thus we have seen that Lotze cannot derive the actual unity of all things, which unity is expressed in reciprocal action, from an underlying logical unity.

Lotze now tries to show that the unity of activity is based upon a real unity effected through the all-inclusive existence of the Divine Being. By taking things as simple beings each wrapped up in its own individuality he has failed to account for the changes which things undergo in reference to one another, and in which changes the things show themselves as being what we call real. He has failed to account for the activity of these beings upon one another in that he could not discover a connection between them, such connection being presupposed in the action upon one another of things which are separate. The next step he takes is to maintain that things exist in a single world in such a way that they stand in no need of a connection as existing between them holding them together and yet apart. We have already seen how he tries to establish this conclusion; his argument is to the effect that if no change or influence can pass over from A to B or from B to A, and if both A and B change in reference to one another, then A and B must exist in such a way that a change in the one is at the same time a change in the other; such an existence can only be formed when A and B are parts of a whole, for in a whole the whole itself acts in such a way that in its changes a passing from one to the other does not take place; the whole acts and changes at once in and through all its parts. From this it at once followed that since all things

Nature  
of the  
unity of  
existence  
which  
holds  
between all  
things.



act upon one another, either directly or indirectly, the whole world really consists of a single being M putting forth its single activity, which lives in or runs through all things and gives them the appearance of acting upon one another from independent standpoints. Into the question as to how a whole can act at once in and through all its parts, Lotze does not inquire; he takes it as an ultimate fact admitting of no further explanation.

Criticism  
that M is  
not re-  
quired to  
explain  
particular  
reciprocal  
action.

Certain difficulties present themselves at this point. If, in every reciprocal action, the whole M acts, then it would seem as though we ought to be able to trace, or at least to set before ourselves the ideal of tracing, not merely the actions of 'a,' 'b,' and 'c' which enter into this or that particular reciprocal action, but also the actions of 'd,' 'e,' 'f,' etc., as entering into it, until all things finding an existence in M are exhausted. It is quite true that in cases of physical action, such as the striking of one billiard ball upon another, we consider all material existence, even to the furthest stars, as contributing to the effects which the billiard balls have upon one another. But physical action is not the only kind of reciprocal action, and in many of the other kinds the whole of the activity seems to be, and indeed is considered as being strictly limited to the very few objects immediately taking part in it. These few objects form for the time being a whole among themselves in and through the particular activity in which they all take part; in this whole outside things have no part, and therefore the unity of outside things, in so far as that unity is effected by reciprocal actions as existing between those things, would seem to have no part here either. It is true that the objects taking part in this particular reciprocal action are connected with the outside world in a multitude of different ways; but in reference to the particular action in which they now take part they are not so connected.

Lotze's answer to the problem we have just raised is to the effect that the change which M initiates and determines in itself only requires that these few objects shall act upon one another, and demands that the rest of the world shall remain unaffected for the time being.<sup>1</sup> He rests this argument on a deeper view, holding that the world is the expression of a single meaning; in order to maintain unity of meaning, as against change which might destroy such unity, it is not necessary that a corresponding change shall run through every portion of the world, when a change takes place in this or that particular portion.<sup>2</sup>

Lotze's answer that the unity of the world is that of singleness of meaning and does not demand singleness of reciprocal action.

Now it is clear that in this unity of meaning we have a kind of unity other than that of reciprocal action. This unity is intended to heal the seeming pluralism that runs through actual reciprocal action. A thing has meaning in so far as it adapts itself or can be adapted to purposive activity on the part of a consciousness which acts in relation to it. This consciousness may belong to that which claims meaning, as when the object is a person; or it may belong to a consciousness outside of the thing, as when we seek to give meaning to some instrument, machine, or thing. This is the case, too, where meaning is summed up in statements: a sentence has meaning when it conveys an idea to me, such a conveyance of ideas to me through the medium of language representing another's purpose of giving me some kind of information. A thing may have many meanings according to the many purposes for which conscious beings can use it; singleness of meaning is gained through or represents singleness of purpose; a life gains unity of meaning when the person to whom it belongs has introduced into it a singleness of purpose; a thing has a single meaning when it can be used for only one purpose.

What are we to understand by meaning?

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 72.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 70 end, and sec. 72.

Can the  
world be  
said to  
have  
meaning?

When it is said that the world has singleness of meaning, is it meant that our purposes in relation to the world as a whole enable us to give meaning to the world, or is it meant that the world is a conscious being having a purpose in relation to itself? Lotze undoubtedly means it in the latter sense. He considers that the universe is a conscious being having a meaning for itself. But unity of consciousness is not bound up with unity of purpose; for unity of purpose has to be gained. We see that the whole movement of human life is directed to subordinating conflicting purposes to the unity of a single purpose. Further, such singleness of purpose is not confined to the individual: the movement of national life is directed towards the gaining of singleness of purpose by the community constituting the nation; the nation, again, strives to take part in a larger and more comprehensive movement which shall give unity to the race; and lastly, these movements of the individual, the nation, and the race tend to become movements in a still larger movement towards the realisation of a singleness of purpose comprehending within itself the whole of humanity. These larger movements are essentially characteristic of modern times. Now comes the question: Is the purpose there from the beginning; is it only waiting for the struggle which shall bring it to full and perfect being; or is the purpose to be gained—a something to be sought for and introduced into life; has it to be produced from the many conflicting purposes of daily life? Thus to show that the world has a singleness of meaning which gives unity to all that takes place in it, requires the solution of several problems connected with the nature of conscious and of self-conscious life, the relation of centres of consciousness to one another and to the world as a whole. At the point of his argument where he tries to show that the world of material objects is a single whole through the fact that there runs through

it a singleness of material activity, Lotze springs upon us the categorical statement that the world has singleness of meaning, and that this singleness of meaning gives it unity of material activity. How meaning can be realised through the medium of such merely material activity—for at this point of the argument the activity of objects must be taken as merely material—Lotze does not tell us. We are therefore justified in neglecting, at this period, his contention that the world has singleness of meaning which gives unity to its seemingly pluralistic material activity.

Further, even if the world had singleness of meaning which it had to maintain against changes in itself which would tend to destroy it, this does not solve the problem which Lotze seeks to solve by the use of this theory, namely, the problem as to how the activity of all things centres in a whole which includes them all within itself. The question at once arises as to how these changes originate in the world; does the world as a whole initiate activity in certain parts of itself in order that its unity of purpose may be destroyed for the moment, and that in the next moment it may be restored again? If this is the case, what can the world gain by such a process? If the world has a singleness of meaning, or of purpose, and if this meaning rests in the world itself as a whole, and can only be destroyed and restored again by the activity of the world itself, then all reason for movement and change is destroyed—the world may keep its singleness of meaning or of purpose in eternal immobility—for it gains nothing by change. If, on the other hand, change is initiated in parts of the world, independently of the world as a whole, and if the world has to react upon these changes in order to restore singleness of meaning in itself, then the activity of individual things can claim an independence of the activity of the whole, and singleness of activity is destroyed notwithstanding unity of

Unity of meaning as not solving the problem which Lotze meant to solve.

meaning, for we now have activity initiated in things and activity initiated in the whole, both standing facing one another.

The reality of individual things as given to them by the whole in which they enter

We have seen Lotze seeking to show that a thing is only real in so far as it is a part of a whole which includes all existence within itself. The question now arises as to how this whole comes to give reality to the various objects which find existence within it. The problem that has to be solved is as to how the whole, through its nature, or activity, or purpose, or meaning—that is to say, through that which renders it a whole—gives rise in itself to certain dividing lines, as it were, which enables us to mark off the being or reality of one thing from that of another. Lotze has failed to show us how the logical unity of adaptation, which he further resolved into an aesthetic unity, can give us such dividing lines, or how unity of meaning, which he considered the world as possessing, can perform this task. On account of this failure he has not been able to show that there is singleness or unity of reciprocal action running through the world, which would enable us to see how each thing is an element in, and finds a determinate place in a whole through which such unity of activity runs.

Lotze's theory of substance as being put forward as a solution of this problem

The question now arises as to whether or not his theory of substance will help us out of this difficulty. Lotze maintains that the single being *M*, in which all things find their existence, is a substance.<sup>1</sup> Now the content of a finite substance consists of a plurality of sense contents which are bound together to form a whole through the unique way in which their varying determinations are exchanged for one another under varying conditions. Neither as regards contents nor as regards activity does Lotze give us any reason to consider the Infinite Substance as differing in nature from a finite substance. In fact,

<sup>1</sup> *Microkosmos*, Bk. III. Chap. v. sec. 3 (Eng. trans., vol. 1. p. 381).

he never puts forward the idea that there can be any essential difference between them. We may note in passing, however, that in the case of a finite substance the conditions which determine change in it are external to it; in regard to the Infinite Substance this cannot be the case. Lotze would say in answer to this that conditions determining change in a thing are not really external to that thing, but enter into its being; if, however, this is really the case, then a thing cannot be a substance, and we should have not many objects, each being a substance, but only one substance. And, indeed, this is a conclusion to which Lotze himself is driven. It is evident that the content of the Infinite Substance must consist of all the various sense contents belonging to all the various finite substances which go to make up the world; the substantiality of the Infinite Substance must be found in this—that all the various sense qualities, while participating in various modes of behaviour according as they belong to this particular object or to that particular object, at the same time participate in a single mode of behaviour which extends over the whole of existence. Each unique mode of behaviour of each unique group of sense qualities which we characterise as a thing, while having a distinct character of its own, yet acts in relation to the modes of behaviour of other things, so that altogether the modes of behaviour form a single activity. Thus things, as regards both their content and their activity, are not independent; they are dependent upon the one single being which comprehends them all within itself. Really, there is no independent reciprocal action between independent objects; there is only the one action of the one Infinite Substance, which in some unknown way divides itself up into the many actions of the many substances going to form its being. Quotations from Lotze will make this plain. He says, 'Every excitation of the individual is an excitation of the whole

Infinite, that forms the living basis even of the individual's existence. . . . It is not anything finite that out of itself as finite acts upon something else; on the contrary, every stimulation of the individual, seeing that it affects the eternal basis that in it, as in all, forms the essence of the finite appearance, can through this continuity of related being—but through this alone—act upon the apparently remote.'<sup>1</sup> Again he says, 'As in all being the truly existent is one and the same, so in all reciprocal action the infinite acts only on itself.'<sup>2</sup> As regards the manner in which the one Infinite activity comes to split itself up into many activities taking place in many substances, Lotze says, 'It is true that the manner in which it comes to pass, that even within the one Infinite Being one state brings about another, remains still wholly unexplained; and on this point we must not deceive ourselves. How it is in general that causal action is produced is as impossible to tell as how Being is made.'<sup>3</sup> This interdependence of all activity through its taking place in the medium of Infinite Substance is manifested in the unity which we term the 'laws of nature.'

Here it is clear that Lotze has failed again to show how the whole has given reality to the parts, or to single objects. The argument really amounts to no more than the statement that if the parts are real the whole must be real.

Lotze as  
denying  
any  
reality to  
objects

Now comes the question—if the Infinite Substance is that which alone acts, and if we fail to see how this Infinite Substance gives independent activity to the finite substances existing in it, how comes it that such finite substances seem to have independent activity? Lotze takes a further step and seems to maintain that the Infinite Substance *M* divides itself up into a plurality of real objects only in our apprehension.

<sup>1</sup> *Microkosmos*, Bk. III Chap. V. sec. 3 (Eng. trans., vol. I. p. 381).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>3</sup> *Outlines of Metaphysics*, sec. 48.

The changing plurality of the world of sense is only seeming, and the oneness of the All is the only reality. He says, 'It is not till we come to the consideration of cause and effect that we find any necessity to hold this further view—to hold that things can only exist as parts of a single Being, separate relatively to our apprehension, but not actually independent.'<sup>1</sup> Again he says, 'Let M be the truly existing substance; A, B, and R the single things into which, relatively to our faculties of presentation and observation, the unity of M somehow resolves itself.'<sup>2</sup> We do not consider that Lotze held or would have held that the world of objects is lost in the Infinite, as these statements imply. It was the conviction of the real existence of a real plurality of real objects in the natural world, each having an existence in and for itself, that he sought to justify, and which gave him the starting point of his philosophy. But his efforts to arrive at a real unity of the plurality of sense led him very near to a denial of a real plurality, which denial involves the theory that individual things have no reality belonging to themselves, or which they possess in and for themselves. Further, another difficulty arises in connection with this view: if the whole M separates itself into a many relatively to our apprehension, then we must stand outside of the whole, because the whole can only be made up of objects which do not apprehend other things. And this is largely true of Lotze's whole procedure—he finds his unity of all things in the unity of material existence, and later comes to introduce into this unity a whole world of soul existence which was not in it at the beginning.

We may ask, however, how Lotze comes to the view that the whole splits itself up into a plurality relatively only to our apprehension. Certainly, the logic through which he goes in trying to give unity

Why  
Lotze  
tended to  
deny real  
plurality.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, Bk. i. Chap. vi. sec. 69.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk. i. Chap. vi. sec. 70.



to the world drives him to this conclusion, but it is quite possible that in saying that our apprehension divides the world up something different may be meant. We are all aware of the fact that in our apprehension of the world we divide up reality according to different, and often cross principles, so that what from one point of view seems one object, from another point of view seems many objects. In saying, then, that the world divides itself up into a many in our apprehension, Lotze may wish to emphasise this fact, namely, that our apprehension is inadequate to finding out the ultimate divisions or principles which divide up the world and render it a real plurality, and that consequently we never come to know an ultimate individuality. Thus we see that whatsoever nature Lotze gives to the whole of reality, whether it be that of a logical whole, a whole formed by some kind of aesthetic unity or justice, a whole of meaning, or a whole of reciprocal action, or, lastly, a whole of substance, he fails to show how this whole gives reality to that which exists within it. The principles which divide up the world into many objects, each having a reality of its own, are not shown to spring from the whole—it is as if things claim a reality of their own, not in virtue, but in spite of their existence in the whole.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE NATURE OF THE PLURALITY EXISTING IN THE WORLD

WE are now brought to the question of the many, or the problem of plurality. Lotze's insistence that a thing possesses reality in its own right makes it necessary for him to show that the world is a real plurality. It seems often to be taken for granted that the problem of the One and the Many is chiefly, if not wholly, concerned with showing that the world is One, or unity, and in trying to give expression to the form of unity which shall hold within itself the obvious plurality of the world. It is rarely considered that any difficulty exists in showing that the world is a plurality, or in determining what exactly is the principle of plurality. Lotze, however, did seek a principle of plurality lying in the material world which would enable him to mark off the reality of one thing from that of another. This principle was that of substance. A thing, he said, is real if it is a substance, and it is a substance if it can be shown to possess a unique mode of behaviour amongst a circumscribed group of sense qualities. We must now consider whether this conception of substance serves as a principle of plurality. The particular mode of behaviour which belongs to an object, and which separates it from other objects having other and different modes of behaviour, is, in many cases, only a particular aspect of that object's being, and separates it from other objects only in this or in that respect, but not completely. We consider the world under this or that aspect because our interest in it is of this or of that kind, and we find that the point

Substance  
as a  
principle  
of  
plurality

Criticism of  
this view

of view from which we look at the world makes a very great difference as to what we consider as the modes of behaviour of objects, and as to where we place the dividing lines between those objects. This is particularly the case with the different sciences; each science splits up the world differently. But while each science considers the world as being *really* divided up in the way in which it considers it as being divided, still it does not regard these divisions as ultimate. To find out what are the ultimate divisions of the world is not the task of any one of the positive sciences; this task belongs to philosophy. Lotze, in his theory of substance, however, gives us a principle which, instead of going beyond the principles of division which each science uses, leaves these principles as ultimate. When taking the world from the point of view of the chemist, and at the same time accepting Lotze's view of substance, we must regard the divisions which the chemist draws in the world as ultimate divisions of reality; and the same applies as regards the other sciences. Thus we come to have confused divisions of reality. This can be illustrated easily if we take the sciences of chemistry, physics, and biology. The chemist regards elements and compounds as having definite and unique modes of behaviour, and these are the wholes with which he deals; for him gold is a substance, and all the gold that is forms only one substance. The physicist regards things from the mass point of view, and whatever is brought under a unique play of forces and responds in a unique way to it, is for him a whole, and, in Lotze's sense of the term, a substance. For the physicist a very small piece of gold would form a whole in Lotze's sense of the term. The biologist regards that as a whole which has a definite biological function, and for him a cell is the unit. Thus we see that Lotze's conception of substance is not a principle which will introduce order among the various cross

divisions into which we split up the world when we look at it from varying points of view.

Lotze could not but be cognisant of the failure to reduce the perceptual world to plurality through the conception of substance as a law governing the mode of behaviour of a group of sense qualities. He now brings in a new principle as constituting the inner being, and therefore the individuality of things. He holds that the singleness of substance and its separation from other substances consists in its nature as a self-feeling and self-experiencing being. Most philosophers are agreed that the perceptual or material world has its basis in a spiritual world, although different philosophers will interpret this dependence of the material world upon the spiritual in very different ways. In seeking to solve the problem of the unity and plurality of the world, the material may first be reduced to the spiritual, and the unity of all things may then be sought in the spiritual realm of being. Lotze himself, in his conception of substance, reduces the material to the spiritual, but at the same time he seeks to find a unity of the material as material; he considers the material world as having a characteristic unity and plurality of its own, and he seeks to understand these aspects of its being without first having recourse to their deeper spirituality. We have seen how he has failed in this—his conception of substance does not give us a real plurality, nor does it point out to us where the real plurality in the world lies.

Lotze now comes to consider that a real plurality, that is to say, a plurality the members of which are individual and independent of one another, can only exist if these members are minds. He held that things, as such, can act and react upon one another only if they are states of the One Infinite Being which comprehends them all within itself. But he saw that in this way the actual sense content and also the activity of a thing can no longer be thought of

A second principle of plurality that things are minds

Reason for transferring the principle plurality to minds.

as belonging to that thing itself, but must be considered as belonging to the whole in which all things find their existence. If things possess only this sense content and this activity, both of which belong to them as material objects acting and reacting upon one another, then that independence which is to constitute them a real plurality does not seem to exist among them. Things must be independent; they must be something for themselves, and they cannot be this unless they are, in some way or another, outside of the Infinite. He says, 'It is true, however, that things, so long as they are only states of the Infinite, are nothing in relation to themselves; it is in order to make them something in this relation or on their own account that we insist on their existence outside the Infinite.'<sup>1</sup> According to him this independence or self-existence is constituted by self-hood—only those things are independent which feel or experience their own being. 'It is in so far as something is an object to itself, relates itself to itself, distinguishes itself from something else, that by this act of its own it detaches itself from the Infinite.'<sup>2</sup> This self-feeling and self-experience of one being cannot enter into the life of another; each being is confined exclusively within its own inner life of feeling. 'Now all inner states of all other things are unattainable by us; of only our own souls, which we hold to be one of these real beings, have we an immediate experience.'<sup>3</sup> Thus things have a hidden and inner life of their own, and it is this inner life which constitutes each an object whose being is quite shut off from the being of other things, and which thus makes the many a real plurality. The outer life of things, that life which we perceive and which consists of the sense qualities and the mechanical activities of things—this it is that makes

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 98.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 98.

<sup>3</sup> *Outlines of Metaphysics*, sec. 76. See also *Microcosmos*, Bk. iii, Chap. iv., sec. 4.

a One, or which brings it about that things come to find their existence in the life of a single being, which comprehends them all within itself. Thus Lotze separates the principle of plurality from that of unity, placing the one in the material world as material and the other in a mental world which is different from, although connected with, the material world.

But does his conception of souls as underlying material existence give us the principle of plurality which substance failed to give? On a first glance it would seem as though substances and souls as they form the material world must be numerically identical, and that therefore, if the conception of substance failed to show us the dividing lines, in reality the conception of soul must also fail in the same way and for the same reason. Lotze tells us that the unity of substance consists of the unity of mind or soul—not, be it understood, the unity of the subject in knowledge—hence it would seem that the soul underlying a material existence must share the same fate as the substance which is said to constitute the reality of that existence. Lotze, however, does not content himself with making substance and soul identical. He seeks to determine from a much more fundamental point of view the relation between the plurality which is characteristic of extended matter and the plurality which is characteristic of minds.

The problem had previously presented itself to Leibnitz, who had tried to solve it by making both identical. He had tried to establish a point-to-point identity between the ultimate divisions in matter and the ultimate divisions existing between the minds or substances underlying matter. He had maintained that indivisibility is a necessary characteristic of substance; he had also maintained that the extended world is substantial; coupling together these two positions he arrived at the conclusion that the extended world, although infinitely divisible, must have as its basis an ultimate indivisibility; he held

Relation  
between  
souls  
underlying  
matter and  
matter  
itself

Relation  
between  
the  
plurality  
of ex-  
tension  
and the  
plurality  
of minds  
as held by  
Leibnitz

Criticism  
of this  
view.

that only minds are ultimately indivisible and that therefore the infinite divisions in extended matter are in reality infinite divisions among souls. He tells us that these souls, by a certain force of resistance to each other which they possess, prescribe places for each external to the other and so give rise to a whole that is extended. The obvious criticism against this is that this force of resistance, in prescribing places for souls external to each other, does not give rise to extension but already presupposes it. Leibnitz himself saw this difficulty and tried to avoid it by maintaining that the extended world, as such, is not real but only phenomena *bene fundata*. It is a something which, as extended, only exists in the consciousness of the apprehending subject; it is produced in this subject by the action of a real, unextended world upon it. Thus it may be said that minds, through the fact that they form a real plurality, do not enter into each other's being, or do not interpenetrate one another; the efforts of each to keep others from penetrating its own being are interpreted by the apprehending subject as spatial resistance and are considered as giving rise to spatial relations. Thus what is in reality an unextended world comes to be apprehended as extended.

But this attempted solution does not get rid of the real difficulty, because the infinite divisibility of extended matter consists of a plurality which, from the nature of the case, cannot be resolved; no ultimate members of the plurality can be found. On the other hand, the ultimate indivisibility which characterises minds means that among minds ultimate members of the plurality are to be found. If the plurality among minds and the plurality in matter are to be identical or are to correspond, even although the correspondence is interpretative, there ought to be in extended matter, and in so far as it is extended, some ultimate plurality each of the members of which is a unity which cannot be further

reduced to anything less than a unity. If we take any extended piece of matter, there is, lying at its basis, a plurality of minds or souls; these souls are each a unity which cannot be resolved further. It follows from this that the plurality of minds is finite; but in order to arrive at these minds lying at the basis of matter, Leibnitz tells us that we are to carry the division of matter to infinity, and that such an infinite division gives us a finite plurality. But if we must first carry division to infinity before arriving at ultimate entities we shall never arrive at such entities. We are left with the plurality of minds calling for finitude, through the fact that it is a real plurality, and yet being infinite through the fact that it is the basis of matter.

We have given so much space to the consideration of the views of Leibnitz on this point because Lotze adopts these views, taking them wholesale from Leibnitz.<sup>1</sup> The criticism which applies to Leibnitz on this point also applies to Lotze. But there is an additional criticism which has to be applied to Lotze over and above that applied to Leibnitz. We have to ask how the ultimate members of an extended plurality can be substances in Lotze's sense of the term, i.e. how can each consist of a group of sense qualities having a unique and definite mode of behaviour? The first thing we have to notice is that the members of this plurality must be infinitely small; the division of matter is carried to infinity before the individual substances are arrived at. Such substances, in so far as they are single individual beings, cannot be objects of our experience; hence the assertion that such substances consist of groups of sense qualities, each group having its own definite mode of behaviour, is not one made on the basis of an immediate experience of the objects themselves as individual beings. It may, however, be said that the objects of our perceptual experience are composed

Lotze's  
acceptance  
of the  
views of  
Leibnitz.

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. iii. Chap iv. on *Life in Matter*.



of such individual substances, and that since each single object in all its parts exhibits a plurality of sense qualities acting according to a unique and individual law, each of the minutest parts going to make up the object consists of these qualities acting in this particular way. No doubt, if Lotze were pressed on such a point he would answer in this way. But we have to notice that his conception of substance was undoubtedly framed to fit the ordinary objects of perceptual experience and not the highly problematic entities arising from an infinite division of these objects. Again, taking these infinitely small substances arising from the infinite division of extended matter, we have reason to believe that the substances individually may have very different modes of behaviour from that which they have *en masse*. When the particles of water are loosely held together we have vapour, when more closely held together we have water. Gold, again, in the mass is yellow, but when very fine it is green. We see, then, that to argue from the nature of a whole to the nature of its parts, when these parts are not and cannot be a matter of direct experience, may often lead us astray. We cannot say that because such and such an object, when taken as a whole, is throughout all its parts constituted by sense qualities united together and acting according to a definite mode of behaviour, therefore each of the parts taken by itself is in reality constituted by these sense qualities acting in the same way.

Thus we see how Lotze has attempted to introduce real plurality into the world. First, he takes the plurality as given in the world, that is to say the plurality which is seen to exist amongst objects acting in relation to one another; he seeks to introduce unity into this plurality by making all the objects states of a single being M. Now comes the task of showing how this single being M gives reality and therefore plurality to its parts. Lotze fails to

show how this is brought about. Some principle of plurality, however, must be found else the objects in the world lose their reality. The conception of substance is brought in to serve as such a principle—but here again failure meets Lotze, and he introduces the self-feeling and self-existence belonging to mind in order to supplement the principle of substance; but minds are hidden away somewhere in the inner recesses of the being of material things, and therefore cannot serve as experiential indicators of plurality. We cannot look at things and see at once where the mind of this piece of matter ends and the mind of another piece of matter begins; hence Lotze is forced to introduce amongst minds an external principle of division, namely, the infinite divisibility of extended matter. The introduction of this principle, however, destroys his theory of substance as a principle of reality, for substance, as the law governing the changes of a definite group of sense qualities, becomes unmeaning when applied to the problematic entities obtained from an infinite division of extended matter.

The question now arises as to where Lotze has failed. He started out with the idea that philosophy has to define what we mean by a real thing. He denied the validity of the view that philosophy has to discover the nature of that which is real in itself apart from experience. He tells us that we describe our experiences as real or as constituting a thing when they exhibit certain characteristics, and the task of philosophy is that of giving clear expression to these characteristics. But, as we have seen, Lotze, in describing these characteristics, was forced more and more to regard them as forming or constituting a nature which has an existence apart from the fact that they are our experiences, or the experiences of anyone at all. This nature became more and more a something held together by the thing itself as existing apart from our experience.

Where  
Lotze goes  
wrong.

As being held together in itself it came to be a closed whole separate from other things and from us; in fact it came to be a (Thing In Itself.) Now this theory that each thing has a reality for itself, and that in possessing such reality it is a closed whole, demands that clear lines of separation shall be drawn between the various things going to make up the whole of reality; it thus prejudices, in a way, the whole problem of the One and the Many, for the Many are considered as separate and the One as somehow holding together by means of dividing and uniting lines things which are separate. But lines of separation are essentially static, and our idea of them is drawn from our perception of extended matter considered merely as extended. This brings it about that Lotze, in seeking to find a real plurality amongst things, is driven to a spatial interpretation of reality. He seeks unity in an all-embracing whole which is really a kind of spatial whole, and he makes the principle of unity centre in something static, namely, in eternal adaptation. The same thing happens with regard to the plurality of the world, for at the last he finds the principle of plurality in spatial division, and by so doing loses plurality in infinite division, which really represents the impossibility of ever arriving at ultimate members of a plurality. Lotze, in his endeavours to determine the nature of reality, has left experience and fallen back upon certain logical prejudices; he unconsciously holds that the fact of things possessing a reality in or for themselves rules out our experience as a factor determining the nature of this reality, and as a result he is driven to logical presuppositions as the factors determining this reality. But even logical presuppositions by themselves fail, for they contain no content, and thence Lotze is driven to some aspect of reality, namely, the spatial, from which he draws a content which shall fulfil the demands of logic. This turning away from experience as that

in which reality lives first occurs when Lotze tries to show that the reciprocal action in which things find themselves, and which gives them reality, presupposes a unity of all things, for here he turns aside from the nature of reciprocal action to the nature of the seeming logical presuppositions involved in it.

We turn back to the point where we consider Lotze as having wandered from the track which his thinking had marked out for him, namely, to the point where he considers that a thing in order to be real must act in relation to other things. The things which act upon one another consist of the contents of our experience grouped together to form a whole; as such they are considered by Lotze as having a certain nature which they possess for themselves, notwithstanding the fact that they also live in our experience.

The nature  
of reci-  
procal  
action.

He holds further that this nature which is possessed by things is of a permanent character. This can be seen from the following: first, he considers this nature as capable of being expressed in the form of law, this law having two aspects, the one that of actual realisation in the living reality, the other that of eternal validity in a system of truth. Secondly, he considers that the natures of things are adapted to one another, such adaptation rendering reciprocal action possible, the world forming a whole through this action. It is clear that if the activity of things can only proceed on the basis of such adaptation, and if the world, in its activity, is subject to laws such that we can determine with unerring certainty what events will or will not happen in the world, then such adaptation must represent a permanent character as belonging to the things which are adapted to one another. This permanent character belonging to a thing serves as the basis of its activity in relation to other things in that it allows only certain changes to take place

The per-  
manency  
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which act.

in that thing, these changes being in a certain harmony with its nature. Lotze brings us illustrations in support of this. He tells us that 'The same occasional causes, light, warmth, and moisture, excite the seeds of different plants to quite different developments . . . The same remark applies to the behaviour of living things at a later stage, when fully formed. The form of action which they exhibit, upon occasion being given from without, is completely determined by their own organisation.'<sup>1</sup> Again he speaks of the form of the result of an explosion of gunpowder as lying in the nature of the gunpowder—'in the capability of expansion possessed by the elements condensed in it.'<sup>2</sup>

Activity and permanence of nature as belonging to a thing are contradictory.

Now comes the question as to how change and permanency of nature are related to one another. Lotze tells us that the nature of a thing's activity or of the changes which take place in it find their determining ground in the nature of the object; this is clear from the view we have seen him expressing above, namely, that reciprocal action presupposes permanent natures adapted to one another. This is the position which we have now to examine. We will suppose an object A to consist of the various properties 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd'; these seem to us to form a certain harmony, and, with Lotze, we may call this harmony the thing's nature. Now the new state 'a'' comes into A on account of A's activity; is it possible for us to find anything in the nature of the states 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' or in the nature of their unity, which makes them a home for 'a', and altogether prevents them from being a home for 'z'? or is it not rather that because 'a'' and not 'z' as a matter of fact finds a home among 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' we say that the whole formed by the unity of these states welcomes 'a'' and rejects 'z'? Let us take an illustration:—all the properties of marble form a single whole, and this whole acts in certain

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 53.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

ways ; the marble is greyish-white in colour, it sinks in water, is cold to the touch, and so on. Now there is nothing in the properties of being greyish-white in colour, of being cold to the touch, of being of a certain consistency or hardness, that would prevent the marble from floating in water ; these properties, as far as we can see, would just as well harbour the new property of floating in water as the present property of sinking in water. And the same applies as regards the relation of the other properties one to another ; each property of a thing seems to issue in action, the other properties having no determining influence in relation to it.

And that it is impossible, for us at least, to find out how a thing's activity follows from its nature as a whole, or how a thing's nature harbours this event and not that event, is really presupposed in Lotze's theory of substance. A substance was for him the unity of a group of sense qualities ; but these sense qualities lay, as it were, side by side, and Lotze found no unity in them as such ; he had to give to them a consciousness, or an experiencing of their own being on the part of themselves, before he could unify them ; then he made this consciousness an inner and a hidden one with which we, as outsiders, could not come into contact. Thus for us the thing remains a mere grouping of sense qualities, and its nature is merely a name for our description of this grouping.

*Lotze's theory of substance as presupposing that a thing's nature cannot determine the nature of its activity.*

Further, the fact of the thing's experiencing itself, while undoubtedly bringing all its states and modes of activity to unity as being moments in the life of a living experience, yet does not give to the thing a nature which makes it act in this way rather than in that way ; the object A, consisting of the states ' a,' ' b,' ' c,' ' d,' would still be a self-experiencing whole if it should harbour the new state or event ' z,' instead of the state or event ' a,' which it now harbours ; we could find nothing in the nature of

'z' which would split up or destroy the self-feeling of A, and we can find nothing in the nature of 'a' which tends to make stronger this self-feeling.

Again, let us suppose that A has a certain nature X, which brings it about that 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd' shall take to themselves 'a' and not 'z.' This must mean that A is already in some kind of connection with 'a,' and that it is not in such a connection with 'z'; 'a' must be already waiting for A's call, as it were. But 'a' is not in existence; the whole meaning of change is that the new property 'a' shall come into existence from non-existence; if everything that is to happen in the world, if every event that is to be, were already in actual existence, then there would be no movement at all in the world. A, therefore, cannot be in any kind of connection with 'a' before 'a' comes into A's being. Let us give up the idea that A is in a previous connection with 'a,' and let us consider that 'a' has to come from unreality, or from nothingness, into reality; the problem now is as to how 'a,' as soon as it comes into reality, in fact, through the very act of coming into reality, shall find a place among the qualities 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd' for itself, always, and in the same way, just when 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' or 'd' wants it. It may be said that 'a' cannot have a definite form, or a definite nature, until it shall have found a home for itself as an event taking place in a particular thing, the nature of the particular thing determining the nature which 'a' has to assume. This, indeed, is what Lotze means when he says, 'Yet after all it is only the distinctive nature of the new that can somehow be thought of as contained in the previously existing. The reality of the new, on the other hand, is not contained in the reality of the old. It presupposes the removal of that reality as the beginning of its own.'<sup>1</sup> But how can 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' or 'd' act on the particular nature of 'a' and not on its reality?

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 39.

They could not possibly do it unless 'a' could somehow or another split itself up into two parts, one part being its reality and the other part its nature. But such a thing is impossible, and Lotze would have been the first to recognise this impossibility.

Thus we come to the conclusion that a thing does not possess a permanent nature which determines the nature of the changes that shall take place in it. With the loss of this permanency of nature as lying at the basis of reciprocal action, and of the eternal harmony or adaptability of things in the unity of the whole M, Lotze finally loses his hold upon gaining any real unity and any real plurality for the world of material existence. The ultimate reality of the material cannot be determined by considering its characteristics as merely material. Lotze undoubtedly saw this when he sought to place minds at the basis of matter. But he did not let this conclusion play any important part in the determination of his view as to that which constitutes the reality of material existence. He sought to construct a theory of reality that would satisfy the ideal of science. He failed to do so because he neglected other spiritual demands made upon us in our relation to the reality even of the material world.

It remains for us, therefore, to see from Lotze's examination of the spiritual life how far he is able to gain from the nature of the spiritual a conception of the nature of reality which will reach down even to the material world.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE PASSAGE TO THE HUMAN SOUL

Our relation to objects as introducing into them the distinction between mental and material.

IN order to see how spirituality is involved in the nature of the reality of things, we must first turn to the meaning of the spirituality which Lotze assigns to things merely as things. He draws a distinction between mental and material as belonging to things themselves. Now this distinction first makes its appearance when we come to consider our relation as outsiders to things; a thing exists, not merely for itself, but for us; it exists not merely in its own experience but in our experience. The thing, however, Lotze maintains, as it exists in its own experience is different from what it is when it exists in our experience. When we know a thing we are only aware of its sense qualities, which are grouped together so as to form a whole; we fail to experience the thing's actual experience of itself. This at once introduces two sides or aspects into the nature of the thing: namely, the side which it keeps to itself and the side which it reveals to us. The question at once arises as to whether this distinction is one made merely by us as standing outside of the being of things and being unable fully to apprehend them, or whether it is a distinction which centres in the being of each thing itself. When we consider the way in which Lotze arrived at his theory that substances are of the nature of minds, there is no reason to believe him as holding that the distinction centres in the object itself.

Reasons for holding that the distinction

But other reasons force Lotze to do that which his theory of substance does not really allow him to do. These reasons are twofold, the one being largely

metaphysical, the other largely psychological. First, as regards the metaphysical reason. Lotze's theory of substance was framed on the presupposition that individual objects are real as individual. A real thing, or substance, he tells us, consists of an enclosed group of sense qualities possessing unity, through the fact that they experience themselves as unity. However, he very soon discovered that a thing cannot be wholly described as an *enclosed* group of sense qualities, since it stands in relation to other things, and these other things enter into and determine its nature to a very large extent; this destroys any total exclusiveness on the part of any individual thing. On account of this he could no longer hold to the naïve Pluralism with which he started, for he had to recognise that things possess their reality through the fact of their existing as parts of a material world, which includes all perceptual existence within itself. But Pluralism refuses to be laid aside; our perceptive consciousness seems to tell us that the individual thing, as individual, possesses a reality of its own, and that this reality belongs to the thing alone and to nothing else. Exclusiveness of content no longer exists; where, then, could the exclusiveness necessary to plurality be placed? Lotze has no hesitation whatever in drawing a distinction between the content which belongs to a thing and the experience of that content which also belongs to that thing, placing exclusiveness in the experiencing side of the thing's existence and denying it to the content. He thus introduces into the being of each thing a double life, giving it on the one hand a mental life, and on the other hand a material life.

between  
mind and  
matter  
centres in  
things.  
First, meta-  
physical  
reason.

An obvious criticism against this view at once presents itself here. If it is a thing's consciousness of its content which brings that content to unity, and in which alone such content can live, then every change in content must be also a change in the consciousness which a thing has of itself; disintegration

Criticism  
of this  
view.

of content must mean disintegration of consciousness; unity of the content of one thing with that of another must mean that the consciousness of the one thing unites itself with that of another and that both form one consciousness; in fact, consciousness must share the same fate as the content which it unifies; for if not, then content and consciousness become separated, and it is not consciousness but something else which performs the function of unifying content. Let us take an example. We will suppose two objects A and Z—A consisting of the sense qualities 'a,' 'b,' 'c'; Z of the sense qualities 'x,' 'y,' 'z.' Now A possesses a consciousness of itself (a, b, c) and Z a consciousness of itself (x, y, z). A and Z, however, act upon one another to produce the new substance P, possessing the qualities 'p,' 'q,' 'r,' and thus having a consciousness of itself (p, q, r). It is clear that the sense qualities 'a,' 'b,' 'c' of A, and 'x,' 'y,' 'z' of Z, have changed to the qualities 'p,' 'q,' 'r' of P. But if the soul or mind of A and also of Z are distinct from the content of A and Z; and if the real plurality rests in these souls, so that A and Z through them can be said to be still real, although the lines of their individuality have faded in the new substance P, then one of two things must happen. Either these souls must float contentless in the void, or they must find an existence in P. If the souls of things thus float contentless in the void they could have no distinguishing characters which would enable them to be assigned to different things, the one as belonging to this particular thing and this only, and the other as belonging to that particular thing and that only. Further, no one would hold, least of all Lotze, that the souls of things find such a contentless existence in the void. The souls of A and Z, therefore, must find an existence in P. But here again they are either useless or contentless, for the whole of the content of P is contained in the sense qualities 'p,' 'q,' 'r,' which are united together by

(p, q, r) the soul of P; the qualities 'a,' 'b,' 'c' and 'x,' 'y,' 'z' no longer exist, and therefore the souls of A and of Z, which exist in P, cannot unite them together, nor can these souls unify the content of P. Thus we see that Lotze is not justified in drawing a distinction between the mental and material life of an object in order that he may place the principle that unites the thing to all other things in the material side, and the principle that separates it from all other things in the mental side.

Lotze's second reason for drawing an objective distinction between the mental and material sides or aspects of a thing's being is based largely on psychological grounds. He believed that the experience or consciousness of any content is obtained through the medium of sensations or feelings, which are mere temporary existences very different in nature from that which they enable us to experience. This view had arisen in opposition to English Empiricism, which had identified sensations and experienced content, and had maintained that what we experience are only momentary existences which pass through our minds never to return again. On such a view as this the world which each one of us experiences comes to lose its universal validity and its permanence, and does not seem to be able to lay claim to reality. In order to get away from this position the Idealists split each individual fact of experience into two sides, giving it on the one hand a merely temporary existence which they called sensation or feeling, and on the other hand a content which possesses a universal and abiding or permanent character; it is this universal and permanent character which renders it possible for us to give to each fact of experience a place in a permanent world which is the same for all. This splitting up of each fact of experience into two elements is thus really made in order to satisfy a metaphysical demand which we make upon experience. But at the same

Second,  
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time it lays claim to justification on the basis of certain psychological facts. When a person perceives anything, the act of perceiving does not enter into and form an integral part of the content perceived in so far as this content is constitutive of an object. It is in the facts of perceiving and not in the actual content perceived that the exclusiveness characteristic of mental life is supposed to lie; exclusiveness cannot lie in the actual sense content, for this is formed into a single world which is lived in and known by everyone. But what is it in the facts of perceiving which constitutes itself a soul, or mind, or mental life possessing a certain exclusivity of its own? Exclusivity of mental life may be considered as resting in one or in both of two sets of circumstances. In the first place, sense contents are only perceived when a bodily organisation adjusts its sense organs to the objects in which the contents to be perceived rest. Such adjustment of the sense organs is accompanied by bodily sensations. Those sensations localise themselves exclusively in the body in which they arise. All sense content perceived through such adjustments of sense organs to objects external to them connect themselves with, and group themselves around, the sensations due to this adjustment. Because these sensations are exclusive to that in which they arise, the sense contents come to live in or to be perceived through the medium of a whole of bodily sensations which forms the basis of, and is identified with, an exclusive soul life.

In the second place, the same object is perceived, not once, but many times, and by many different persons. In each perception the sense qualities constitutive of the object may be perceived in differing orders, and indeed some of them may even not be perceived at all. As an existence in an objective world this object has a single, permanent, or at least relatively permanent existence, and is made up of a series of constituent sense qualities existing

in a single and unchangeable order. At no moment of its existence could it drop any of its sense qualities or change their order. The content of our perceptions, therefore, it is argued, cannot be identical with the content of the real world. Each perceived whole in so far as it is the content of our perception is an individual whole different from the individual whole which is referred to through the medium of our perception. This difference is interpreted as exclusivity.

Thus the fact of the existence of bodily sensations, and also the fact that there is a changing individuality of experienced sense content different from the permanent individuality of sense content as going to the constitution of an objective world, go to show the existence of a soul life which is exclusive of, and which stands over against the world of objects.

But while this is undoubtedly the case, still it cannot be maintained that this distinction between an exclusive soul life and a universal material existence or content can enter into the being of a material thing as Lotze conceives it; material things are not subject to the psychological conditions on which this distinction between a mental and a material side of existence is based. A thing does not choose what sense content shall or shall not enter into and be constitutive of its being, like a person chooses what sense content he shall or shall not perceive; and a thing does not adjust a bodily organisation to a perceptual life in the same way as an animal or a person does.

That this psychological basis of the difference between mental and material does not exist in the case of things.

Lotze, however, does not pay much attention to the souls of things; they have served a certain metaphysical purpose for him in giving plurality to the material world. They play no part in the building up of a community of moral beings in which, according to him, the deepest meaning of reality rests; therefore he leaves these souls of material things and seeks to determine the nature of the

The relative unimportance of the souls of things.

human soul and its relation to the material world. It is, then, in these higher souls and in their relation to the material world that we shall have to seek for our principles of reality. Now just as a material object is composed of matter and mind, so a human being is composed of soul and body; the body consisting of highly complicated and organised living matter, and the soul of highly complicated mind. Lotze maintains that the body has an existence of its own, that the soul has an existence of its own, and that both are brought to unity in the life of the individual human being.

Difference  
between  
the reality  
of a thing  
and that  
of a  
human  
being.

There is, however, a great difference between the nature of the reality of a thing and the nature of the reality of a human being. In the case of a thing the fact of its being a group of sense qualities changing according to law is undoubtedly the most important part of its reality; its hidden life of self-experience or self-feeling is of minor importance. Such self-experience makes the thing real for itself, but we, who know the thing, have nothing whatever to do with it. With a human being, however, the case is different. Here *being* centres in the life of experience, or in the life of the soul, more than in the life of the body.

A second difference presents itself in that the soul of a thing is considered as performing the function of bringing to unity the several qualities belonging to that thing as an object in the material world. A human being, in so far as he is a body, is also an object in the material world, yet it cannot be said of the human soul that its function consists in bringing to unity the sense content which goes to form the human body; if this were the case, then the human being would never perceive anything other than his own body. True, it may be objected that the soul in perceiving an object merely interprets the state of its own body; that when it sees this thing as blue, or feels that thing as hard, it only gives a meaning to certain changes taking place in the higher

nerve centres. Still, even if this is the case, the actual blue, or the actual hardness, cannot be said to be a state of the higher nerve centres; whether the colour blue or the quality hardness are mere interpretations of bodily states or not, or whether or not they have real existence outside of the human soul which perceives them, makes no difference to the fact that the soul, in perceiving them, becomes aware of something more than the body with which it is connected. Thus the human soul brings to unity far more than that which belongs to its body, whereas on Lotze's theory the soul of the thing only exists in and through its bringing to unity that, and only that, which exists in the thing as its bodily or material side.

In the third place, the wealth of material belonging to the life of the individual soul forms an integral part of what is called the social whole; it goes to the building up of culture, of morality, of religion, or of what is often called the spiritual life; in this spiritual life, morals, religion, art, history, and other great movements have their existence and come to form a whole often seeming to stand in violent opposition to the material world. In discussing the nature of the human soul it is to the nature and reality of this spiritual world that we shall have to turn our attention.

The world, however, does not sharply divide itself up into the merely material world of nature on the one hand, and the highly developed cultural life of human society on the other hand. Between the human soul and the merely material there exists a large sphere of organic existence.

Lotze, however, maintains that living organisms as such, even in the case of the human body, are no more than things which have become highly complicated through purely material activity; they have become structural wholes, that is, wholes of parts which co-operate in their movements so that we have movements within movements, yet all constituting one

Lotze as holding that the animal world is a merely material world.



single movement. It may be maintained, however, that a living body is something more than a thing, or than many things acting together; that the co-operative movement of its parts involves a plan or an idea as operative in its constitution. A thing is merely a unity of sense qualities, whereas a living body is a unity of functions all directed to the attainment of an end. Lotze, however, denies this; he maintains that if the reality of a living being centred in an idea or plan of the whole, which idea determined the whole development of bodily life, then the idea would stand in some kind of determining relation to the body; it would, in fact, have to act reciprocally with the body, and thus idea and body would constitute two things acting upon one another; further, even when the body perishes no reality is lost to the world: the perishing of the body simply means that a material system has been dissolved and that its elements enter into other and new material systems.

The reality of a living being not exhausted in its materiality.

But, we must object here, that the reality of a living being is not exhausted in its materiality or thinghood. In a living being there is something over and above the fact that it is a unity of sense qualities, or that it is a system or structural whole formed out of many such unities. It is this something that constitutes the very being of that which lives. That in the animal which is over and above mere thinghood consists of sentient life; whether or not plants have also a sentient life is difficult to determine, and Lotze never pronounced any opinion on this question.

The sentient life of living beings.

Now it is this sentient life which plays the most important part in the being of an animal existence; it is this which gives value for self to the animal, and it is towards the promotion and welfare of this that the bodily organisation of the animal is subordinated. Lotze indeed recognises this. In opposition to those who hold that organic life shows us a systematic whole of closely connected existences whose

value lies in the fact that it is such a whole, he maintains that organic nature does not show us such a whole, but rather a huge variety of forms connected within certain limits, these forms being developed so as to give to their possessors all the enjoyment and variety of life of which each is capable.<sup>1</sup> Here the centre of being is placed, not in any systematic whole of organic life, not in the nature of the living or bodily forms, but in the enjoyment or variety of life—that is, in the sentient life which belongs to these forms; the material side of life becomes subordinated to this sentient life of the individual living being, and it is this latter which takes the place of what many thinkers consider the idea or plan involved in the living world.

In sentient life something seems to be separating itself from mere bodily life and coming to an existence and value of its own, and the question that asks for an answer is as to whether or not this sentient life, as such, has reality. If this sentient life has reality, then arises the question, what are the conditions of its reality, or what form of existence must it possess in order that we may call it real? Lotze, however, never tackles this question as to the reality which is to be given to the merely sentient life as it is found in the organic world. He tells us in effect that a knowledge of the animal world gives us no knowledge of man, and he therefore leaves aside the examination of this life as not bringing forward any philosophical problems.<sup>2</sup> But while it is true that a knowledge of the animal may not enable us to understand the destiny of man, yet the world is not constituted by man alone, nor by things and man, animal life being, as it were, a mere interval between them which we can afford to disregard. The mere sentient life of the animal calls for its place in reality just as much as does the soul of the highest product of human culture.

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. iv. Chap. iv. (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 465).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk. iv. Chap. iv. end of sec. 1 (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 467).

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE HUMAN SOUL

WE must now turn to the soul of man. Man, like the animal, possesses a sentient life; but over and above this there appears in him another form of soul life so different from the merely sentient life, and separated from it by such a vast interval of development, that it has often been considered as constituting a mind or spirit calling for an existence of its own standing over against the sentient life. Lotze holds that this difference between sentient and soul life does not mean that there is in human life both a sentient soul and a higher soul. The only use a sentient soul could serve would be that of mediating between the higher soul and the material world.

Its relation to the sentient life.

He tells us, however; that there is no reason for believing that the higher soul cannot directly act with the material world, hence a mediating sentient soul is not required.<sup>1</sup> But the sentient life must belong somewhere; if it has no independent existence of its own, then it must form a constitutive part of some other existence. Does it belong to the material side or to the soul side? Lotze decides that in the case of human beings the sentient life belongs to the soul side.

The soul has a unique form of existence.

Lotze brings forward certain considerations to show that the soul demands a form of existence different from that belonging to material things; he further tries to show that the soul, through its unique form of existence, stands over against matter, acting and reacting with it just as one object acts

<sup>1</sup> *Microkosmos*, Bk. v. Chap. i. secs. 1 and 2.

and reacts with another. First as to the proof that the soul calls for a form of existence peculiar to itself. The first argument which he brings forward for the establishment of this position is drawn from the fact of the incomparability of the mental with the material. We do not see stretching before us a single world of mental life like the world of nature. We cannot experience the mental flow of events which takes place in minds other than our own in the same way as we can experience the flow of events that takes place in the material world lying outside of us. On account of this we cannot view as a whole a single flow of mental events taking place in a single mental world, as is the case in respect of the material world. We can only view the course of mental life as it exists in our own individual mind. Furthermore, the inner mental life which each of us possesses in addition to and in intimate connection with his outer bodily life consists, Lotze tells us, of sensations, ideas, feelings, emotions, and volitions. These are intimately bound up with our bodily life, and through this life with the material world; yet in their nature they are so absolutely different from that which constitutes the material world that they must be considered as hanging together and forming a unique kind of whole. This whole constitutes what we call the soul.<sup>1</sup> The most important and fundamental content of the soul is that of sense, for it is in relation to this content that the whole of soul life is built up,

We speak of sense as consisting of the sense qualities existing as constitutive elements of the things in the world outside of us; we speak again of our bodily sensations and also of pleasure and pain as belonging to sense or to the senses; and lastly, we speak of the content of sense, meaning by that the content of our soul life, this content existing as acts of perception and also as the content of

Different  
meanings  
given to  
the term.

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. ii. Chap. i. sec. 1 (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 144). See also *Metaphysics*, sec. 239.

Distinction  
between  
bodily  
sensations  
and sense  
qualities.

perception through the medium of which we come to know the world outside of us. Let us first deal with the distinction between bodily sensations and sense qualities which are constitutive of things in the outer world. If I take a pin and scratch the book in front of me I hear the noise of scratching and see the mark I have made ; if, however, I scratch my hand I not only see the mark there, but I feel the pressure of the pin on my hand and I experience pain in my hand. The feeling of pressure and of pain I regard as bodily sensations, the mark on my hand, however, although it is on my body, is not regarded as a bodily sensation any more than the mark on the book is regarded as a bodily sensation. Again, when I move my eyes I experience certain sensations due to these movements ; when I speak I experience sensations due to the varying relations in which the various parts of my mouth move in respect of one another ; if I am unwell I may feel pains or aches inside me ; all of these I regard as bodily sensations. If, however, I put a bottle of scent to my nose I have the sensation of smell, or if I put sugar in my mouth I taste it as sweet ; these sensations are localised in the nose and in the mouth, yet I do not regard them as bodily sensations. Thus we see that a certain group of sensations form themselves into a peculiar class ; they are all localised in the body, yet not all sensations that are localised in the body belong to this class. The ground of this distinction is to be found in the fact that these bodily sensations do not in any way form part of the outside or material world ; the body is part of the outside world, and like all that exists in this world it has a certain size, a certain shape, colour, and so on : all that belongs to it as a material object, such as the mark imposed on it by a scratch, belongs also to this outside world. But, further, the body has this living or sensitive side which does not belong to it as a mere object in the material world, and in this

sensitive side live what we call bodily sensations. I do not regard the book which lies on my table as sensitive, but I do regard other bodies like my own as sensitive, even although I can only experience the sensitiveness of my own body. Thus we regard these bodily sensations as belonging to us in a peculiar way; they go to form part of our being; they make the body a possession belonging to ourselves in a way in which nothing else can belong to us, for if any part of my body loses its sensitiveness it does not seem to belong to me in the same way as the other parts of the body which retain their sensitiveness.

We now come to the distinction between sense qualities as constitutive of things in the outer world, and sensations as events and also as contents belonging to our inner life. (We may note at this point that Lotze gives bodily sensations a place as events belonging to the inner life of the soul.) First we must distinguish between sensation as a content and sensation as an event. When I turn my eyes to the table I see a book lying there, and I see that this book has a certain shape, size, colour, and so on; the shape, size, colour of the book belong to it independently of the fact that I or anybody else sees it; they are sense qualities going to constitute the being and nature of the book as an object existing in and for itself external to me. But my looking, my seeing, or what I term my experiencing of the book, of its colour, of its shape, of its size, and so on, are events in my life and do not in any way belong to the book which I see. There is thus a distinction between an act of experiencing and the sense quality which is experienced; the act of experiencing is considered as a sensating of something which is experienced, this something being either a sense quality or an object consisting of sense qualities having an existence in the outside world. Acts of sensation are merely momentary, existing at a particular moment and then

Distinction  
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passing away into complete nothingness; hence if we are to have a soul life which shall be something more than a mere flow of events, these sensations as events must be merely the medium through which a definite content which the soul can hold is conveyed into the life of the soul. This fact seems to point to the view that the actual act of experiencing mediates a content which it derives from that which it experiences; it may be considered that I know the outside world although I am a soul standing outside of that world, through the fact that I draw a content from that world into myself, and that since this content comes to form part of my life I experience in my life that which really belongs to something external to me. If this is the case, however, then the things which are experienced must find a momentary existence in the soul which experiences them. Either they must never have existed outside of the soul, or they must submit to a process whereby the soul draws out their content from them, and yet afterwards leaves them to go free with all their content. Against the view that the soul draws into itself a content from the things which exist in the outside world, Lotze brings definite objections. He maintains that the transference of complete states from one thing to another, or from things to the soul, is impossible; that when influences come to a thing or to the soul from something external to it these influences are of the nature of stimulations or calls for the thing or the soul to draw forth from itself that which previously existed potentially within itself. He says, 'All bodily impressions are for the soul but strokes drawing forth from its own nature the internal phenomena of sensation that can never be communicated to it from without.'<sup>1</sup>

This brings us to a third alternative which presents itself, namely, that the soul, in coming into relation with the things in the outside world, comes to a special

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos* (Eng. trans.), vol. i. p. 282.

activity. In this activity it produces within its own being a content, through the medium of which it comes to a knowledge of the outside world. The momentary act of producing the sensation on the part of the soul is what we call the act of experiencing, or the act of sensation, and constitutes the peculiar breaking in upon consciousness characteristic of sensation. The content is held in the life of the soul and goes to build up that life. That, outside the soul, which stimulates or calls the soul to activity in the production of this content, is an object or objects made up of sense qualities; and the soul through its sense content comes to a knowledge of these sense qualities.

This process presupposes the soul as already existing and standing in relation to the outside world. The question as to the origin of the soul, or as to the way in which it comes into existence from non-existence, is a matter which Lotze does not enquire into. He tells us that reality as a whole shows us soul and body as having come into existence, and as working, together; the actual coming into existence, however, remains a matter hidden from us. We can only see new content taking its rise in an already existing soul, just as in the material world we can only see new sense qualities springing up or taking the place of old sense qualities in an already existing object.

Further, although the soul produces its content through its own activity, and although this content is very different from anything that exists in the material world, yet we must not think of the soul as having a specific nature of its own from which the nature of the sensations that take their rise in it can be seen of necessity to follow. I cannot give to marble a specific nature which shall reveal to me how it is that marble is cold to the touch; I can only say that as a matter of fact marble is a unity of sense qualities among which is this quality of being cold

Origin of  
the soul  
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The soul  
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to the touch. In the same way, Lotze tells us, it cannot be seen how the soul can produce from a nature peculiar to itself a sense content whose nature is determined by, or can be seen of necessity to follow from, the nature of the soul; the sense content belonging to the soul simply occurs in it when the soul comes to activity; further, this content is brought to unity, along with other sense contents, by the soul, and thus goes to form the life of the soul. The soul, like a thing, has no hidden, inner nature which flashes out in manifestations peculiar to itself; the soul is a unity of certain kinds of manifestations, and in this unity manifestations of a like kind take their rise when the soul as a whole comes to activity; sense consists of those manifestations which come into existence when the soul acts with the material world.

Relations between the sense contents going to form the life of the soul and the sense qualities going to form the reality of an object.

Now arises the question as to whether or not this sense content going to build up the life of the soul is different from anything that is to be found in the material world. Lotze maintains that it is. By so doing he makes the material world consist of spatial characteristics only, and thus takes away from it the rich and varied content consisting of sense qualities which go to the formation of objects; further, the content which he takes from the material world he gives to the soul, and we shall find that the world cannot keep for itself even those spatial characteristics which Lotze considers as going to make up its being. From this it is clear that one of two things must happen; either the soul will lose itself in taking up the content of the material world, or the material world will lose itself in being taken up as content into the life of the soul.

Lotze as failing to keep the two apart, thereby losing the one in the other and destroying

However, let us see how these results come about. We have seen that the soul is called to activity by stimulations which reach it from the outside world. Lotze now tells us that these stimulations consist of movements which take their rise in things; these movements act upon the body, producing certain

changes in the sense organs ; the changes in the sense organs set up activities in the nerves, and these activities are carried along until the higher nerve centres in the brain are reached. All these changes consist of movements, and when these movements reach the higher nerve centres the soul becomes active in relation to them. As a result of this activity a specific content comes to existence in the soul. Different movements in the outside world act upon different sense organs in the body, giving rise in the soul to different sense contents. For instance, movements in the luminiferous ether act upon the retina of the eye, giving rise in the soul to sensations of colour ; certain movements in the air act upon the ear and through the ear upon the auricular nerve, producing sensations of sound in the soul. Why this should be so, why certain movements in the outside world should pass into the soul as sweetness, others as colour, Lotze tells us, we can never know ; we simply have to accept the fact that such is the case.<sup>1</sup> Further, the relations between sensations and these movements in the outside world which he calls stimuli can be brought within the sphere of exact mathematical calculation. The only senses, however, where the uniformities between stimuli and sensations have been formulated according to strict mathematical equations are those of sight and sound.

From this it can be seen that the outside world as it stands in active relation to the soul is made to consist of a series of stimulations, that is, of a series of movements in space, and of nothing else. This at once raises a distinction between the outside world as we know it, and the outside world as it acts upon the soul. As we know it, this outside world consists of objects constituted by the unities of the plurality of sense : these pluralities consist of spatial properties, colour, taste, smell, and so on. All these

the distinction between the soul and the material world

The movements in the outside world which act upon the soul and cause it to produce sense contents in itself consist of spatial changes.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 320. See also *Microcosmos* (Eng. trans.), vol. 1. p. 175.

exist as sense qualities in the actual being of the objects known. But as it acts upon the soul the outside world consists of things possessing only spatial properties—i.e. motion, figure, position; in the same way the body as it acts upon the soul consists only of movements of purely spatial wholes. Now comes the question as to whether or not the outside world, as we know it, is identical with the outside world as it exists in and for itself over against our minds. Lotze's answer to this question is that the two are not identical—that the world as we know it takes its rise in our minds who know this world; that it exists there and only there; that the world as it exists in and for itself is constituted of activities and natures the same as those which act upon our minds and stimulate them to activity. Thus the outside world is made to consist of spatial properties only, whereas the content which takes its rise in the soul is made to consist of that plurality of sense which is incomparable with what is merely spatial, but which we are accustomed to think of as belonging to things; such plurality of sense consists of sound, taste, smell, and so on.<sup>1</sup> Thus sense qualities as belonging to things would consist merely of spatial properties or primary qualities, whereas sense contents as belonging to souls, and through the medium of which sense qualities are known, would consist of what we are accustomed to call the secondary qualities of things.

Lotze's distinction between primary and secondary qualities: the one kind belonging to the soul, the other to things, as being invalid.

Certain considerations, however, make it quite clear that it is impossible to consider the material world as consisting of primary qualities only, and to hold that souls holding within their mental life the secondary qualities stand over against this material world. In the first place, spatial properties are known properties, and belong to the world as *known* just as much as do the secondary qualities of things, hence spatial properties are not excluded from existing within the life of the soul and as going to the

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 239.

building up of that life. In the second place, the plurality of sense qualities, including both primary and secondary qualities, is not held together in unity in the soul as an entity standing over against the outside world; rather is this plurality held together in unity in the outside world through the medium of a consciousness which takes within itself the actual material world; for instance, the colour blue and the coldness to the touch belonging to this piece of stone are held together, not in the being of some soul standing outside of the stone, but in the being of the stone itself, in so far as this stone is experienced or experiences itself, and they are held together there along with the spatial characteristics of size, shape, and so on.

Lotze now brings forward another argument to show that the sense content of the life of the soul is not to be identified with the sense qualities going to the constitution of the material world. We have seen him claiming that the existence of sense contents in our experience of the world is entirely dependent upon the rigid, mechanical, necessitative determination of spatial movements in things acting in relation with such movements in the body. He now maintains that we have a power of determining or of selecting to a certain extent what contents shall or shall not enter into our experience, and that this determination takes place through a freedom of activity which is altogether different from the mechanical activity of things. In this free activity of an experiencing subject in relation to an existing world the subject may order the contents of his experience in a way which is different from that in which sense contents actually exist in the material world. For instance, I may be interested in two books, each of which lies at opposite ends of my bookshelf. I reach down one and without regarding the intervening books also reach for the other; my experience grips only those two books; but the

The sense content of the soul is selected by an activity of the soul not derived from sense.

actual existence in which those two books stood included all the intervening books. Again, I may disregard the colour of an object at which I look, being only interested in its shape; or I may disregard its shape, being interested only in its colour; yet the actual existence of the object includes all that I have disregarded. Now such selective power is not mechanically determined; it does not belong to the material world, but is, Lotze maintains, a characteristic of a mental life distinct from and standing over against that which belongs to matter. And further, we may notice that this selective power seems to call for a difference or distinction between the sense content which enters into and is constitutive of experience and the sense content constitutive of the actual existence of the thing experienced, for the actual existence of the thing does not tolerate an alternative existence and non-existence of certain of its contents according to the play of non-mechanical interests.

The views  
of Herbart  
and  
Fechner,  
and  
Lotze's  
criticism  
of them.

This distinction between mental life as constituted by our experience of objects, and material existence as constituted by the being of objects, is indicated by Lotze in certain objections which he brings against both Herbart and Fechner, to the effect that they had tried to explain the rise and conservation of sensations in the soul on purely mechanical principles, leaving out any activity on the part of the soul itself. Fechner sought to measure the physiological activities of the body and the psychical activities of the soul, and to give to both physiological and psychical activities certain mathematical values, thus bringing both activities under the range of mathematical formulae. His application of mathematical formulae to sense was based on the view that not only does the nature of the sensation stand in a mathematical relation to the nature of the bodily stimulus, but that the occurrence of the bodily stimulus and the taking up of the

sensation connected with it into the life of the soul are also determined by this mathematical relation. According to Herbart, on the other hand, sensations are introduced into the mind through the mind reacting with other minds; for him the material world ultimately resolved itself into a plurality of minds; each of these sensations was supposed to have a certain strength, and according to its strength it pushed other sensations out of consciousness and remained itself in consciousness, or was itself pushed out of consciousness by them. The mind was thus merely a place which allowed free play for the actions and reactions of what might almost be termed mental atoms; at all events, the interplay of the contents of mind became approximated in nature to the interplay of atoms in the material world. Lotze objects to both of these views on the ground that they altogether disregard the nature of the soul, which acts as a whole in all its activities. Both theories regarded the soul as merely passive, conscious of all that takes place between the various elements that find their existence within it, yet taking no part in what takes place. As Lotze clearly saw, such a view as this denies reality to the soul; the soul comes to be the mere after-effects of material processes and gains no independent being of its own. In order to possess reality, the soul, as a whole, must act in relation to the sense content which comes to find its existence within it.

This, however, at once gives rise to a difficult problem: the course of the sensational life is determined, on the one hand, by the purely mechanical and necessitative influence of the movements in the material world, and, on the other hand, by the activity of the soul acting as a higher power in relation to the sensations which take their rise in it. Lotze wants to show that sensations are constituent elements in the life of the soul as standing over against the material world, and possessing a freedom of activity

The course of sentient life as determined by the mechanical course of the outside world and as determined by the activity of the soul as a whole.

The  
existence  
of im-  
pressions.

altogether foreign to the mechanically determined activity of this world, and that yet these sensations are produced in the soul in a purely mechanical way through the soul's interaction with the outside world. He tries to harmonise these two moments by introducing between bodily stimuli and sensations what he calls impressions, giving to these impressions the mechanical character of the outside world, and to sensations the characteristic of being constitutive elements in the life of a soul determined by freedom of activity. These impressions are neither stimuli nor sensations, neither have they an independent existence as standing alone between sensations and stimuli; they are changes in the mind which follow directly upon stimulation, yet they do not form any content of the mind; they are merely internal states of the mind upon which consciousness must be brought to bear before they can assume any value for the mind. He tells us that we can never know the nature of these impressions as they really are; we can only know them when consciousness is brought to bear upon them and converts them into sensations. Yet they do not at first exist as impressions, and then become converted into sensations through consciousness being turned upon them after they have come into the soul; rather is it that their coming into the soul, and the activity of the soul in turning consciousness upon them and thus producing sensation from itself, is one and the same activity. He says of them, 'We may regard both (i.e. sensations and impressions) as at every indivisible moment simultaneous, as so blended together that the different names which we give them denote no longer two processes, but different phases of one process in itself indivisible.'<sup>1</sup> Again he says, 'We do not know why the wave of light that strikes our eye should have had first by its action on the soul to produce an indescribable unconscious impression which was

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. ii. Chap. iii. sec. 2 (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 200).

succeeded as a reaction by the sensation to which it appeared as red or blue. The sight of a particular colour, the hearing of a particular tone, may unquestionably be conceived as the single, undivided state into which the soul passes, and we call it impression when we think of its being caused by an external stimulus, but vital reaction when we call to mind that the same stimulus would have excited other states in other natures—that consequently the form of the state here present depends on the nature of the soul.’<sup>1</sup>

We must now consider how these impressions perform the service of bringing together, first, the mechanical activity taking place in the outer world; secondly, the mechanical interaction taking place between the soul and the outer world through the medium of the body; and thirdly, the free activity of the soul as a whole. The nerve centres which are charged with every stimulation that reaches them through the medium of the sense organs from the outside world, stand in such a relation to the soul that reciprocal action must take place between them and the soul. If all stimulations from the nerve centres do not reach the soul, then the uniformity of law cannot be considered as applying to the activities which take place between soul and body. The soul itself, however, does not take up into consciousness and convert into elements of its own sensational life all the stimulations that reach it from the outside world; it possesses, as we have seen, a certain selective power in this respect. If, however, the soul selected directly from stimulations, saying, as it were, that it would only receive to itself this or that stimulus, then soul and body would not really interact mechanically, for the soul would place itself above the mechanical chain of events and refuse to be altogether influenced by it. If, however, it selects from impressions which are already effects

How impressions operate between the mechanical world and the selective activity of the soul.

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. ii. Chap. iii. sec. 2 (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 201).



of the mechanical interaction between soul and body, the mechanical chain remains unbroken.

Subcon-  
sciousness.

Lotze brings forward the fact of subconsciousness as favouring this view of the existence of unconscious impressions and of the selective activity of the mind in relation to them. In subconsciousness the soul possesses numberless impressions which at times it brings into the clear light of consciousness. Once received into the soul, impressions have a persistent and indestructible existence there; further, the activity of the soul can be brought to bear upon them when required, thus bringing them to full consciousness. By means of these unconscious impressions the phenomena of memory is to be explained. Lotze says, 'Of these impressions the Law of Persistence, it is supposed, holds good; when they have once come into being they do not again pass away; but they stand in no constant relation to the mind's cognitive energy, which, like an unsteady light shining now on one, now on another, at one moment takes them up, at another lets them relapse into the unconscious existence of latent impressions.'<sup>1</sup>

How the  
soul selects  
from un-  
conscious  
impressions.

But why is it that consciousness presents to itself as sense contents certain impressions, while leaving others in the sphere of subconsciousness? He states this problem quite clearly in Bk. ii. Chap. iii. sec. 3 of the *Mikrokosmos*, where he says that there are two theories as to the way in which the activity of the soul builds up a content for itself; the one theory maintains that all the content of the soul life is derived from the reciprocal action of sensations; this theory he refuses to accept; the other theory—and this is the theory which he accepts—'will have to enquire into the reasons why certain unconscious impressions draw the attention of presentative activity to themselves and divert it from others.' He seeks to solve the problem involved here by attaching to sensations a certain value or worth, maintaining

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. ii. Chap. iii. sec. 2 (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 199).

that it is this worth or value, estimated by the individual soul as belonging to sensations, which largely determines what impressions it shall convert into sensations; the soul only wants in its life those sensations which have a certain worth or value for itself, and those which have not this worth the soul seeks to keep out. We need not now stop to enquire into the exact nature of this worth or value, or as to the way in which the soul builds up its content into a whole, using this idea of worth as its guiding principle. What we have here to notice is that as soon as the soul employs the idea of worth as a determining principle then it breaks the chain of mere mechanism, for this conception involves choice determined by an estimation of the value of what is chosen, whereas mechanism knows no such choice.

We must notice, however, that this selective power is limited in certain ways through the nature of the bodily organisation and the constant nature of the mind itself. A loud sound or a striking colour will often obtrude itself into consciousness although we may not wish to see it; the stimulation from the nerve centres is so great that consciousness is forced to take up what it gives. Again, the quality of the sensations is not in any way altered by this selective activity of consciousness. When the light waves of a certain length pass into the eye, and when the impressions produced in the soul by the stimulations from the nerve centres connected with the eye are taken up as sensations into consciousness, then a colour having a certain place in the spectrum is always seen. The selective activity merely chooses; it does not in any way change the nature of that which it chooses.

Limitations of the selective power of the soul.

We have seen Lotze maintaining that impressions and sensations are not in any way separate, that the distinction between them consists only of a difference in point of view from which the same single and undivided activity is regarded. If, however, the

Separation involved between sensations and impressions.

soul, as regards the coming into existence in itself of impressions, possesses no selective activity, whereas in regard to the taking up of these impressions into clear consciousness it possesses a selective activity, then impressions must have a different and a separate being from that of sensations. Lotze tries to keep impressions and sensations identical and separate at the same time; through their identity he seeks to harmonise the mechanism which interaction with the material world introduces into the soul, and through their separation he seeks to keep for the soul a free activity belonging to itself alone. But this identity and separation cannot really be held together in the same moment of activity. Thus impressions serve no real purpose; they do not constitute any advance upon stimulation. Further, impressions, Lotze tells us, are unknown and unknowable; while belonging to the soul they do not belong to consciousness. If this is the case, how, we may ask, can consciousness choose between a number of impressions all of which are unknowable and unexperienceable?

Thus Lotze has failed to show us how impressions can perform the service of bringing together the mechanical activity taking place in the outer world and the free activity taking place in the soul.

## CHAPTER IX

### REALITY OF THE SOUL AS STANDING OVER AGAINST THE MATERIAL WORLD

LOTZE's aim has been to connect the soul with, and at the same time to free it from, the material world. The soul is to be connected with matter through its relation to the reign of law; yet at the same time it is to be above this reign of law in that it brings to the contents brought to it by law a certain selective power, enabling it to build up these contents into unique wholes of soul life. This the soul does in knowledge and in will. We shall find that in both cases Lotze is not able to keep to the view that the higher soul thus stands free of the material world. He cannot approximate the nature and reality of the soul to the nature and reality of a material object, and he cannot find the reality of the soul in any mere uniqueness or individuality which it may be considered as possessing. He is driven to seek for the reality of both things and souls in a wider spirituality which issues in our experience as validity and value. First, then, as to the freedom of the soul in willing in relation to the material world. According to Lotze the material world is one single whole and all the events that take place in it are governed by law. But human beings, he tells us, are free from this reign of mechanical law in so far as their deepest activity is concerned. Their freedom consists in the fact that they can freely change the course of events which take place in the mechanical order. The justification for this view of the freedom of the individual in relation to the mechanical reign of law Lotze finds in the ethical judgments of right and

The way  
in which  
the free  
soul acts in  
relation to  
mechanism.

wrong, and in the feelings of remorse which follow upon certain of our actions. When we have done something wrong we feel that, if we would, we could have ordered it otherwise.

The soul  
as intro-  
ducing new  
beginnings  
into the  
world.

But how, we ask, can a free soul change the course of events in a purely mechanical system? Lotze has tried to show that one event follows with mechanical necessity upon other events, and to depart from this view by saying that an outside non-mechanical influence can affect the course of events would seem to be fatal to the mechanical unity of the material world. He seeks, however, to keep both the mechanical unity and the outside non-mechanical influence upon the members of this unity by maintaining that individual souls initiate a new series of events in the material world, and that this new series, when once introduced into the world, must take a mechanical course. He tries to make this conception of the introduction of new beginnings into a mechanical scheme consistent with itself by saying that freedom postulates causality although causality does not postulate freedom. For if it is required, by means of a new beginning, to bring about a certain result 'z' in the world, then the new beginning 'a' which is introduced to this end must be followed by certain events, 'x,' 'y,' 'z,' according to law, so that 'z' and not any results 'p' or 'q' will follow 'a.' Thus necessity and freedom are made to harmonise one with the other.

How the  
new  
beginning  
is brought  
into being.

The question now arises as to how this new beginning is to be brought into being, for the individual who decides that it shall come into existence must also bring it into existence. Lotze tells us that the mechanical scheme, in so far as it is guided by free individuals, does not merely mean the events which take place in outer nature; it means also the world of our inner life in so far as it is a series of feelings, sensations, and so on. These, according to him, flow on in quite a mechanical way, and the free

soul stands outside of them just as it stands outside of the flow of events which exists in outer nature. In changing the course of events in the mechanical scheme, what the free soul does, we are told, is to set before itself certain purposes, the realisation of which requires the existence of certain new events in the mechanical scheme. The adoption of these purposes gives rise to ideas of certain events as existing, and these ideas, in quite a mechanical way, set other ideas going. Through some kind of unknown connection between the mental and material these last ideas set our bodies in motion in such a way that first efforts necessary to bring into existence the event desired are put forward. The free act is thus the adoption of certain purposes; after this everything is mechanically determined. But while we can formulate the laws according to which one mechanical event comes to determine another of the same kind, we cannot formulate the laws according to which an idea mechanically determines the bodily events which are the first steps towards bringing that idea to realisation.

We must now notice that this adoption of purposes on the part of the individual is not mechanical. It is a freedom of choice as to what new beginnings shall come into the mechanical scheme. This choice is determined by the subject's desire to realise what he considers as having value permanently and for its own sake. The world is considered to be a single whole which can be made to realise a single meaning, such meaning having a worth or value in and for itself. And it is through this choice on the part of individual souls that such meaning comes to be realised. It is difficult to know what we are to understand by the term 'meaning' as applied to the world; it seems as though the demand that the world shall have meaning is a demand that in the world new content, new movements, new organisations of that content, shall spring up; that all these

The adop-  
tion of  
purposes  
by an  
individual

new movements and contents shall not consist of a mere unending cycle of events simply moving according to fixed laws, but that they shall exhibit themselves as moments in the conscious building up of a permanent structure. A mechanical process of itself cannot give to the world that newness of being which renders the world process a real movement towards a preconceived structural whole. Mere mechanism goes round and round in a circle, and if any variety, any plan, any meaning has to be given to that which comes under its sway, this variety and this meaning must be introduced into it from outside.

Difficulty  
of under-  
standing  
how the  
soul can  
introduce  
anything  
new into an  
enclosed  
circle of  
events

The initiation of a new series of events into the mechanical whole must mean the bringing into existence in that whole of new sense contents. It cannot mean an entirely new and non-mechanical moving of the sense qualities already existing in that whole, for in that case the mechanical chain would be broken. Lotze holds that this chain cannot be broken; it is only that new links can be introduced into it. Further, events are not different from the content which constitutes the being of things; an event must have a content, and when this event takes place in the material world its content must be a sense content; a new event must consequently mean the coming into existence of a new sense content. These new sense contents do not come into existence through mechanical means, but once in existence their future course is mechanically determined.

The soul produces within itself certain ideas; the body, through an unknown connection with what is mental, produces within itself corresponding movements, and the thing produces within itself corresponding changes. The thing, however, will only produce changes within itself which are in harmony with its nature. If the human soul is to have any influence upon a thing, then it can only exercise that influence within a limited circle, namely, that which

is circumscribed by the nature of the thing. Hence the soul cannot initiate into the being of a thing any new change or any new beginning which the thing itself, under certain conditions, could not produce within itself quite mechanically. If the soul could produce in the thing a new beginning, i.e. a new sense quality, which the thing's nature was not competent to produce from itself through mechanical means under quite definite conditions, then the whole theory, according to which a thing is a substance having an existence in and for itself through the fact that it is a unity of sense qualities acting in a uniform way, would at once break down; uniformity of activity and of nature would be broken into, and a thing might come to harbour any qualities at any moment; the thing would lose all permanency of being. If, on the other hand, the soul cannot introduce into the being of a thing new beginnings, which that thing of itself could never produce, then the soul cannot really give to the world anything new. Free souls could not on this view give to the world a real history which shall be directed to the realisation of purposes or ideals not contained in a mere mechanical circle of events; for wherever souls introduce change into the world that change could only be a momentary setting back, or pushing forward, or halting of a circle of events which is always the same. Let us take an example: an object A consists of the changes 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' 'e.' I cannot introduce a change 'x' into this series since A is of such a nature that it does not allow of 'x' being taken up into its being. I am limited, in my influence upon the thing, to bringing 'b' into existence when in the ordinary course of events 'c' would come into existence, or of bringing 'd' into existence when 'b' would otherwise have come into existence, and so on:—that is, instead of having the series 'c,' 'd,' 'e,' 'a,' 'b,' I make it 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' 'e,' 'a,' and so on. I do not give to the series a new something



whereby it can move out of the everlasting circle which constitutes its nature, and so allow it to come to a real historical movement in the realisation of an ideal which I can demand of it to realise.

Thus the being of a thing is bound down by a mechanism into which nothing new can enter, for once let anything new enter into it, then the hard and fast nature of the thing whereby it comes to reality falls to the ground. Thus free souls cannot be the means of introducing into a purely external world of mechanism a sense content which shall be the expression of their ideals in relation to this world. If we give to the soul freedom, and yet deny the activity of this freedom of the soul in relation to the world, then we shall have the world on one side and the soul on the other, and between them there can be no manner of active communication; if we maintain, however, that the soul acts freely in relation to the world, then this freedom demands that the world shall no longer be considered as a merely mechanical something having a rigid nature of its own, and standing external to the soul.

Demands  
made upon  
the nature  
of the  
world  
by the  
possibility  
of being  
acted upon  
by free  
souls—  
things must  
also be of  
the nature  
of free  
souls.

If the material world can be renewed, or given a history through being acted upon by free souls, then the things in this world must themselves be of the nature of free souls, and their activity must be free activity. The material world itself must introduce into itself, through the free activity of the objects which constitute it, the new beginnings which are to give it a real movement towards the realisation of ideals lying outside of a merely circular mechanical movement or rhythm. Let us see how this comes about. We have seen Lotze maintaining that a thing is a soul, and that it is conscious of its own being; that this consciousness consists in the fact that it is a unity of sense qualities, and that sense qualities are feelings or experiences for a consciousness. Now it can scarcely be said that Lotze, by this theory, meant to give to things a perception of their own

being; this self-feeling on the part of a thing is more likely to be something very indefinite, like the confused perception in the very lowest of the Leibnitzian monads. But if a thing, in and for itself, is a unity of the sense qualities which we perceive it as possessing, then its being and the consciousness which is bound up with that being cannot be something indefinite, cannot be a mere confused feeling which somehow or another produces unity amongst the sense qualities. In perception we do not merely experience a bundle of sense qualities—our consciousness, in order to perceive them, must compare them and contrast them, and must bring them under a definite point of view—the comparing and the contrasting and the coming under the definite point of view are moments not contained in the sense qualities as a mere series of contents following one after another. Now if a thing as we perceive it, or as it exists as an object of our experience, that is, as a unity of sense qualities acting according to law, is to possess in and for itself the reality which we attribute to it, then the consciousness on the part of the thing, in which this reality comes to being, must be a comparing, contrasting, and meaning-giving consciousness. The thing must possess a meaning for itself, it must view its own being in the light of its meaning, and this meaning cannot consist of anything contained in a merely mechanical or circular movement of a plurality of sense qualities. In the light of this meaning the thing can call into itself new beginnings, new sense qualities—not to complete a mere circle or round of events, but to realise its own purpose. The freedom that is exercised in all activity proceeds not from a mechanical order, not from souls standing over against this order, but from a depth of purpose centring in reality as a community of free souls. (Lotze, however, refuses to consider things in this light. He is concerned to give to higher souls a freedom and a reality only as existing over against a background of material

and mechanical existence.) We must now see how Lotze strives to give to the soul in its *knowledge* of the material world an existence and a reality as standing over against that world.

Function  
of the  
sense  
content of  
the soul in  
relation  
to the  
outside  
world.

We have seen Lotze maintaining that the soul, by means of its purely mechanical interactions with the outside world through the medium of the body, produces within itself sensations which go to form the basis of its life. We have distinguished between three kinds of sensations—first, the bodily feelings due to adjustment of the sense organs to the objects in the external world ; secondly, the acts of sensation, each of which is a mere event, or breaking into consciousness of an actual sense content ; thirdly, the sense content which comes to have a permanent meaning and which can be called to clear consciousness at any moment through the medium of memory. It is as content that sensation plays the most important part in the building up of soul life. Feelings of adjustment and acts of sensation undoubtedly have their place, but Lotze neglects these altogether ; they come, they go, and for him that is the end of them. We must now deal with the function which sense contents have to play as constituents of an independent soul life that is being built up. The soul does not exist enclosed within itself ; it knows, experiences, or perceives the world which exists outside of it ; and it is the function of sense contents to set the soul in this knowing, perceiving, or experiencing relation to the world. It is in perception that the soul first comes to experience its individuality ; here it is that it comes to place itself over and above the world which it perceives. Furthermore, we undoubtedly do interpret this undeveloped soul individuality standing over against the world as externality to that world.

Function  
of know-  
ledge.

The nature  
of per-  
ception.

Now sense must be unified as perception before we can have knowledge. Lotze holds two views as to the nature of perception, and these views are incon-

sistent with one another. The one may be described as materialistic, the other as spiritualistic. It is the materialistic view with which we shall deal at this point. On this view Lotze connects perception with the mechanical interactions taking place in the material world, making it a continuation of these interactions. Sense is brought into the soul through mechanism, and it becomes unified in perception through the same activity. He tells us that the first subjective order in which the individual receives experiences, and gathers them up into the unity of his own mind, is not altogether subjective. It has a certain objectivity in that it corresponds to an order in the outside world. By means of the delicate organisation of the senses there is an order and sequence of the stimulations received by the soul from the body which corresponds to the actual relations between things. This order acts as a guide to the soul in relating the sensations which are excited by the external stimuli, so that the order of sensations corresponds to the order of things affecting the body. Speaking of the relation between body and soul he says: 'But the delicate organisation that makes it possible for the body to transmit these signals (i.e. stimulations due to the action of the outer world) in a definite grouping and sequence, answering to the actual relations of things, also guides the soul to an alternation and association of its sensations, in which it attains all the truth possible through the mere apprehension of given facts without reflective elaboration of their internal connection.'<sup>1</sup> Thus we see that apprehension or perception of the outside world is mediated through a unity of sense contents, this unity being carried out by a purely mechanical process. Although it is in perception that the soul comes to its first knowledge of the material world, and although it is in this knowledge that the soul comes to experience its individuality

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos*, Bk. iii. Chap. i. (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 283).

over against the world which it knows, yet such knowledge of the external world and such individuality as thus accrue to the soul are poor and inadequate. Both knowledge and individuality come to fruition in thought. Just as he held a materialistic and a spiritualistic view as to the nature of perception, so Lotze holds a materialistic and a spiritualistic view of the nature of thought. It is to the materialistic view that we shall now turn our attention, leaving the spiritualistic view until later.

The supervening of thought upon perception.

When perception reaches a certain stage of complexity it calls for thought as its supplement in the formation of an experience which gives us a more adequate knowledge of reality than perception does. We must not think of thought, however, as a finished activity which is added to the activity of perception, nor must we think of the world of thought as standing sharply over against the world of perceptual reality. Thought supervenes upon perception gradually, just as, for example, the perception of reality as three-dimensional supervenes upon a less complex perception of reality. (We use the term *supervenes* here provisionally, as not committing us to any view as to the way in which thought comes into being—whether it arises out of perception, or takes its rise in a special principle and is added to perception—as to whether or not it is individual or cosmic in its origin.) The further development of thought itself is also gradual; the earlier stages of thought approach perception in their nature; as thought itself develops it passes through various stages, each stage arising out of the one previous to it, being higher than it, and becoming more and more different in nature from perception.

Memory images as forming themselves into a mechanical system.

Now thought has two stages; the first is that of mental imagery, and the second is that of conceptual thinking. The first that supervenes upon perception is that of mental imagery. When the perceptual content in the life of an individual reaches a certain

stage of richness and complexity, this content becomes supplemented by ideas or memory images. Where in the scale of being the required perceptual complexity first occurs is a matter which would be difficult to decide, but in all probability the higher animals possess some power of ideation. The answer to the question as to how these memory images come to supervene upon sensation will depend to a large extent upon what we consider them to be ; we may characterise them as references to actual sensations which have been previously experienced ; they are images in that they copy to a greater or a lesser extent the experiences to which they refer, but with this difference, that the disturbance in consciousness, which we undergo from concrete experiences, drops out when these experiences are reproduced in memory in the form of mental images ; and further, they are not considered as belonging to the real in itself. This is due to a qualitative difference between them and the sense contents to which they refer. The image of blue which I have in my mind does not contain the element of blueness. Now these memory images, in their flow through consciousness, form themselves into something of a system ; Lotze tells us that through the medium of the whole mind in which they exist, they act and react upon one another according to certain laws of association and reproduction ; through this action and reaction it comes about that certain of them become combined more closely with one another than with others, thus giving rise to a certain degree of system among themselves. As each individual mind is different from every other, so the extent, content, and organisation of the system of memory images belonging to each individual mind will be different from those belonging to all other minds.

Lotze tells us that the ways in which this early constructive ideation is carried out are quite mechanical. Memory images follow upon immediate

experiences and upon one another in certain orders determined by certain definite sets of conditions; this gives to the flow of images a certain regularity and uniformity of behaviour. For example, other things being equal, the memory images will follow upon one another in the same temporal sequence as the experiences to which they refer; again, images which are alike tend to call one another into consciousness. This regularity in the flow of ideas Lotze interprets as mechanism. In the lives of the higher animals this flow of memory images exists without any further and higher ideational process supervening upon it; in their case the function of such images is that of giving to the animals a certain anticipation of reality as it reveals itself to them in sense, so that they can act in relation to this reality in accordance with the limited needs which their nature sets them. Lotze writes, 'We do not deny that, apart from thought, the mere current of ideas in the brute gives rise to many useful combinations of impressions, correct expectations, seasonable reactions.'<sup>1</sup>

The second  
ideational  
process :  
conceptual  
thought.

Where conceptual thought comes into existence this first ideational process serves as basis for it. This brings us to the problem as to the nature and function of this second ideational process.

As animal life grows in complexity, and as the conditions affecting it become more varied and irregular, the part played by memory images in correctly anticipating reality becomes greater and greater. Eventually, however, the system which is introduced amongst memory images ceases to be an anticipation or representation of reality adequate to the needs of growing life; the system amongst memory images represents the order in which the subject has come into touch with realities outside himself, rather than the order in which these realities are systematised in and for themselves. A more

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, Introduction, paragraph 7.

complicated adjustment of the subject to reality, however, demands that the subject shall know reality as it is, or that he should be able adequately or completely to represent it to himself as it is in and for itself. Lotze tells us that as time goes on memory images can themselves perform this function; he tells us that the subject, by his repeated comings into contact with reality, tends more often than not to follow the lines of systematisation which exist amongst objects, and so these lines tend eventually to give their order to memory images. The process by which this is brought about, however, is a very slow one, and at a certain stage in mental development conceptual thought comes into being and takes over the task which the memory images have only inadequately performed.

Just as in the case of concrete experiences, the disturbance in consciousness which we undergo from them drops out when they are reproduced in memory, so in the case of these images, in their further development to conceptual thought, the actual imagery drops out, leaving behind only their references to an external reality; it is these references to which we give the name of concepts, and it is their systematic unity which constitutes conceptual thought. The question naturally arises as to how such references to a reality beyond themselves can be held in the mind, for a mere reference without a definite content seems to be a nonentity. The answer is that these references connect themselves with a content which is entirely different from that to which they refer; they connect themselves with language, that is, with words, either spoken, or written, or consisting of some kind of movement, or with the memory images of such words. Thought came to be thus connected with language through a desire on the part of individuals to communicate memory images in order that they might help one another to the satisfaction of their needs, combined

The view  
that  
thought  
is a con-  
tinuum  
of sense



with the fact that 'our sentience found in the single sounds with which it had to work a decided similarity to the perceptible qualities of things and to the forms of events.'<sup>1</sup> This led to the memory images becoming connected with the sounds in such a way that the sound served the same purpose of reference to an object as the image did.

Now if conceptual thought is, as we have portrayed it, a mere system of references to reality obtained by dropping the imagery from mental images, and held together through language, then it is its connection with language, a connection which has been portrayed as accidental in its origin, which gives to thought the power of representing reality in a more adequate way than memory images do.

But if this account of the process and content which go to make up the human mind in its knowledge of the material world is correct, then it seems as though the problem is not to account for the way in which the subjective order comes to some sort of adequacy in its representation of the objective order, but rather as to how inadequacy creeps in. The task of mental imagery and conceptual thought could not be that of correcting an inadequate representation of reality given by the first subjective process. Nor could it be that of giving us a greater degree of truth; the task of these later thought processes could only be that of widening and extending our representation of reality in a greater measure than could be done by immediate experience. They would be able to perform this function because, in the case of mental imagery, the images come faster to consciousness than actual experiences, and in the case of conceptual thought, because our control over language is much greater than our control, by means of the senses, over immediate experiences. Language enables us to gather up our memory images, to arrange them, to make them flow, and thus to hold, in thought,

<sup>1</sup> *Mikrokosmos* (Eng. trans.), vol. i. p. 616.

reference to huge spheres of reality which would be impossible in the case of actual experience.

Such a view as this regarding the origin, nature, and function of thought is undoubtedly very materialistic; it makes thought merely a development of physical processes, this development being carried on in and through the medium of the individual mind. The physical connection between material objects and the human body brings it about that experiences are generated in the mind standing in connection with the body—these experiences following of necessity the order of objects in the material world. Further, these actual experiences, after having existed in the individual mind, drop part of their content: first the force with which they break in upon consciousness, thus coming to be mere images; then their actual imagery, thus coming to be mere references. In this last aspect of their being they further connect themselves with other physical processes, namely, movements of the organs of speech, i.e. with spoken sounds, so that they can be easily held together. Thought is thus a mere physical process; it is a mere outcome of the flow of material existences, a mere gathering up, in the consciousness which a body has of itself, of all the materially determined influences of objects on the body, and a gathering up which is determined by the flow of material events, and not by any ideals of truth or validity standing independent of the mere existence of the material world. Further, this view of the nature of thought destroys all claims of thought to objective truth. Error cannot be accounted for; falsity can never creep into the representation of reality. Material existences by acting on bodies weave plans of themselves with as much material necessity as the loom weaves plans on the cloth, or the copying machine prints copies of a piece of writing. And the self is nothing but such a plan—a body conscious of itself and feeling its material influences—that and nothing more.

These  
views  
as ending  
in material-  
ism.

## CHAPTER X

### THE TASK OF THOUGHT

The inadequacy of Lotze's attempt to find the reality of the soul as something isolated.

LOTZE does not rest satisfied with the view which sets forth a purely mechanical nature as belonging to thought and perception. He himself saw that on this view knowledge of reality is impossible. Furthermore, it involves the theory that knowledge and experience are only representative of reality; that therefore they do not grip into and make it their own. Such a view makes the relation between knowledge and reality unintelligible and unmeaning.

Again Lotze endeavoured to build up the life and being of the soul as he had tried to build up the being of an individual thing. The ramifications of the soul, however, run deep within the texture of reality, and the soul connects itself with large spheres and principles extending over the whole of that which is real. It is from these spheres and principles that the soul draws its sustenance and its reality, hence no examination of its nature as isolated or as being a member of a mere plurality will reveal its reality to us. And more than this, the reality of that which constitutes the material world is bound up with the reality of the soul which knows that world. To discover in what the reality of the material world consists it is therefore necessary to consider our own deepest longings, highest endeavours, and intensest activities. It is only when we move from these to the world of existence that we shall discover what this world really is. Lotze quietly takes up this point of view, and it is in his theory of the nature of thought that we have the first step in this direction.

The first indication which Lotze gives us to the effect that the higher processes of the mind are not purely mechanical, and that they have a special function to perform, not merely in recognising reality but in moulding it, is given us when he comes to grips with the function of memory. He tells us that images become ordered through certain laws of reproduction and association; that as thus ordered they play a part in the ordering of the content of sense, or in the systematising of perception. He says, 'Not merely like a mirror does consciousness render back the shape of the external—bringing single parts together into smaller wholes, and shutting them off by boundary lines from their environment—it introduces lines that are not in the picture as given, but start from the assumption of an unequal internal coherence that sometimes binds together the comparatively remote more closely than the adjacent. The new arrangement of import and meaning into which we throw the objects perceived by sense, we make partly under the mechanism of our association of ideas.'<sup>1</sup> Thus the organisation of memory images flings a meaning around, or introduces a meaning into our sense experiences. He tells us that thought performs this same function in a more extended and satisfactory way than mental imagery, and he also tries to show us in a detailed manner how thought does so; but in the case of mental imagery he seems to take this activity as a matter of fact, and to leave it at that.

Thought as moving in a non-mechanical way.

Now thought is an added element or moment in mind. Lotze tells us that it is brought into being by the systematic whole of perceptual experience, as given in the unity of sensation and mental imagery, further acting upon the mind and causing the mind to act in a creative fashion so as to produce thought from itself. He makes thought stand outside of sense and imagination in order that he may consider

The way in which thought arises in the mind.

<sup>1</sup> *Microkosmos* (Eng. trans.), vol. 1. pp. 231 and 232.

it as surveying, criticising, and interpreting sense ; he wishes to make it quite clear that thought cannot be considered as a further process of the reality which it criticises, for in that case it would be merely another part of that reality, would function in the same activity, and would not be able to turn round or exist apart from that reality so as to adopt a critical or interpretative attitude towards it. Thought now becomes interpretative or critical of reality—but not of material reality. As soon as reality calls for interpretation it ceases to be the merely material reality which stands external to the human mind.

Lotze as dropping all reference to an external reality.

Thus when Lotze comes to separate thought and sense he drops all reference to an objective external world of mere things, over against which stands the individual soul constituted by the unity of sense, imagination, and thought. The reality which thought refers to, which it surveys, criticises, and interprets, is constituted by the contents of sense, or the contents of the individual experience. There is no real world of mere material existences standing outside of the individual in reference to which the individual acts, producing within himself the content of sense and imagination. Objective reality is made to spring up in sense ; it wells up in and through individuals ; it comes into being and exists as the sense content of individual minds. Individual minds, individual centres of consciousness, are the mediators of reality. In thus rising up through the medium of the individual mind the reality constituted by sense does not exist as a material order ; it exists rather as a multitude of streams of events, and it is the task of the multitude of individuals to convert all these streams into one objective order having meaning and a hard and fast existence ; in fact, individuals must form their sense experiences in such a way as to reveal an objective world, which is the same for all, and which is yet independent of all. And it is by means of thought that they do this.

This brings us to the nature of sense welling up in individual minds, and which sets thought the task of criticism and interpretation in reference to itself. Sense mediates or reveals to us, even in its lowest stages, a world of reality; and a world which is therefore a unity, however poor and inadequate that unity may be. This leads Lotze to draw a distinction between intuitive thought and abstract thought, and to maintain that intuitive thought is involved in sense experience even at its lowest levels.

The distinction between intuitive and abstract thought.

The first requirement that a perceptual object in being perceived demands of the mind which perceives it, is that the mind shall hold together in unity and in difference, at one and the same moment, the various sense qualities which belong to that object. This means that each of the sense contents has to be recognised as identical with itself and as different from the others. Such a recognition of identity and difference can only take place if the soul can pass from one sense content to another, and if, in passing, it can hold apart the content from which it is passing and the content to which it is passing, while at the same time keeping them both together as parts of a single whole. The soul thus exercises a single, undivided activity, which takes up within itself the variety of content perceived by it. The simplest perception is therefore an immediate recognition of wholeness, and Lotze calls it intuition. It may be described as that characteristic of perception in which a plurality of elements are gripped together in a single act of the mind, and in that act are experienced as members of a distinctive whole having its own distinctive nature.

Why is it that this intuition involved in perception should be described by Lotze as an activity of thought? He was undoubtedly connecting himself with the Idealistic development which had considered thought as being involved in sense in so far as sense is ordered. Briefly, this view was as follows:

Why and how intuition comes to be described as an activity of thought.

The soul in its recognition of sense content must hold this content separate from the mass of experience which tends to obtrude itself into the mind, and where there is a plurality of sense contents it must pass from one to the other, while yet keeping them all separate. In this activity the soul is guided by principles or motives not contained in the sense contents as such. In order to recognise or perceive something as blue it is necessary to consider the sense content of 'blueness' as identical with itself and as being different from everything else. But identity and difference are not part of the sense content 'blueness' in so far as it is content. Sense contents come and go, and in their coming and going they change continuously and rapidly. For any one of them to be considered as identical with itself, and as being different from everything else, it has to be given a permanency of existence, or of meaning, which is not contained in its passage through consciousness. This is more clearly seen when we consider the perception of objects. The connecting principles which bind together a plurality of sense contents into the unity of an object are those of substance and attribute. If we analyse our sense experience ever so far we shall never be able to experience any characteristic which we can describe as substance, and which is the same in nature as the sense contents united through its medium. Again, this relating activity of consciousness is not only directed to recognising the content of a single perceptual object as belonging to that object and as forming a unity within its being; it is also directed to the recognising of objects as being related to one another in various ways so as to form a single perceptual experience or world. The connecting principles involved here are those of cause and effect, space and time, and so on.

These principles of unity also possess a certain universality, necessity, and validity which do not

belong to mere sense, and which further accentuate the difference between sense and its forms of unity, causing us to describe these forms as belonging to thought.

At the same time Lotze saw that it is impossible to separate these forms of unity from the sense content to which they belong. They are constructive principles welded into the nature of sense content, and on account of this cannot be the same in nature as the abstract thought by means of which a system of truth is built up.

Intuitive  
thought is  
not the  
same as  
abstract  
thought.

Further, it is the special nature of the content of reality which determines which principles of unity we shall apply when we seek to explain changes taking place within reality. It is the *concrete detail* of experience which determines that in this particular instance the principle of cause and effect shall be applied; in another instance the principle of thing and property, and in another instance the principle of mere spatial connection. Thus what we call constructive principles are not forms distinct from the content which exists in them. A constructive principle consists rather of a change in sense along a given direction, this direction being one with the actual content which exists in or lives through it. Thus constructive principles cannot be *a priori* in the sense of depending upon conditions of experience which are independent of the nature of that which is experienced. They are not given in and through the medium of thought as reflective, or as abstract; their recognition belongs to perception, but to that characteristic of perception which grasps experience as a whole. If we take any part of experience we shall find that it comes to us not as a stream of events each one entirely cut off from the rest, but in pieces, or wholes, each of which possesses a more or less definite character; the spatiality of things is not entirely a construction; in our very first experience, the content which is experienced holds together



through a character of spatiality which is further unanalysable; events run along certain directions in the very first instance; heat and cold belong together; whatever changes of heat and cold may occur, and however vague the experience may be in which such variations occur, yet these changes are perceived as all belonging together, and this belonging together becomes expanded, with growing experience, into the causal relation. It is clear, then, that the thought which is bound up with sense in the formation of perceptual experience is not abstract and mediated through ideas. Abstract thought, as mediated in ideas, possesses its whole character and meaning in the very fact that it is cut loose from the reality to which it refers. It moves over the face of the content of perceptual experience; it creates ideas of the elements contained in that experience; brings them together one by one, and through a multitude of comparisons, contrasts, and so on, builds them up into a whole and predicates them of reality, or claims validity for them in reference to reality as given in perceptual experience.

Abstract  
thought as  
being in-  
terpreta-  
tive of  
experience.

Abstract thought is thus considered by Lotze as being interpretative of reality as given in experience. This interpretation consists of reading into sense experience an internal connection, or an internal dependence of the content of one experience upon the content of another, and of finding and giving expression to certain necessary grounds for this connection or dependence. Thought performs this function by means of the concept. We have already seen that following upon sense impressions we have mental images, which are references to and copies of these sense impressions; we have seen, further, that following upon images we have ideas; these ideas are references to sense impressions or to mental images, but with all the content that is found in sense impressions, and with all the imagery which belongs to imagination, left out. Now concepts

are a still further advance upon ideas; a concept is a rule according to which we combine and separate our ideas; when such a combination of ideas takes place a whole is formed, each element of which has its place assigned to it by the determining rule which constitutes the concept. This whole is what we call a universal, that is to say, it is not itself concrete but is universally applicable to that which is concrete, when this latter fulfils certain conditions.

This ideational structure is that by means of which we interpret reality in that it constitutes itself a mode of apprehension through which our sense impressions are taken up by us so as to form a systematic world of sense experience. Each idea—meaning by the term idea what we have seen as the first advance upon memory, images—refers, either directly or indirectly, to a particular sense impression, and as this impression occurs in consciousness it becomes taken up and placed in relation with other sense impressions, according to the systematising rule which holds in the concept, where the idea corresponding to the impressions finds itself. Thus, instead of a mere flow of sense impressions we come to have a systematic world of sense built up according to conceptual thought. Each object which we know is thus a systematic, coherent whole by being apprehended through the medium of the concept.<sup>1</sup>

In the soul in its first state, impressions, or sense contents, Lotze maintains, follow one another in a mechanical order determined by the interactions of the body with the objects standing external to it. Differently constituted bodies, and bodies living under different conditions from others and being placed in different surroundings from others, will occasion 'in the souls standing in connection with them orders of sensations or impressions very different from one another. Thus no two souls would have an order of ideas which was the same, for the very

How we interpret reality by means of the concept.

The concept as giving a universal character to the particularity of sense.

<sup>1</sup> *Microkosmos*, vol. i, pp. 226 and 227.

simple reason that the mechanical determinants of the contents of these souls are different. As Lotze says, 'If we know the permanent characteristics of a single particular soul, if we had a view of the form and content of its whole current of ideas up to the present time, then, the moment it had produced a first and a second idea on occasion of external irritants, we should be able to predict on the basis of those universal laws (i.e. those which mechanically determine the course of sensations and ideas) what its third and fourth idea in the next moment must be. But in any other soul, whose nature, past history, and present condition were different, the same first and second idea, developed at this moment by a similar external irritant, would lead with a similar necessity in the next moment to an entirely different connection. An investigation of the subject would therefore have to recognise that any given current of ideas was necessary for that particular soul and under those particular conditions; but it would not discover any mode of connection between ideas which was universally valid for all souls.'<sup>1</sup> The task of thought consists in converting the particularity of the order of our ideas, i.e. of sensations, memory images, etc., into universality; it consists in introducing into our ideas an order which shall be the same for all minds. Lotze says, 'Connections of ideas are true (i.e. determined by objective thought) when they follow such relations in the matter of the ideas as are identical for all consciousness, and not such, merely empirical coincidence of impressions as takes one form in one consciousness, another in another.'<sup>2</sup>

The way  
in which  
thought  
performs  
this  
function.

The external world is represented as having a hard and fast, or permanent existence. The book exists on my table whether I see it or not—it is blue even when I do not see it, and even when no one else sees it. But my sensations, my perceptions, which

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, Introduction, sec. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, sec. 3.

are obtained by looking at the book are fleeting ; each exists only in the moment of perception, and never again. Thus our first consciousness is constituted by a mere flow of ideas. The task of thought is that of giving to these ideas a certain permanent reference ; it catches hold of the content of these ideas and places them in a permanent order which is the same for all souls. Lotze gives us an example of this conversion of a mere flow of ideas into a permanent order. We may regard an animal as seeing a tree in leaf ; all he is aware of is a plurality of images—various colourings, shapes, and so on, all these following one another ; he does not connect them all together, making them all parts of a single object having a permanent existence. In winter, when the person sees the tree stripped of its leaves, he considers that it is the same tree but that parts of it have been destroyed. But the brute would not recognise it as the same tree ; for him it would merely be another series of sense impressions. In thus ordering his sense impressions the person is able to do so because he has taken the characteristics of the tree, given them a permanent value, and also a permanent order in idea ; when he next comes to experience these sense impressions he makes use of these permanent values and this permanent order, and sees his impressions through their medium.

Thought thus orders the contents of our impressions, or rather connects them together systematically, not in the order in which they come to us, but in an order in which the characteristics belonging to them force us to think of them. Lotze says, denying that thought gives permanent existence to that which it objectifies, 'We only mean that certain special forms of resistance and tension, which we feel in the course of our ideas, are not only peculiarities of our state and inseparable from it, but that they depend upon relations inherent in the matter of various ideas, which everyone who thinks these ideas will

find in them just as we do.<sup>1</sup> Now this resistance and tension existing in the course of our ideas, depend upon the nature of the content of these ideas rather than upon their existence as acts of sensation. The ideas 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' 'e' follow one another in our consciousness in the order named; they follow the order 'a,' 'c,' 'd,' 'b,' 'e' in another consciousness, and 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' 'a,' 'e' in a third; but in all these minds the contents of these various ideas tend towards or demand one order for themselves, namely, 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' 'e.' Eventually ideas become connected in this last way so that those ideas whose contents belong together eventually occur together in consciousness. But how comes it about that *thought can bring our impressions into existence* in the order 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' 'e,' instead of in other orders, such as 'a,' 'c,' 'd,' 'e,' 'b'? Lotze tells us that by comparing and contrasting our sense impressions we find that the contents of certain of them possess an inner coherence, and we *think* of these contents as existing together. But this is not altogether what is required; we want to *perceive* these contents as existing together, and in order so to perceive them it must be their inner coherence which is to determine their order as sense impressions in our consciousness as completed experience. Thought must possess a determining power over the course of our ideas, which power to a certain extent, at all events, can nullify their first flow into consciousness, however that flow may be determined. Let us take an example. I see smoke coming from a chimney. I first see the smoke, then I see the chimney, and afterwards I go into the house and see the fire in the grate. The order in which circumstances have led me to see these various elements might make me believe that the smoke is the cause of the chimney, and the chimney the cause of the fire; but the content of my sense experience demands that the fire shall be considered as the cause of the smoke,

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 3.

and not *vice versa*. This knowledge of the inner coherence and order of the content of these sense experiences guides me in the future in my perception and in my activity in relation to like experiences which may occur again—e.g. if I want to produce smoke for some purpose or another I kindle a fire ; if I want to see what is the cause of certain smoke I see somewhere I look for a fire ; thus my perceptions, or the order in which I will that sense impressions shall come to me is determined, to some extent at least, by thought, or by the knowledge of the inner coherence of the content of ideas ; and this order may take precedence of any other order which would otherwise have supervened.

Even if, however, thought were wholly successful in making us think an order of ideas determined by a complete inner coherence amongst their contents, its task, Lotze tells us, would not be completed. Thought must supply grounds for this coherence ; thought must not merely think as being placed together in a certain order the leaves, branches, stem, and roots of a tree, but it must tell us why they so exist together ; thought must not only think of smoke as existing after fire, but it must tell us why this order exists. A coherence is *valid* only if it has this ground. Furthermore, this ground is expressed by us in the universality and necessity with which thought constructions appeal to us. This universality and necessity belonging to thought, and this seeking for a ground for the coherence which thought predicates of the content of reality brought to it in idea, depend upon the fact that thought is not identical with reality. Thought brings us into touch with a system or a reality which is, to some extent at all events, beyond ourselves.

It is in this reference to a reality which is thus beyond our grip, and which moves through our life, that discursive thought finds its function and its character. 'Only a mind which stood at the centre of the real world, not outside individual things

The ground of the coherence amongst the contents of our ideas.

The place of logical principles in relation to the structure of reality.

but penetrating them with its presence, could command such a view of reality as left nothing to look for, and was therefore the perfect image of it in its own being and activity. But the human mind, with which alone we are here concerned, does not thus stand at the centre of things, but has a modest position somewhere in the extreme ramifications of reality. Compelled, as it is, to collect its knowledge piecemeal by experiences which relate immediately to only a small fragment of the whole, and thence to advance cautiously to the apprehension of what lies beyond its horizon, it has probably to make a number of circuits, which are immaterial to the truth it is seeking, but to itself in the search are indispensable. However much, then, we may presuppose an original reference of the forms of thought to that nature of things which is the goal of knowledge, we must be prepared to find in them many elements which do not directly reproduce the actual reality to the knowledge of which they are to lead us; indeed, there is always the possibility that a very large part of our efforts of thought may only be like a scaffolding, which does not belong to the permanent form of the building which it helped to raise, but, on the contrary, must be taken down again to allow the full view of its result.<sup>1</sup>

Our experience does not come to us as a finished product; it comes to us piecemeal, and has to be built up into a world of experience through our own efforts. This experience which we build up is not always unified in the same way. We often unify it wrongly; again, we see what claims to be the same reality being unified in our experience, at one time in this way, at another time in that way; by one person in this way, by another person in that way; if this reality, in respect of its unity, claims universality and necessity, which is what we mean by the term validity, as it must do if it is to be the same for

<sup>1</sup> *Logos*, Introduction, sec. ix.

all, then we cannot think of it as being differently unified at different times and for different persons.

There are several ways of giving this universality and necessity or oneness and permanency to reality over against its multiplicity and growth in the individual mind. It can be maintained that an external reality which is eternally one and the same comes to be represented in our experience; that its representation is a matter of growth; reality may never be represented completely in the experience of the individual, but nevertheless the more it comes to be so represented the more certain are we of the necessity and validity of the later principles of unity holding in our more completed experience. That is to say, the ground of coherence, the expression of which in our judgments about reality gives validity to those judgments, may be made to rest in an external world. Or it can be maintained that outside of our experience there is no reality, but that the oneness, and permanency or necessity belonging to the reality constituted by our experience consists in an end point, or ideal, or goal, at which all unifying activity in relation to experience must aim, this ideal being given by thought. That is to say, the grounds of coherence are principles given by thought as such. Or again, it may be held that the permanency belonging to reality, reality being bound up with experience, is to be found in the fact that the content of sense demands to be unified in certain ways; that it has a nature which only allows of its being unified in these ways, and that thought, by processes of comparison, contrast, classification, and so on, finds out how alone this sense content can be unified; that is, the grounds of coherence are made to exist in that which coheres. The first of these ways of justifying the universality and necessity belonging to the constructive aspect of our experience leads inevitably to scepticism; the aim of thought is to know reality as it is in and for itself; if it is maintained that there

This ground of coherence as giving universality and permanency and therefore validity to sense.



is a sphere of reality altogether outside the range of our experience, then thought can never compass it, and so can never come to a knowledge of ultimate reality. The second way of accounting for universality and necessity is peculiarly Kantian. Kant distinguished between two kinds of unity as holding amongst the various contents going to the constitution of our experience; between a subjective and objective, or between a psychological and logical unity; the latter alone, he maintains, brings us knowledge. The distinction between these two kinds of unities lies in this, that in the psychological unity the individual unifies his experience for himself alone, or as if he were the only being whom he need take into consideration, whereas in the case of the logical unity the individual unifies his experience as if it belonged not merely to himself but to universal mind or mind as such.

The validity of thought as resting in a reality independent of all individual minds.

But such an analysis of experience, and the way it is built up in the individual mind, is not sufficient. Thought, in giving us valid experience, introduces us into a reality which is or which *exists*. Thought cannot exercise its determining activity in relation to all minds unless it rests in a reality which is above and beyond all minds, and yet in relation to which all minds must stand if they are to exist at all. The logical presuppositions of knowledge must give us a real assurance that that knowledge is true, that is to say, that knowledge results in revealing to us a reality standing over against ourselves, and yet carrying itself into our experience. This was seen by the followers of Kant, who built up metaphysical systems on the basis of his theory of knowledge. In these systems universal mind, or mind as such, became converted into a concrete, living experience including everything within itself; consciousness and its logical movement came to be considered as objective spirit centring in an Absolute, and logical unity came to be that unity which the Absolute or objective spirit

imposes upon itself. The followers of Kant were undoubtedly justified in seeking for a metaphysical *real* as that which forces thought to unify the experience of the individual in certain ways ; thought claims truth, and truth is not mere validity for all who think, as Kant's theory would seem to imply ; truth consists of the assurance that an over-individual reality exists in, or is revealed through, the medium of our experience ; metaphysics has to discover what this over-individual reality is and to show how thought has its source and justification in it. The real is that which has existence in and for itself independent of ourselves who happen to experience it. The logical necessity belonging to thought must tell us that our experience has been organised or unified ; and in this necessity it must reveal reality by giving us an assurance that in making use of thought principles we are coming into contact with a real something that can and does exist in and for itself, independent of our merely individual experience.

The great question is as to what this real something is. So far we have seen that universality and necessity, or, if we choose to call them so, logic, or validity, rests in a *real* which is over-individual. For Kant and for the Post-Kantians, logic meant the demands which are made by consciousness upon that which it knows or can know ; the logic of reality extended itself into system in detail, this system depending upon the ultimate characteristic of reality as self-conscious being. But, and this is important, thought or logic, or universality and necessity, lost their peculiar characteristic of resting in the distinction between truth and falsity as soon as the individual, as an individual, became lost in ultimate reality or the Absolute. An Absolute which manifests a completeness of self-consciousness throughout the length and breadth of its being could not, in any part of its being, be deflected from the systematic structure which is dependent upon its

The nature of the over-individual reality in which the validity of thought rests.

The Post-Kantians as making this real in which validity rests a real of *Existence*.

self-consciousness; it could not therefore harbour falsity, nor know the alternative between truth and falsity upon which the meaning of necessity and universality rests. Kant himself saw that universality and necessity do not rest altogether in the demands of self-consciousness; he saw that if the world of knowledge is to possess universality and validity, that is, if it is to be the same for all of us, not only must its form be the same, but its content must be the same. Beings living in the same world of causes and effects, things and properties, and so on, could not communicate with one another if tastes and smells, and colours and sounds, existed in the experiences of some and not in the experiences of others; if when one person perceived smells another perceived sense contents which were of an entirely different nature, then inter-subjective intercourse would be impossible; thus inter-subjective intercourse through the medium of which the psychological becomes the logical, and the merely individual and subjective becomes the over-individual and objective, demands universality in the content of sense as well as in its structure; and Kant gives it this universality, not from the point of view of logic, but from the point of view of matter of fact; he holds that a single world existing in and for itself stands outside of individuals, and that the sameness of this external world, coupled with the sameness of individual natures, gives rise to the sameness or universality of sense needed for inter-subjective intercourse. Thus, even with Kant, universality and necessity of content necessary to knowledge were made to rest in a real existence standing external to the individual; and with the Post-Kantians the universality and necessity of form were also made to rest in a real existence standing external to the individual. Thus even with these thinkers the universality and necessity, or the validity which forces itself into our experience and which finds

abstract expression in truth, is not a condition of the experience of the individual over against a reality external to himself; it is not merely a condition of experience as such, nor is it a condition of mere knowing; it does not belong to thought as a reflective process exercised by individuals in relation to their experience; it is not a mere condition of inter-subjective intercourse; it is rather a condition which ultimate reality as a self-existing universe imposes upon itself, a something which calls for no justification and for no reason; it is an ultimate aspect of a self-existing reality. But to rest universality and necessity in a reality which is that of existence is to lead us back to scepticism. If logical principles are made to rest in existence, then they become constitutive or constructive of that which is, or of that which exists. If this were the case, then we should have a factual reality facing a factual knowledge, and between the two there would be no bond to give assurance to the knower that in his knowledge he had gripped hold of reality as it is in and for itself. Thus universality and necessity do not belong to experience, or reality as made up of things existing and acting upon one another; they are not characteristics of being and existence and activity as such; they belong to individuality or personality in its power of judgment; they mean the forcing upon the individual of one point of view, or of one judgment rather than another; the individual has to accept reality as this rather than as that, and it is in being forced to accept reality in this way that universality and necessity rest. Further, the possibility of accepting reality as different from what it really is must exist, otherwise necessity cannot exist.

Now the power of judgment in relation to reality on the part of the individual rests in thought in so far as it is reflective, abstract, or discursive; hence the universality and necessity, or the ground of coherence which issues in validity, must rest in the principles

of thought as abstract, and as being exercised by the individual mind. This is the point of view which Lotze takes, and it is here that he seeks for the grounds of coherence.

Distinction  
between  
construc-  
tive  
principles  
and  
principles  
of validity

Now thought has two moments, it has a content and a procedure by means of which that content is obtained. The process by means of which thought obtains its content from its contact with immediate experience can only take place through the medium of certain presuppositions or working hypotheses. For instance, in order to discover any laws governing any course of events I must assume that like conditions are followed by like results. In order to make any statement at all about reality I must maintain the principle of identity and the principle of excluded middle; if I maintain that a thing can be and not be at the same time and in the same sense, then I cannot make any statement about the nature of reality; i.e. I cannot gather into my thought a content drawn from reality. Thus not merely has thought a content consisting of ideas of those things to which thought refers, but the process of thought has also a content consisting of these presuppositions or hypotheses; again, not merely is the content proper of thought called truth, but the content of the process of thought is often called truth; it is sometimes called truth of reason, intelligible truth, or a *priori* truth. This distinction, however, between the content belonging to the process of thought and the content of thought as referring to reality has not always been made clear; constitutive principles, such as those of cause and effect, substance and property, and so on, have often been considered as a *priori*, as principles determining the nature of our knowledge or experience of reality, as being given by thought and not as belonging to, or being one with and the same in nature as the detail of experience. The principles of thought, such as those of excluded middle, of identity, the constructive

principles of experience as those of cause and effect, substance and property, have all been considered as on a level, as being the same in kind, and as having the same meaning and significance in relation to reality. Lotze is not free from this view; he tells us that it would be logical suicide to reject the principle of causation just as it would be logical suicide to reject the principles of identity and of excluded middle.<sup>1</sup>

We come now to the different forms which thought uses in order to refer to the character belonging to the content of its ideas. Reality reveals itself in experience as structional; hence thought in referring to it has to use forms which are capable of referring to system. For example, we find within the content of our experience things, properties, and events. To refer to these we use the logical forms of substantive, adjective, and verb. There are thus three moments or elements involved in every thought complex. In the first place there is the content of reality itself with its definite nature and structure. In the second place there is the reference to reality through the medium of thoughts, or ideas, or concepts. In the third place there are the logical forms which these references must take in order that they may be valid of the particular reality to which they refer. For example, we could not refer to a thing by means of a verb, nor to a property by means of a substantive. To refer to a thing we must use the substantive form, and to refer to a property the adjectival form.

The nature of reality as guiding thought in its function of reference.

It can be seen from what has been said above that thought has to be systematic and structural, not merely in respect of its content, but also in respect of its form. I speak of a thing and its properties; a thing and its properties are part of the texture of reality itself; the concepts of a thing and property are elements in the structure of truth about reality.

The distinction between truth and logical form.

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 332.

But in making any statement about a thing and its properties I must always use the logical forms of subject and adjectives. Thus we have a logical structure in the medium of which is built up a body of truth which reveals to us the nature of reality.

Furthermore, it is clear that logical form and structure are the means whereby we can guarantee in intersubjective intercourse that we all are referring to identical elements in the structure of reality. If we were not restricted to using one form for one kind of reference and another form for another kind, then intersubjective intercourse would be impossible.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE PROCESS OF THOUGHT

WE have stated that the task of thought is that of revealing system as belonging to reality, and also of justifying this system to us, who are not able to grip the whole of reality, but only part of it. Thought, therefore, before it can build up its structure of truth, which is to be valid of reality, must grip hold of that in the real which is the basis of system.

Thought through the medium of memory and imagination, as predicating a definite nature of reality.

The first thing that thought does is to predicate a definite nature as belonging to reality. The content of our experience possesses two aspects or sides. There is, on the one side, an actual substantial being, which belongs to that which we experience, and, on the other side, a nature through the medium of which this actual being of the thing lives. The being of a thing is perceived by us through its nature, and lives in our experience—but only for the moment. Its nature, on the other hand, is held in our imagination and memory. Now, thought moves in memory or reflection. Its processes are exercised upon the contents of our experiences as natures or meanings torn from the concrete, living wholes in which they first come to us in perception. This tearing away of their natures from the things to which they belong Lotze calls logical objectification. ‘But in the more favourable cases, where we have succeeded in creating a name, what exactly is it which this creation effects and indicates? It is just what we are here looking for, the conversion of an impression into an idea. As soon as we give the name of green or red to the different movements which waves of light produce through our eyes, we have separated something



before unseparated, our sensitive act from the sensible matter to which it refers. The matter we now present to ourselves, no longer as a condition which we undergo, but as a something which has its being and its meaning in itself, and which continues to be what it is and to mean what it means whether we are conscious of it or not.<sup>1</sup>

Validity  
as being  
introduced  
in our  
reference  
to reality.

This objectification is necessary on account of the fact that there is a plurality of minds which have to live in a single world which is revealed through the experiences of each member of the plurality. It is necessary that each mind shall be able to identify the contents of its own experience as being also the contents of the experience of others. 'The logical objectification, which the creation of a name implies, does not give an external reality to the matter named; the common world, in which others are expected to recognise what we point to, is, generally speaking, only the world of thought. . . . We only mean that certain special forms of resistance and tension which we feel in the course of ideas are not peculiarities of our own state and inseparable from it; but that they depend upon relations inherent in the matter of various ideas, which everyone who thinks those ideas will find in them just as we do.'<sup>2</sup> This objectification is described by Lotze as the giving of validity to the contents of our thought. Validity is thus that characteristic of thought which makes it possible for mind to communicate with mind on the basis of individual experience, yet through this communication to live in an objective world which is the same for all.

Thought  
as moving  
from  
universals  
of sense.

Over and above the definite character belonging to the content of reality there are what Lotze calls universals of sense. They are fundamental and first principles of unity which perception reveals as belonging to its contents; and, furthermore, they are the necessary foundation from which all thought

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, Chap. i. sec. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Chap. i. sec. 3.

must proceed, and which make thinking possible. An example will make clear what this universal of sense is. We experience the content blue, and we single it out. We find, however, that there are different shades of blue; we compare them and arrange them in a series; the comparison is carried out in reference to a common character which belongs to all the shades of blue, and determines the extent of the differences within this common character. This common character exists in the content of our experience and in what Lotze calls a first universal or a universal of sense. 'It is always, as we know, only a single definite shade of colour, only a tone of definite height, strength, and quality, which is the object of sensation, and it is only these definite impressions which are so repeated in memory as to present substantial and perceptible images to consciousness. Universal ideas never have this perceptibility. . . . Words like "colour" and "tone" are in truth only short expressions of logical problems, whose solution cannot be compressed into the form of an idea. They are injunctions to our consciousness to present to itself and compare the ideas of individual tones and colours, but in the act of so comparing them to grasp the common element which our sensation testifies them to contain, but which cannot by any effort be really detached from their differences and made the material of a new and equally perceptible idea.'<sup>1</sup>

Having revealed the universal of sense, thought has to proceed a step further. It has to determine how the qualitative differences are related to the common character which sense itself reveals as belonging to them. That is to say, thought has to discover and give expression, through the medium of logical forms, to a systematic or structural unity of differences, of which this universal of sense is the centre. The principle of structure which thought thus reveals is called by Lotze a first universal of thought, and

The first universal of sense as the centre of a system of universals.

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 15.

its articulation through system is revealed in the concept. If we take any object of perception, such as an animal, our reference to it is a universal of sense, in that it points to a nature or characteristic common to all animals, and revealed to us in sense perception. Perception, however, while it reveals that there is this common characteristic, does not define, or articulate, or analyse it, so that we can know exactly what it is. Thought has to do this, and it is able to do so by building up a structural whole. Thought groups together all the different kinds of animals, our references to which are themselves sense universals, such as cat, dog, rabbit, and so on. These constitutive universals Lotze calls 'marks' of the wider universals or concepts. Thought then finds a principle or group of principles which describe the mode of behaviour and the form of connection existing between these constitutive universals. 'I speak of any composite matter "s" as conceived or as a concept, when it is accompanied by the thought of a universal S, which contains the condition and ground of the co-existence of all its marks and of the form of their connection.'<sup>1</sup> In the case of the concept 'animal' the universal which binds together the variety of content which it contains, namely, the universals, dog, cat, rabbit, etc., and reduces them all to species of the same genus, or instances of the same universal, is that constituted by the characteristics of breathing, reproduction, and motion.

The moments of universality and necessity, as being indicated by the concept but not contained in it.

The concept has revealed a principle of structure or of system, and it has shown us the elements which are to be systematised by means of this principle. But in order that the concept may be adequate to reality as the objective basis of universal truth, it must contain an element of necessity or universal validity. In and through the concept there must be given the assurance that the structure it reveals is not conditioned by merely individual peculiarities

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 26.

and points of view. The concept can only do this if it can show this structure as being grounded in reality; the principle of system and the elements of system must be seen as being so welded together, as being so much part of one another, that they cannot subsist one without the other. The reasons which make it clear that these moments of unity are so bound together are the grounds of coherence, and without these grounds all assertions of unity lack that universal validity which is the hall-mark of truth. But the concept fails to give us this assurance; there is nothing in its structure and constitution that can reveal the reasons for the unity which it asserts of its content. (For instance, there is nothing in the nature of the principles of breathing, reproduction, and motion which connects them of necessity with the nature of animals. We can only trace a factual, not a necessary connection between them.) We must proceed a stage further to see if the higher processes of thought have anything in them that can do what the concept has failed to do. We now come to the judgment.

The judgment groups a certain content of thought within a wider content according to a definite principle. This grouping is clearly stated in the categorical judgment *S* is *P*. If I say 'Dogs are animals,' I include the content 'dogs' within the wider content 'animals,' and I do so in virtue of the fact that the principle which determines 'animality' is constitutive of, or enters into the nature of 'dogs.' Dogs breathe, they reproduce themselves, and they move; hence they possess animality. Now the problem of thought is that of discovering how this principle, which determines the wider content, in this case that of animality, is also constitutive of the narrower content, in this case that of the nature of dogs. The categorical judgment, however, does not attempt to solve this problem. It merely states the fact that the one content is included in the other. The

The nature of judgment, and the search for universality, validity, and necessity.

hypothetical judgment goes one step further; it reveals a connecting link between one content and another which serves as a principle of coherence. I say, 'If S is X it is P'; if dogs breathe they are animals. Here X is put forward as being the principle which is responsible for the inclusion of the smaller content within the larger one. Breathing is a principle constitutive of animality; therefore if dogs breathe they are animals. The hypothetical judgment has shown us the principle of coherence both in the smaller and in the larger contents. But it has not in any way shown us how this principle unites the content of the smaller universal with that of the larger one. In order to discover how this principle of unity grips into various contents it is necessary to analyse these contents down to their constitutive elements. It is of no use placing together two universals, affirming a principle of unity as binding them together, and then to expect a justification of this merely through our assertion. We must be able to see this principle of unity gripping right into the body of these contents; hence the need for revealing their concrete texture. The disjunctive judgment carries us a step in this direction. The passage from the hypothetical to the disjunctive judgment is made by the general judgment. It takes the form, 'If S, then P'; 'If men, then mortal.' It thus imposes the necessity of mortality upon every individual man. The subject groups itself into particular instances of the universal represented by S, so that the judgment runs: 'If any particular man "a," "b," "c," "d," or "e," then mortal.'

The next stage is a like breaking up of the predicate into its particular instances. This is carried out in the Disjunctive Judgment. We can say: Men are either short lived or long lived. That is, men, either 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' or 'e,' etc., are either 'p,' short lived, or 'q,' long lived.

The disjunctive judgment has asserted a unity

as holding between 'a' or 'b,' or 'c' or 'd,' and either 'p' or 'q.' This unity holds in virtue of the facts, first that 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'd,' 'e' are included in the universal S, and 'p' and 'q' in the universal P; and secondly, that S and P are the spheres within which the coherence moves or lives. The disjunctive judgment gives us the particulars, and also the principle of coherence. But it does not show us the principle of unity as gripping the particulars, because it does not tell us whether it is 'a' or 'b,' or 'c' or 'd,' which is either 'p' or 'q.' The judgment can carry us no further in this direction, so we must have recourse to the next stage above the judgment, namely, inference.

The first form of inference with which Lotze deals is the syllogism. The essential nature of the syllogism is shown most perfectly in the first figure.

The nature  
of inter-  
once.

All men are mortal	--	M is P
John is a man	--	S is M

∴ John is mortal	-	∴ S is P
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The problem set by the disjunctive judgment was that of connecting a particular 'a' or 'b,' or 'c' or 'd,' or 'e,' which are particular instances of the universal S, with 'p' or 'q,' which are particular instances of the universal P. What the syllogism does is to connect one of these instances of S, namely, 'a,' or 'b,' or 'c,' etc., with P, but not with any of the particulars 'p' or 'q.' (We must notice a slight change of nomenclature in moving from the judgment to the syllogism. The wider universals are now characterised as M and P instead of S and P, and the particular instance we wish connected with P is now characterised as S.) But on what basis has the syllogism connected the particular instance S of the universal M with P? There are two conditions necessary to render such a connection possible. In the first place, the major premiss must already

give expression to the connection between the concepts M and P, or as in the universals chosen, 'man' and 'mortality.' This premiss would then involve the statement, 'If men, then mortal.'

In the second place, the minor premiss must give expression to the connection between a particular instance S of the universal M and that universal itself. From these two premisses we can then conclude as to the relation between the particular S and the universal P.

Futhermore, the conclusion itself has to satisfy a double demand that is made upon it. It has to be valid or true, and it also has to be new. The truth or the necessity of the connection expressed in the conclusion turns upon the necessity of the connection expressed in the major premiss. Its newness depends upon the connection expressed in the minor premiss not being first assumed in the major. But how is the concept M necessarily connected with the concept P? It may be said that there is 'the immediate perception of the universal truth of a synthetical judgment'; that is to say, our knowledge is based upon a universal of sense given in perception whenever and wherever M and P are experienced. Or again, it may be said that the connection is based upon the 'antecedent experience of its truth in every particular instance.' Both of these explanations Lotze rejects because they would only give us an empirical connection, and could not lead us to necessary truth. The major premiss of the syllogism asserts a unity, but is not able to justify it. 'For the effective use of the syllogism it is firstly necessary that we should find universal major premisses, based neither on an immediate certitude nor upon the antecedent experience of their truth in every single instance; it must be possible to assert the universal mortality of men, both before it is understood as the necessary consequence of certain conditions, and also before we have

tested every individual man to see whether he is mortal.'<sup>1</sup> In the minor premiss we assert a unity between S, a particular instance, and M, a universal. But on what grounds do we assert this connection? We may say that S is M because it is P—John is a man because he is mortal. This presupposes a necessary connection between man and mortality, on the basis of which John, because he is mortal, is declared to be a man. But this connection has not been established; and even if it had been established both minor premiss and conclusion would only repeat what is already stated in the major premiss. With regard, therefore, to the minor premiss Lotze says: 'There must be a method for finding minor premisses which subordinate a given subject to a genus before it has been shown to possess fully all the marks of that genus.'<sup>2</sup>

The problem of truth, as we have seen, is that of getting beyond individual points of view and individual limitations. But what is the problem of newness which is involved in the syllogism? This problem, it would seem, connects itself with our growing view of the nature of reality. The universals which we form are at first, comparatively speaking, empty; but they become more and more finely articulated, and this gaining of articulation we describe as newness of knowledge. Lotze, however, will not accept this view. He maintains that it is not altogether our growing knowledge, but rather the movement of reality shaping itself anew through a mass of detail, that gives to our conclusions the newness we demand of them.

This brings us to Lotze's view that the higher processes of thought deal with becoming or change. Conceptual thinking leaves us with a world of universals whose particular instances are safely included within them. We may not know all the particulars included within any universal, and so we might set

The ground of coherence as being revealed by the principles of Becoming.

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 100.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



out to improve our knowledge in this respect. But such an improvement of knowledge would not give us truth. We cannot altogether consider truth as being a reduplication of reality in the mind of an individual standing over against that reality. Truth shows us the real as being actively shaped and moulded, and also sets us in active relation to it. Logic, through the medium of its higher processes, seeks a form which will embody this principle of the active shaping of reality, and it proposes to find it where it sets before us a universal actively moulding the particulars which are included within it. Speaking of conceptual thinking Lotze says: 'The utmost that we could attain by such means would be merely the image of a fixed order, in which simple and composite concepts stood side by side, each unchangeably self-identical and each bound to its place in the system by invariable relations to all the rest; whereas what reality shows us is a changing medley of the most manifold relations and connections between the matter of ideas, taking first one form and then another without regard to their place in the system.'<sup>1</sup> It is the movement of principle through the detail of experience, the widening and narrowing of the universal through the particulars included within it, that reveals, or should reveal, the justification or the ground of the unity of the particulars. In any static reality there could be no coherence; there could only be co-existence or cohesion. Coherence consists of mutual determination between the elements which are united together; and such mutual determination is only possible on the assumption of an active influence as proceeding through the various members of the system which coheres together. Hence no mere static inclusion of particulars under a universal, nor any empirical verification of this inclusion, could ever give us the reason or ground of this unity. There must be a way of seeing

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec 35.

principles moving to the detail of experience, and universals gripping new contents. The ground of coherence must therefore be sought in the principles of movement or change. Lotze proceeds to the higher processes of thought which deal with change.

The processes of thought Lotze now considers are those of induction and analogy. Induction discovers different subjects each possessing the same mark. From this it concludes that these subjects all belong together by reason of a common essence of which this mark is the consequence. The subjects P, S, T, V are now included as co-ordinate species under a higher concept in virtue of the same mark 'm.' Now, if L, M, N are found to possess the same mark they are also included under the same concept. The same process, in a reverse direction, is carried out by analogy. A subject is seen to have different predicates. We conclude that these predicates all belong together in virtue of a common essence.

The processes of analogy and induction.

What, then, have induction and analogy done for us over and above what has been done in the judgment and the syllogism? They have taken the detailed content of a universal and revealed it as holding together in virtue of unity of principles. The nature of the inference drawn from induction and analogy consists of the attempt to give expression to this principle of unity, not merely as holding together a definitely known content, but as gathering new content to itself and keeping it within the same unity. An obvious criticism now presents itself. We say that P, S, T, V are included within a higher concept in virtue of the possession of a common mark 'm.' We find L, M, N also possessing this mark, and we therefore conclude that they also are included under the same universal. But this is no advance upon our first premiss, which amounts to the statement that all subjects possessing the mark 'm' belong to the same concept. Neither induction

How induction and analogy are an advance upon the syllogism

nor analogy shows us the principle of unity moving to its content; and this is what we demand of them. They merely state that the principle does move to new content. Unless a logical process can show us the principles of unity as continually moulding and systematising new content, it can never give to us a knowledge that grows and develops.

How  
thought  
charac-  
terises  
movement  
through  
system

Now the system which is revealed in a universal is not a hard and fast system, nor do its particulars stand in a permanent relationship to it. Certainly in our thought we may make it hard and fast, but the character of reality is such that system changes, and particulars move through system. Hence the main task of the higher reaches of thought is that of giving us a form which will enable us to express the way in which change affects system. 'From another point of view we may notice the fact that in logic it has been too exclusively the custom to use categorical judgments as illustrations, and therefore also to represent the inclusion of one concept within another as the most frequent and most important of logical operations. In the living exercise of thought this is by no means the case; we are seldom concerned in practice to determine a mark which belongs to a concept once for all, or in the circuit of which the concept is to be classed; most frequently we want to know what variable mark P will occur in a concept S if S is subjected to the condition "x." Questions of this kind are being raised at every moment by life, science, and art.'<sup>1</sup>

We can characterise the new condition which is introduced into a system by 's' and the system itself by M. We want to discover what effect this new condition 's' will have upon M along the direction P. For instance, we say 'All men are mortal'; that is, M is P. A new condition 's' is introduced into M; e.g. certain glands when decayed can be removed and new ones substituted. Now what we

<sup>1</sup> *Logico*, see 107.

want to do is to discover what effect this will have upon the mortality of man. We look for a certain modification of this mortality, and if we describe mortality as  $P$ , then this modification can be described as  $\sigma P$ ; e.g. as a result of new glands men's lives in general will be shorter or longer. But such a general conclusion is of little use to us; we want to discover the extent to which the new condition 's' affects, not the generality of mankind, but every particular man  $S$ . Our major premiss is now  $sM$  is  $\sigma P$ , and the minor  $S$  is  $sM$ . We do not want the conclusion  $S$  is  $\sigma P$ , because such a conclusion is a modification that as yet is undetermined and indefinite. What we do now is to analyse  $M$  into its constituent parts or marks, 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' 'x,' and to consider the relations + or — which hold between them. We say the marks of the concept man are that his heart beats, that his brain controls his muscles, that his nervous system is of such and such a character, etc. Our formula for  $M$  will now run  $M = a \pm bx \pm cx^2$ . Here we have substituted for the concept its developed content. Now we can see how 's' modifies this developed content. For instance, the renewal of a gland in a man will affect the action of the heart, which again may react on his nervous system, which again will give him greater vitality. But to determine the exact modification which a man's vitality will undergo when his glands are renewed, here lies the difficulty. The logical form of substitution does not reveal it to us. It can only be revealed when in any particular case we can assign mathematical values to the condition 's' and to the moments in the developed content of  $M$ . If we can say that the state of action of a man's heart is 3, the state of his nervous system 4, the amount of his vitality 5, and that the state of his glands as being 1 gives to each of these moments its present value; that by renewal of the glands the new state of the glands is given the value 3 and raises each moment, namely, his heart, his nervous

The application of mathematical calculation.

system, and his general vitality to three times its former level—then we can discover the extent to which this new condition has affected a man's mortality. Variation in M. has now been balanced by a corresponding and rigid mathematical variation in P. Hence, Lotze argues, the very great importance which science attaches to the reduction of differences and variations to mathematical determinations. 'It is hardly necessary in our days to draw attention to the fact that natural science owes its existence to mathematics; in other fields also we have learnt to prize the important aid of quantitative statistics in discovering the laws which govern the combination of society; and even in sciences, which from the nature of their objects are farthest removed from mathematics, we often feel very clearly the need of connecting them with quantitative ideas. . . . If only it were practicable, the penal law itself would draw conclusions in our figure of syllogism; it would break up every crime by substitution into its several elements, and from "sM," i.e., by calculating the particular values of the single elements of the crime in this instance, and so the particular value of the whole, it would deduce  $\sigma P$ , i.e. the kind and amount of punishment which the particular instance deserves.'<sup>1</sup>

Often it is the case that the contents, or the reality with which our thought deals in the different concepts in relation to which it draws its conclusions, are not determined mathematically in the same way, e.g. a colour 'a' is not capable of the same mathematical determination as the vibration of ether ' $\rho$ ,' which is considered as its cause. After experience has taught us that ' $\rho$ ' is the cause of 'a,' we are able to establish a proportion between the variations of ' $\rho$ ' along a certain direction, or in a certain medium, and the variations of 'a' along a different direction or through a different medium. But while

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 112.

it is experience which teaches that ' $\rho$ ' is the cause of ' $a$ ,' it is also experience which teaches that ' $\rho$ ' varies through a specific mathematical determination ' $x$ ,' as ' $a$ ' moves through another mathematical determination ' $y$ .' With other contents the proportion would be different, e.g. as in the case of sound and vibrations in the air. Now it is not the quantitative constitution of things that is determinant of the modes of relationship into which they enter one with another; on the contrary, it is the particular natures and relationships of things which determine the quantitative aspect of their being. 'Nothing but the specific character of a given subject, in obedience to which all its marks determine mutually one another, justifies us in concluding from a known value of one of them to the corresponding value of another according to a proportion which holds good for this subject only.'<sup>1</sup> Hence no quantitative determination, nor any conclusion following from quantitative determinations, can reveal to us the structure of things or the informing principle of unity or coherence among them. Neither inference by substitution nor by proportion have, then, given us grounds of coherence.

It is evident that no mere examination as to how a new condition affects a set of circumstances will give us the informing principle for which we seek, unless the set of circumstances is itself a whole of a structural kind. No new condition moves creatively through a mere aggregate or a mere conglomeration of wholes. Before we can see how change works through principles which actively mould reality, we must see the whole upon which change works as 'an authoritative or constitutive concept,' one in which 'every mark is determined throughout by every other though in various ways,'<sup>2</sup> and we must discover in this whole the principle or rule that governs the connection of marks and is

The  
principle  
of classifi-  
cation.

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 116.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 117.

responsible for their mutual determinations. This discovery of a rule of determinations of the marks in a concept or in any definite set of circumstances is carried out in logical classification. Classification discovers 'authoritative principles' by means of which we include a number of individuals within a universal. Our ordinary, unscientific thought does a great deal for us in this direction. 'In the actual course of its development, therefore, thought is first directed to those universal concepts which really contain the law for the complete formation of the individual for which they are required.'<sup>1</sup> The task now is to examine the logical and scientific method of classification. 'These tendencies which have hitherto unconsciously put us in the right way, we have now to translate into logical activity; in other words, we have to become conscious of the reasons which justify us in setting up a certain universal M exclusively as the authoritative rule for the formation of a number of individuals, instead of some other M to which we might have been led by comparing the same individuals upon a different principle.'<sup>2</sup> In the constitution of any concept which we are investigating we find that certain marks, 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' have a determining influence upon the presence, absence, or modification of others, 'α,' 'β,' 'γ,' while these latter do not have such a determining influence upon 'a,' 'b,' 'c,' but would exist equally well with others, 'p,' 'q,' 'r.' From this we at once conclude that 'a,' 'b,' 'c' are essential marks, while 'α,' 'β,' 'γ' are unessential. Now we have not only to show what marks are essential—this would only reveal to us the fact that these marks remain together; it would not show us their coherence together through the medium of a formative principle. We have further to show what different values these marks have. Those which are of most value will dominate all other marks; that is to say, their continued

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 122.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 123.

presence will modify to the greatest extent all other marks. The marks which remain longest unchanged through the different modifications of the individual instances of a concept will be the dominating ones.

Our next problem is that of showing how this inner circle of marks can dominate the rest. In the first place, we must notice that this inner circle of marks runs through the whole extent of a variety of modifications in instances of the universal. This gives us at once a systematic unity whose informing principle is this inner circle of marks, as being constitutive of the universal or concept. A concept which thus contains the law which determines the order of all the other marks is 'constitutive'; it is the 'logical idea' of the object. Classification, then, has enabled us to discover systematic unity within the content of the universal, and to discover the law which is formative of that content.

There is a tendency, Lotze tells us, to regard this 'Idea' or constitutive principle, or formative law, as being an operative force, or as being active in relation to the various forms which the instances of the universal takes. 'In these cases (i.e. those of plants and animals) we are prone to regard the universal Idea of animal or plant as a living and operative force, whose unvarying and consistent activity gives rise to a series of different forms, according as external conditions determine one or more of its points of incidence and oblige it to change correspondingly the whole course of its action. Another way in which we are equally prone to regard it is as an unvarying end, which regulates its modes of operation according to the relations in which it finds itself placed, and in the different forms which it is thereby compelled to assume, realises one and the same purpose in various ways or with various degrees of completeness.'<sup>1</sup>

The principle of unity as 'Idea' or 'End' or 'Purpose.'

Lotze maintains that Logic has merely to give

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 130.



an abstract form of expression to these operative forces, or ends, or purposes. It has not to show how they work nor to grip them in their working; its only task is that of formulating the active force as a reason and the modifications which it produces under certain conditions as its consequents. Thus thought follows reality, and the logical arrangements of thought content as thus following the movements of reality will be similar to those movements.

Lotze's task now is that of showing how thought gives expression to the movement of reality, without entering into that movement, becoming part of it, and being lost within it. 'We are not surprised in a self-realising tendency if, under certain conditions, it fails in its endeavour; and we find it intelligible that an end should be attained under different circumstances with different degrees of completeness. Thus both these notions very naturally give rise to the assumption that different realisations or examples of the formative idea are of different values, and that they are not merely co-ordinated in a general way as species under the universal concept of their idea, but form within this co-ordination an ascending or descending scale in which each one has its uninterchangeable place between certain others.'<sup>1</sup> Having found that our group of dominant marks is equivalent to our 'idea,' or 'end,' which is constitutive of a universal, we can trace its influence in shaping reality by the extent to which it is realised in the various species or particular instances of the universal to the point where we see its influence passing out altogether and giving place to other influences. 'If we suppose that when a mark *P* of the generic concept *M* assumes the value "*p*," the influence which it always exercises upon the other marks is so intensified as entirely to change the form of the whole content *M*, the resulting species will no longer be a species of *M*, but of some other genus *N*.

<sup>1</sup> *Logos*, sec. 131.

And those values of P which approach this decisive limit but do not reach it, will produce forms which still fall under the genus M, but approximate gradually to the structure which is characteristic of N.<sup>1</sup> The most perfect instance, or, as Lotze calls it, that which is 'typical' of any universal, is that in which the distinguishing marks have all 'the highest value which the combination prescribed by the genus allows, in which therefore no mark is exclusively prominent and none is reduced to zero, but all combine, as far as possible equally, to produce the impression of stable equilibrium in the whole.'<sup>2</sup> The way in which we determine the value of marks is by mathematical calculation. A mark is at its highest value when there is quantitatively most of it present. Thus we see, then, that reality does not remain bound down within hard and fast universals, but moves through them. A species may move from a more or less unsettled to a settled equilibrium of balance among the marks of the genus to which it belongs. It would then be moving to a final state of itself determined by the authoritative law of its being. On the other hand, a species may move through various genera to a higher genus Z. The species would then have a destination to which it is developing. In this latter case the genera L, M, N, through which a species moves in its passage to Z, would form an ascending series, the value of each being determined by the extent to which it realised the balance of marks or the authoritative principle of the genus Z. 'This progress might go on to infinity, or to the point at which we succeeded in finding a highest ideal A, exhibiting the mode of connection to which all kinds of existence, real and thinkable, must conform; from this A a classification might be derived in the form of a development which evolved from itself the whole content of the universe, and this development, if it were possible,

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 131.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 133.

could give the only logical security that every species had a place in the series of cognate species answering to the degree of essence which it expressed.'<sup>1</sup> But now, although thought has followed the process or movement of reality, yet it has not entered into that process; on the contrary, thought creates a hard and fast system of universals which merely reflects the stages through which development moves. It is the stream of events in the real world that moves; it is one state of being that actually passes into another; our thought merely chronicles this. 'When they are reflecting on the past or forecasting the future, these speculators may picture to themselves certain situations as temporary states of equilibrium, which they assume to follow one another in the stream of events in a fixed and necessary order; but how the transition from one to another actually comes about, they cannot tell us. Nor could they do so even if they undertook the endless task of dividing the interval between two such states of equilibrium into an infinite number of states; they would be able to show that the concept of each stage, when it is reached, is preliminary to the concept of the next, but they would not show how the reality which this concept expresses brings the reality expressed by the others in its train.'<sup>2</sup> We can see now that what thought or knowledge does is not to systematise reality, but to systematise our ideas of reality—ideas which are not the realities to which they refer. An object is real when it is considered, not as a member of a system, as the Hegelians maintain, but when it is seen to be determined by an authoritative principle. This is fully in accordance with Lotze's metaphysical principle, that an object is regarded as real when it is seen to possess a uniform mode of behaviour which can be summed up as the law of its being. Authoritative principles are always represented by universals, and a universal is

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 135.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 141.

the idea of a definite character symbolised in a unity of marks or conditions which are taken from the content of reality. We can say, If this that I see before me moves, breathes, and reproduces itself, then it is an animal. 'If we sum up these considerations, we may say that every individual and every species of a genus is what it is through the co-operation of the complete sum of its conditions; these conditions consist in the fact that a number of elements or marks, which might also exist in separation, are as a fact given in a certain combination, which might conceivably be different and each with a certain quantitative value, which is one among other possible values. From this union of conditions, according to universal laws which hold good beyond the limits of those elements, this perfectly definite result follows.'<sup>1</sup> It is evident that all knowledge is hypothetical, that is, it can only say that those things are connected with those things if and when those or those conditions are fulfilled.

'The form of science becomes essentially hypothetical. It does not describe what is and what comes to be; it defines what must be and come to be if certain conditions are given; the question whether, and in what order and connection these conditions occur, is excluded from the province of logic and left to be answered by experience, which will bring the facts to illustrate the application of the theory.'<sup>2</sup> The universality of law, which states that wherever  $a + b$  is found  $C$  follows from it, is based upon the principle of identity, which is the fundamental principle of Thought.

But can this reduction of knowledge to the mere discovering of general laws, of bringing things under them, and then approximating them to types, be satisfactory? Thought fails to grip reality. Thought has sought for a ground of coherence in things—it has only told us that if the characteristics

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec 144.

*Ibid*, sec 145.

of an object hold together in this or that fashion, or after this or that type, then that object is a whole—(it has never revealed the principle of unity which makes the object a whole); and in the same way with groups of objects, and ultimately with the whole of existence. And the same thing is true of change. Logic set out to show us how changing conditions affect things. We see change or movement that is guided and controlled. Thought follows it; it sees movement or change as capable of being expressed as the disturbance in the equilibrium of a balance of marks in a universal. These disturbances, or rather the effects of them, can be arranged in ascending or descending values, with the result that we can trace change through a series of universals until we can include the whole of reality within a web or system, mechanical undoubtedly, of such values. But what is the principle of movement or change? Certainly not the universal, nor the balance of marks within it. We fail entirely to get at grips with reality; instead we get a system of grounds and consequents all resting on a hypothetical basis.

Now, says Lotze, the aesthetic side of our nature is quite dissatisfied with this. Beauty demands that a thing shall be not an approximation to a type, nor an example of this or that law, but a well-knit whole, the source of whose unity, and the creative power of whose being, lies within itself. Applied to reality as a whole this would demand that the world should be seen to issue from a single creative principle. This speculative side of our nature makes the 'content of a supreme principle the one and only ultimate ground of everything, both of the power of these universal laws themselves, of the direction in which the world as a whole develops, and of the individual forms which in consequence reality assumes at each moment.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, sec. 151.

## CHAPTER XII

### MORAL VALUES AS DETERMINING THE NATURE OF REALITY

LOTZE has striven to show that we come into touch with the reality of an object when our thought can give expression to the content of that object as being a systematic structure ruled by an authoritative principle. This is fully in accordance with the view with which he started, namely, that the reality of an object consists in a form of behaviour as belonging to it, which can be described as the law of its being. Lotze now maintains that to know the law of a thing's being is not enough. We must penetrate into the being of that thing, as actively formed by its constitutive principles. Thought, however, never enables us to do this. It can analyse a reality that is already formed, but it cannot reveal the coherence or the holding together, through formative principle, of the detail of reality. Hence it is clear that we cannot be satisfied with the lifeless reality which thought presents to us. Furthermore, Lotze makes it clear that the reality of things cannot be found in their mere existence. Creative principles do not move through reality in order to shape it to a mere existential unity. Wherever creative principles are present they always move towards a purpose, which cannot be characterised otherwise than as the end of moral endeavour. 'All apparent activity is only a system of contrivances, by means of which this determinate world of phenomena, as well as those determinate metaphysical habitudes for considering the world of phenomena are called forth, in order that the aforesaid Highest Good may become for the

The need  
for con-  
necting  
the nature  
of reality  
with  
purpose.

spirit an object of enjoyment in all the multiplicity of forms possible to it.'<sup>1</sup> 'I feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which should be the ground of that which is.'<sup>2</sup> If we would hold reality in our grasp, then it is not to thought that we must go, but to the activities of feeling and will, through the medium of which we guide and shape our lives. It is in these activities that we are creative in respect of the order in our own lives; consequently it is easy to see that these same activities must be the root of the world order, and will give us the clue to the nature of that order. The world of existence is thus merely an aspect of a form of life which is guided by ideals and by purpose. As mere existence it would have no interest for us, and we should never exercise thought in relation to it. But as that in and through which we come into touch with the Highest Good, it possesses profound importance for us. The success of thought in giving us a true view of reality will always be measured by the degree in which it presents the real to us as an adequate basis for moral endeavour. Thought must thus seek its criteria, not within itself, but in the moral side of our nature.

Existence  
and  
moral  
endeavour.

The task that now lies before us is that of determining the relation between moral endeavour and the realm of existence. That which makes the world a settled order, that which renders it a cosmos, is the plan of its building, or the end which it realises. It is moral endeavour working in fact and occurrence which moulds the world. Furthermore, such moral endeavour is the work of souls. No mere thing is capable of putting forth moral effort; of shaping itself and its environment according to a plan, or for the realisation of an end. Now comes our problem: Is it the souls of persons that grip things which are external to them, moulding them according to plan; or is there a soul life running in things and through

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Metaphysics*, sec. 92.

<sup>2</sup> *Metaphysics*, vol. II., concluding section.

them, in virtue of which the world of existence can mould itself so as to realise an end and be the embodiment of purpose ?

Lotze's theory of substance led him to maintain that things have a being of their own, and that this being is guaranteed to them by a soul life, which is the principle of their unity as things. Lotze failed to find this soul life as belonging to things. He tried to find the soul of a thing in a hidden life made up of a sequence of feelings or an immediacy of sensation as belonging to that thing. He failed, however, to do so. Furthermore, the unity of any object is exceedingly difficult to determine, and is dependant to a very large extent upon the point of view from which we regard it, so that there was no clearly defined home, as it were, in which he could place the soul of the thing. There is no point whatever in looking at the material world as an infinite plurality of undeveloped souls ; such souls play no part in moulding and shaping that world, so as to realise the deeper meaning and wider significance which it receives as the basis of moral endeavour and of religious hope. And even in respect of the fundamental principles which rule in the material world, namely, the laws of nature, these undeveloped souls have no significance. They do not give rise to such laws and the laws take no cognisance of them. Lotze is quite aware of this, and in consequence the monadism underlying his theory of the nature of material reality plays no part in the more speculative side of his philosophy.

If, then, the material world does not shape itself to realise ends and purposes through the activity of the souls that lie at its basis, do the souls of persons grip existence and occurrence, moulding them so as to make the world realise the Good ? Lotze seeks to place souls in this position over against a material world, and to make them exercise a guiding hand in relation to the movements taking place in that world. He has, however, made reciprocal

That there is no union of souls among things which can shape or mould a world in which the Good comes to realisation.

The part played by the higher souls.



action the binding principle in the world, and he has connected together souls and the world through this same principle. But reciprocal action, while it gives unity to the world, never gives it meaning; it never allows the world that freedom in movement and endeavour which is necessary to the realisation of unity of plan or purpose. Lotze, therefore, wants to free souls from this rule, and he does so by making them the centres from which action proceeds and to which it moves. But to make them mere centres of activity is not enough to give them the power of guidance in relation to that activity; hence Lotze gives to them the power of introducing new links into the causal chain. Such a power as this, however, cannot be understood as being purely individual. Any introduction of a new event into a causal chain must involve a plan which the causal chain is intended to realise, and no individual soul which is a mere centre of reciprocal action could experience the necessity of changing the course of events in the world so as to realise a cosmic purpose. Lotze tells us that there is an order of value or worth over and above any mere order of system, and it is in relation to this order of worth that the soul finds those needs from which purposes proceed, and which enable the soul to guide events in accordance with a preconceived plan. Individuals acting in relation to this order of worth constitute themselves a kingdom of souls very much after the pattern of Leibnitz's Kingdom of God, and it is in the medium of this unity that cosmic plans are engendered. Lotze now makes a distinction between souls and spirits. He considers human souls as spirits and subhuman souls as being merely souls. These subhuman souls he excludes from the spiritual world which stands over against the material world. In this he follows Leibnitz, who made human beings members of the Kingdom of God, and who excluded from this kingdom all that was below the human level.

Lotze now moves away from the lower or merely material aspect of reality to this higher aspect, which reveals itself as a kingdom of spirits. It is in this higher aspect that he seeks to find the moving principles of reality. Having found them in this higher plane he seeks to establish a relationship between the world of spirits and the world of things, this relationship being that through which these creative principles are made effective in the world of things. He maintains that the order of worth or value is revealed to the soul in its experience of pleasure and pain. These feelings are made by him the media through which a content of worth is introduced into the life of the soul. We may well ask whether feelings have such a content. Pleasure of itself has no wealth and variety of content that can bring fullness of life to a soul. It is certainly the source of the impulse to much of our activity, but it is not the ideal towards the realisation of which the spirits strive. Lotze realises this, but contends that pleasure and pain have a qualitative content derived from the nature of the object which gives pleasure or pain. The activity of the individual, therefore, is not so much directed to the obtaining of mere pleasure as to the obtaining of this particular pleasure from this particular thing. 'We believed that we could perceive even in the merely sensitive life an inclination to assign to every content of sensation its proper place among others, to find in every tasted pleasure that there was some intrinsic excellence in the thing enjoyed, to seek experience in all directions; not merely in order to procure for self the advantages of a pleasant enlargement of life, but to seek in inseparable connection with this, to provide in one's very enjoyment a place where the worth of things and events may have an existence for consciousness.'<sup>1</sup>

Pleasure  
as  
revealing  
a moral  
order

<sup>1</sup> *Microkosmos*, Bk. v. Chap. v. sec. 8 (Eng. trans., vol. i. pp. 713 and 714).

Pleasure  
as revealing  
a realm  
of objec-  
tive worth  
at the  
basis of  
existence.

This fullness of content obtained for the soul through the medium of pleasure is derived ultimately from the content of the world of existence, in relation to which the soul acts. Just as sense perception, while bringing a content into the life of the soul, at the same time reveals a world of existence lying beyond that particular content, so pleasure and pain reveal an order of worth far beyond the particular feeling of the moment. Thus our pleasure in things is not wholly particular, but like the judgment of truth and falsity it has a universal side, and is a means of discovering an objective order of worth in things. While our judgment tells us what is true or false for all, so our feelings of pleasure and pain tell us what is of value for all. As in our intellectual activity we seek after an order of truth which shall be complete and shall be recognised by all, so in our moral endeavours we seek to act in relation to a universal system of worth giving us the ideal of a duty binding upon all.

Worth as  
proceeding  
not from  
things, but  
from souls.

But what, we must ask, is the nature of this order of worth that is revealed to souls through their activity towards pleasure? At first sight it seems as though Lotze is striving to maintain that there is some quality or other in the constitution of objects which gives a qualitative content to feeling, and that it is in this quality or constitution of objects that worth or value rests. But the difficulty lies in finding worth in things as mere things. We cannot lay our hands upon existence as a whole, nor any part of it, and determine in what, as mere existence, its worth consists. Things do not possess unconditioned worth. Lotze realises this and takes a different line of argument. He maintains that things only possess worth as being conditioned by their relation to spirits. An object gives pleasure or pain, and therefore possesses a positive or negative worth, according as its relation to the soul tends to enhance the soul's development along the lines set down by the nature

which this soul already has. 'It is not what passes between two objects unconnected with us, but what passes between each one of them and ourselves, that constitutes the spring of our pleasure and pain; and either pleasure or pain may be awakened by any simple impression according as it disturbs the conditions and activities, the impulses and habits of working which it encounters in us, and seeks to divert them from their natural direction, or maintains, enhances, or favours their progress in that direction.'<sup>1</sup> 'Unquestionably, that which only corresponds to a momentary and accidental condition, or some individual peculiarity of the mind which it affects, is of less worth; and that is of more worth which harmonises with the general and normal features of the organisation by which the mind is fitted for the fulfilment of its destiny. That would be of supreme worth which caused satisfaction to an ideal mind in its normal condition, a mind which had been purified from all tendency to diverge from its proper path of development.'<sup>2</sup> Worth is thus an ideal organisation of the soul. Furthermore, it is not merely subjective and particular; on the contrary, objective worth is characterised as a realm and as therefore over-individual or universal. From this it follows that the organisation of the inner life of any particular soul, in order that such organisation may be the centre of value, must be carried out in reference to an ideal organisation that is universal. This ideal which guides the soul in its activity in relation to the material world, and from the material world back upon itself, is to be found in a realm of spirits standing over against the material world. It is in this realm of spirits that objective worth rests, and it is in reference to this realm that the soul find the ideals which direct its activity towards the realisation of worth in its own life. Each soul

<sup>1</sup> *Microkosmos*, Bk. v. Chap. v. sec. 3 (Eng. trans., vol. i. p. 689).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 689 and 690.

seeks to act in harmony with other souls so that there shall be a spiritual unity of souls. It is this spiritual unity, or rather the efforts to attain it, that mark the lines of direction which the activity of any soul shall take, and which therefore sets the ideal to the soul's organisation of its own life. Pleasure is really a sign to us that the organisation of the soul, through which the Good comes to be realised, is being more and more perfected. It is the spiritual organisation of the soul that secures for it its highest pleasures, and it is the ideal organisation as being realised in each individual soul that makes that soul a member of a community in which the greatest happiness is possible, and in which the good is most fully realised.

'Nothing else affirms itself so unconditionally and so immediately in respect to its value as *happiness*. Only *it* has valid claim as the ultimate thing to be realised; only in regard to *it* is the question absurd, why it instead of unhappiness must be the final purpose of the world.'<sup>1</sup> This happiness, however, is not a purely individual enjoyment; while each member of the world enjoys happiness, still such enjoyment is only obtainable on the part of the individual in relationship with a like enjoyment on the part of all. 'Widely different from such conditioned happiness is that which, having reference to the whole world, is better designated by the name of "blessedness," and so expresses the sequence of an ordering of the world in which there is no being, no relation, and no event, that is existent as bare matter of fact. The rather, in such an ordering of the world, does everything which *is*, stand in such relations that the most manifold, most extended, and most profound *enjoyment* for all the single elements originates from these relations.'<sup>2</sup>

Worth or value is thus that state of blessedness existing in a kingdom of spirits. Any further characterisation of it is not possible. It is an ulti-

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Aesthetics* (Eng. trans), sec. 13.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

mate aspect of reality and as such defies any deeper analysis.

Now that Lotze has found his creative moral principle in the world of spirits he tries to find the same principle working in the world of things. He tells us that this ideal organisation of a society of spirits, and also of the life of each individual spirit, is developed through the activity of spirits in relation to the world of fact and occurrence. It is the practical problems of life that create, in the soul, impulses and desires, and from which these latter take their content. It follows from this, that that which is the basis or instrument of spiritual life, namely, the world of material things, is not entirely indifferent as regards morality. Our moral endeavour must find within fact and occurrence a nature, an aspect, or else a striving akin to itself. If it could not do this, existence revealing itself as foreign or indifferent to our endeavours, then we should fail to realise ourselves by acting in reference to this world of existence. Lotze, therefore, seeks to find within existence a moral aspect of the same nature as that which is fully revealed in our spiritual life. He tells us that the soul looks out upon the world of fact and finds it moulded or shaped from the point of view of the realisation of moral qualities. 'These (qualities) quite apart from all reference to ethical problems may recur as forms for the combination of matters in nature and in the products of art. Thus "justness," for example, is the formal predicate of consistency, of steadfast development, of the avoidance of everything superfluous, of the rigour and acerbity of stiff rectilinear movements. On the other hand, the idea of "kindness" suggests the habit of equalising opposites by intermediation, of avoiding all sharp contrast, and evoking like forms of demeanour. Both kinds of forms, however, we find again in nature also; and what either of them supports is pleasant besides to the one spiritual

The ideal organisation as developed by activity in relation to the world of fact.

bent which lives in the same forms.'<sup>1</sup> Wherever the soul finds such shaping of facts, there, Lotze holds, it sees beauty. The soul wishes to act in relation to a world in which beauty rests. In acting in relation to a world of this kind the soul would find itself penetrating into the inmost recesses of reality. It would itself be the living force of the world, and would find in its own life the principles which are formative of that world. The moral side of our nature, and not the thought side, would thus reveal to us the fundamental principles of reality.

Beauty as  
subjective

Now it is obvious that when we contemplate things we may see beauty in them, but it is not thereby obvious that the beauty exists in things as such. It surely cannot be said that things are kind, that they are just, and that they experience in themselves these qualities which we attribute to them. Morality does not belong to things in this crude kind of way. Whenever we apprehend an object our whole nature is called to activity in the apprehension. The activity called forth may be very meagre, very thin and lifeless, or, on the other hand, it may be very manifold and full. Now, Lotze maintains, 'whatever excites our cognitive activity to a manifoldness of expressions adapted to it is beautiful; and starting from this point of view, "Aesthetics" has investigated the rules of art, in accordance with which suitable excitements should be furnished to this natural play of our imagination, by putting expectation on the stretch, by enhancing the impression, by surprising effect, by combining a variety of elements into a whole that admits of easy intuition, by subjecting many things under a law easy to discover, etc.'<sup>2</sup> Beauty is thus what appeals to the organisation of our soul when that organisation is at its highest and is most universal; that is to say, when the soul is most fitted to be considered a member of a kingdom of souls. 'The beautiful would be

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Aesthetics*, sec. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* (Eng. trans.), sec. 1.

that which corresponds to so much of the ideal as is actualised in us.'<sup>1</sup> An object influences us when we contemplate it along the line of our moral endeavour. Its form and its unity suggest these or those lines of moral activity on our part. If these lines of moral activity are in harmony with the whole balance of our nature and character, we find pleasure in contemplation of the object which suggested them, and it is on account of this pleasure that we call the object beautiful.

The above view makes beauty and the moral qualities of things purely subjective. The subject apprehends a moral quality in an object or in a situation because the object or situation suggests to him an aspect of his own life; the beauty of the object lies in the suggestion, as does also the moral quality. We demand, however, that beauty shall be objective, that is to say, that it shall rest in the thing which we regard as beautiful. Lotze tells us that there is no equivalent in an object for the pleasure which the impression of beauty gives to us; there is no point, therefore, in saying that a thing enjoys its own beauty in the same way as we enjoy it. At the same time, that in the object which suggests to us a moral quality is somewhat in the thing itself, and is of worth or value. 'The attempt may, however, be made to apprehend that which *objectively*, in the things, lies at the basis of the beautiful impression, as a predicate significant in itself, inserted as of great worth into the entire structure of the world, and belonging to the world's completeness; so that the impression of beauty is produced by something that is, apart from the world and even in itself, of absolute worth.'<sup>2</sup>

Beauty as  
objective.

We must now enquire what it is, in an object, that comes before us as worth or value. Reality, Lotze tells us, has three fundamental aspects, neither of which can be reduced to the other. There is,

Beauty as  
worth.

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Aesthetics*, sec. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* (Eng. trans.), sec. 6.



in the first place, the realm of universal laws, which impress themselves upon us with an absolute necessity as being of binding force, and which rule all that is real. There is, in the second place, the realm of real substances and forces, which presents itself, not as necessary, but only as existent in fact, and which, by being active according to the afore-said laws, produces the manifold forms of phenomena. And, in the third place, there is the definite and specific plan, according to which the elements of reality are brought together in order to realise a definite end by their action according to universal laws. Now, the existence of a world involves all three, and none can be considered as more fundamental than the others. It is the unity of these three in a perfect balance that is of worth or value, and which is recognised by us as the Beautiful. Wherever in the world of existence we can trace substances and forces moving through law to the realisation of an end or purpose, the result comes before us as the manifestation of beauty. 'Between cognition, however, which fruitlessly seeks for a complete insight into this connection (i.e. between law, the real substances and forces which act freely through law, and the purpose or end which is achieved in this way), and conduct which just as imperfectly endeavours to bring about a unity of all that is real with its purposes—and, therefore, between the realm of the true and the good,—feeling intervenes in the impression of beauty in a peculiar manner; not, indeed, so as to furnish any theoretical insight or practical accomplishment of a solution of these contradictions, and yet so as to obtain in the intuition of the beautiful an immediate certainty and assurance of the existence of such a solution.'<sup>1</sup>

The  
existence  
of a soul  
which  
affects the

Lotze now maintains that in no individual, as individual, is this perfect unity of content, of law, and of purpose achieved. Only in the totality of

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Aesthetics*, sec. 9

the world, he holds, does this coincidence between these three moments take place perfectly. Undoubtedly, since existence is a whole, the gathering together of any partial content to realise a purpose will reveal rents or ragged edges, for the content that is brought to a particular purpose will be torn from the whole in order to fit this purpose. Furthermore, through the unity of law which pervades everything, the laws which govern any limited content will reach out beyond it into a wider world. No particular plan, or purpose, therefore, could wholly contain these laws, nor could it completely exhaust the content of which these laws are valid. It is thus only in the totality of the world that the perfect coincidence between fact, purpose, and law can be realised. 'Only in the totality of the world, which is self-formed, are we able to presuppose a perfect congruity between the end to be fulfilled, the free activity of the means, and the general laws of their action.'<sup>1</sup>

unity of  
the three  
aspects of  
reality.

Lotze's argument so far, however, has only gone to prove that there is a purpose in the world, and that the unity of purpose with its content is only achieved in the world as a whole. But undoubtedly his main task is that of finding, in the totality of the world, some aspect, or side, of life which can harbour purpose. In order to achieve this task he maintains that the totality of the world is itself a soul.

Lotze gives two main arguments for his view that the unity of all things is a personal being, and that as the highest of all personal beings He is divine. The one is drawn from the nature of goodness, justice, and so on, which are characteristic of the world order, and the other is drawn from the implications of acting and passivity which run through the whole of reality. As regards the first argument, he tells us that the ethical attributes of wisdom, justice, and holiness, since they exist, and since they are one in their existence, must have a certain manner of existence

Lotze's  
proof that  
the totality  
of the  
world is  
soul.

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Aesthetics*, sec. 10.

which is to give them definite form or concrete being. They do not have an existence of their own in some kind of isolated splendour, neither do they belong to what is dead and lifeless ; they are personal attributes and can only exist as belonging to a person ; hence an objective goodness, justice, and holiness, which pervade the whole universe, must reside in a personal being whose life is coextensive with the universe ; in fact, a moral universe must be a personal being. As regards the second argument, which is drawn from the implications of acting and suffering, we are told that a dead, lifeless, and impersonal thing cannot be said either to act or to suffer. When we say that a thing acts we imply that its changes are the result of its own nature ; when it suffers, that its nature wards off a change which the action of something else strives to produce in it. Such action and suffering can only be thought of as desire and aversion accompanied by felt efforts, and hence as the action and suffering of a self. The ultimate Real Being which is the ground of all things is essentially active, and in its simple activity is to be found the ground for the multiplicity of changes which take place in finite things. From this it is seen that this Being must have a personal existence in that it has a living experience of itself.

Criticism  
of Lotze's  
account of  
the world  
soul.

We must now deal with these two views which Lotze has put forward. We will examine the theory that there is a moral order within the world of fact. We must admit Lotze's argument that if persons, through their activity in relation to a world of affairs, come to moral development, then something of the nature of value must reside in that world of affairs. We must also allow that the value that is in the world is dependent upon some form of personality, or plurality of personalities, which takes the world of affairs into itself. But it does not follow that because the world of fact and occurrence is a whole, because the laws pervading it are a single

system, that therefore the value that resides in it is also single and dependent upon, or resident in, a single personality. Most of the social values, such as love, and even happiness, which is recognised as the highest value, are determined in their nature by the fact that they express attitudes towards one another on the part of a plurality of persons. Were that plurality of persons resolved into one personality, then the values, love, happiness, and so on would become lost; that play of personalities in relation to one another, through which love is engendered, would be done away with. Again Lotze has told us that that which enlarges the soul in the direction or along the lines of its nature has value, and because it has value gives pleasure.

But can we centre value in the Divine Being and still give it meaning? Can we say that the goodness or worth centring in the life of the Divine Being, when that life is considered as coextensive with all that is, consists of that which enlarges that life on the lines already laid down by His Nature? Enlargement of life may come in two ways: it may come as the gathering-in of new content into the life, or it may come as the new ordering of content that has already been brought into the life, for such a new ordering brings new experiences into life. The first way of enlargement is closed to the Divine Being, for in Him everything finds its existence, and there is nothing outside of Him which He can bring into His life. Is the second way of enlargement open to the Divine Being? This would only be the case if the universe had not reached such a degree of internal coherence and organisation as to satisfy all the ideals which the working of the life of the universe sets before it. And if we say that this coherence is in process of being reached, then we shall be forced to maintain that to a certain extent the world is not good—that Holiness, Beauty, and Justice do not hold sway over the whole of life.

Worth or  
goodness  
centres  
in the  
Divine  
Being

Lotze finds it impossible to connect directly the world of fact with the unity of a moral order which is sunk within the life of the Divine Being. There is no way of passing from mere fact or mere existence to fullness of life and to unity of moral endeavour. Unity of existence is not necessarily unity of life, nor is unity of direction in activity at the same time and of necessity unity of moral endeavour.

Criticism  
of the  
view that  
the ulti-  
mate Real  
Being is  
the ground  
of all  
change.

We have now, in the second place, to examine Lotze's view that in the life of the Divine Being is to be found the ground of all the changes taking place in finite things. In the world of existence he has made reciprocal action the bond between things; he has also shown that whatever objects take part in any particular reciprocal action must be parts of a single whole, the principle of unity of which is determined by the nature of this reciprocal action. Making the further assumption that reciprocal action rules over the whole world, he has concluded that this world must be a single whole bound down by unity of principle which manifests itself as reciprocal action. Under the statement that reciprocal action rules over the whole world he has introduced another, that this activity is one in its working. This second contention, however, certainly does not follow from the first. Lotze soon becomes aware of this, and is forced to put forward the soul of the world as that which gives unity of principle to reciprocal action, and makes it one in its working throughout existence. Reciprocal action cannot of itself lead to a world unity, because it always takes place between things in these or those directions, or in these or those respects. Each of these directions in which it takes place disregards whole regions of reality, leaving them to be united by a different direction of reciprocal action. It is not, however, possible to unite these different directions of activity so as to make them proceed from one principle; e.g. the chemical affinities between different sub-

stances cannot altogether be reduced to identity of principle with the physical activities in which these substances take part. Lotze is forced to what, as regards reciprocal action between things, is an external influence. He assumes that there is a living soul of the world which establishes directions of reciprocal action between certain things, leaving lacunae between other things, in order that a world purpose may be realised. It is this plan, which the Divine Being realises through reciprocal action, that gives unity to the world.

Lotze is taking a very dangerous leap when he brings in unity of purpose to turn his postulate of a unity of existence into an active principle. We turn now to a further examination of this contention that unity of existence is only realised in unity of plan, which takes its form in the life of the Divine Being. Lotze tells us that the purpose of the world is that of maintaining the self-activity of the universe. It consists in the continuous establishment of the formula  $M=M$ . He says, arguing against the position that there are certain *a priori* principles determining the nature of all possible existence: 'So long as all we know of  $M$  is the function which it is required to fulfil—that, namely, of being the unity which renders all that the world contains what it is—so long we can derive nothing from this thought but a series of general and abstract deductions. Every single being which exists, exists in virtue not of any being of its own, but of the commission given to it, so to speak, by the one  $M$ , and it exists just so long as its particular being is required for the fulfilment of the equation  $M=M$ . Again, it is what it is not absolutely and in immemorial independence of anything else; it is that which the one  $M$  charges it to be. One thing finally operates on another, not by means of any force of its own, but in virtue of the One present in it, and the mode and amount of its operation at each moment is that prescribed it

That unity of existence is realised in unity of plan.

by M for the re-establishment of the equation just spoken of.'<sup>1</sup> This means, however, that the actual initiative of activity proceeds not from the One, or from the Divine Being, but from the individual as a mere individual, and that this activity on the part of the individual is replied to by the Divine Being in order that the equilibrium of His life may not be disturbed by something from the outside, as it were. Lotze almost comes to draw this conclusion, but as soon as he sees where it will lead him he draws back. He supposes the equation to hold  $M = \phi(A B R)$ , that is to say, that the whole universe at a particular moment consists of a plurality of things and events A, B, R, unified according to a certain principle  $\phi$ . He says, 'If we allow ourselves further to assume that one of the individual elements has undergone a transition from A into "a"—however the excitement to this transition may have arisen—then the former equation between  $\phi(a B R)$  and M will no longer hold. It would only be re-established by a corresponding change on the part of the other members of the group, and  $\phi(a b R') = M$  would anew express the whole nature of M. Let us now admit the supposition that the susceptibility, which we had to recognise in every finite being—a susceptibility in which it does not experience changes without maintaining itself against them by reaction—that this belongs also to the one, the truly existing M; then the production of the new states "b" and R' in B and R will be the necessary consequence of the change to "a" that has occurred in A.'<sup>2</sup> Here it is clear that Lotze considers the initiation of fresh activity in the world as proceeding from the individual elements, and that the world as a whole replies to this activity in order that its nature may not be disturbed. But in the next sentence Lotze denies that change can be initiated in any single element going to make up the whole M, and answers that it

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 85.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 70.

must be initiated in the whole as such. He says, 'But this change "a" was throughout not merely a change of the one element A, for such a change would have needed some medium to extend its consequences to B and R. It was at the same time, without having to wait to become so, a change of M, in which alone, in respect of Being and content, A has its reality and subsistence. In like manner this change of M does not need to travel in order, as by transition into a domain not its own, to make its sign in B and R. It, too, without having to become so by such means, is already a change of B and R, which, in respect of what they contain and are, equally have reality and subsistence only in M.'<sup>1</sup> But if it is the whole M which changes when A changes to 'a,' and if it thus changes in order to preserve its self-identity according to the equation  $M = M$ , why should it ever go out of itself to a condition where change is needed to re-establish itself? Why should  $\phi (A B R)$  change into  $\phi (a B R)$ , which change demands a further change in B and R before  $M = M$  again? Lotze seeks to answer this question by maintaining that the nature of M consists in this, namely, that it is a 'definitely directed process of becoming.'<sup>2</sup>

Now the process of the world, if directed, must be directed to an end that is determinate, or that is expressible as a definite or determinate state of affairs, and at some time or another, if the process of the world is real, this state of affairs must be finally reached. When this state of affairs is reached, however, the process of the world would come to an end, and we should reach a final destruction—a really impossible conception. The alternative to this is to hold that the process of the world is not directed to any definite state of affairs, but to its own self-maintenance, this self-maintenance consisting not in any determinate content or order of

That the process of the world is definitely directed.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 70.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 92.



content, but rather in identity of life. To a certain extent Lotze accepts this view; it is accepted by him when he says that the meaning of the world is exhausted in the equation  $M = M$ . But he will not abide by this conclusion; he wishes to maintain that direction always means direction to an order or system; he tells us that the process of the world has a meaning, that this meaning has to be thought of as expressible in an Idea; that this Idea sums itself up in the various forms which the process of the world gives to the world. He says, 'The relation, however, of the Idea  $M$  to the various forms, thus constituted, of its expression— $\phi$  ( $A B R$ ),  $\chi$  ( $a b r$ ),  $\psi$  [ $a B \phi$ —is not that of a genus to its species. It passes from one into the other—not indifferently from any one into any other, but in definite series from  $\phi$  through  $\chi$  into  $\psi$ .'<sup>1</sup> The course of the world takes place in a directed series of phases, and the Idea of  $M$  is not a something apart from these phases. It is only real in each phase. Since the Idea determines the order of the succession of the phases, it follows that each preceding phase must determine each succeeding phase, that is to say, the connection between the various phases of the world's history must be causal. 'The dialectic connection between such phases of reality as stand in a definite order of succession, which was implied in their being regarded as an expression of an Idea, must pass over into a causal connection, in which the content and organisation of the world at each moment is dependent on its content and organisation at the previous moment.'<sup>2</sup> But a difficulty now arises from this use of the causal principle. This principle implies the existence of a plurality of objects, which act one upon the other and produce effects in one another. A thing cannot act and produce effects in vacuity. The world as a whole cannot act and produce effects through the causal relation on another

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 51.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

phase which does not exist—nor can it act on mere nothingness and produce effects which shall constitute a new phase. The only way in which a new phase of the world's history can come into being, through mechanical means, will be by the individual elements in the world acting upon one another, and producing effects in one another, these things and their new effects constituting a new phase in the world's history. And Lotze admits this. He says, 'The transition of the one phase  $\phi$  into the other  $\chi$  is brought about by the combination of the reciprocal effects which the several movements contained in  $\phi$  once for all exercise in virtue of their nature, independently of the phase in which they happen to be combined or of the point in the world's course at which they from time to time appear.'<sup>1</sup> But if this is the case, then although all that exists may be part of a single whole M, and although all the movements that take place in the world may belong to, or unite themselves in, a single process, yet that which guides movement or activity, that which forces the world to move from one phase to another, does not lie within, nor proceed from, the world as a whole, but from relations in which individuals as such stand one to another; that is, it lies in a plurality, not in a unity. Lotze has really failed to sink the world of fact in the world of meaning through making all activity and passivity centre in a Divine Being who acts according to plan. There is a certain hardness, and independence, and power of initiative in things which refuses to allow them to lose themselves as mere elements in a world process.

Lotze has attempted to find a moral aspect to the world of existence by sinking that world in the life of the Divine Being, deducing its moral qualities from the character of God, who rules in that world. But the attempt to identify God and the world has failed, and in this failure Lotze is still left the task of

The Divine  
Being as  
Governor  
of the  
universe.

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, sec. 92.

explaining the view that moral qualities manifest themselves in nature, and reveal to us the deepest character of things. Lotze's argument, therefore, now takes a somewhat different turn. He maintains that the unity of the world is a product of God's will rather than an immanent development of His nature. God is now described as the soul of the world working in union with the plurality of souls that constitute the world, and through whose activity the course of the world is furthered. The highest principle in reality is now that of the Divine Government.

The Divine Being, however, cannot be said to govern the activities of mere things; He can only 'govern' activity that proceeds from a *self*. 'A being which has experience of itself as an individual subject for its own states, and which distinguishes these states from those of other beings, may, it is true, be nothing whatever as to its entire existence but a product of the Infinite Being. But after it is once in existence, it is, by the very form of its existence, by this consciousness which places itself in relation to itself, distinguished as an individual ego from the very Absolute that in reality conditions it, and that now, as posited over against itself, belongs to the non-ego. And by this act, or by this form of existence, does it possess that relative independence which we designate when we say that it is "outside of God."'<sup>1</sup> But an independence constituted by this feeling of self or this feeling of consciousness is not enough. God could not be said to rule the world by governing the multiplicity of feelings of self. There must be an independence constituted by freedom of activity on the part of those who are independent. 'There must exist in individual spirits just this capacity to initiate a new series of events; and therefore in brief a freedom of activity or primarily of willing, by which they separate them-

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, sec. 56.

selves from the universal Substance in a still more decided manner than by their mere "Being for Self" as relatively independent beings.'<sup>1</sup> But Lotze is not willing to grant freedom to things. He analyses this conception of freedom and finds it to consist of a choice between what has value and what has not value. Every act of freedom involves an ethical judgment, and, further, every such act that has failed to realise the good which it sets out to realise is liable to be followed by feelings of contrition and remorse in him who sets it in movement. Obviously, freedom can only belong to persons. 'It seems, therefore, that it is not at all nature directly, but primarily the inner life of the world of spirits only, that forms the object, to which immediate interventions in the government of the world could have relation.'<sup>2</sup> Lotze further maintains that the relation between God and spirits is one of historical development 'in which we come to participate with God in some common experience.'<sup>3</sup> This common experience is that of blessedness, blessedness being that community of feeling between spirits in which all individuals find their greatest happiness. Feeling, or happiness, however, cannot be described as mere states of consciousness. Undoubtedly there is a primitive form of feeling which is constituted by such states, just as there is a primitive form of sense perception constituted by a very crude sense data. But developed sense perception, although it may have such sense data as its basis, is infinitely more than this data, so in the same way feeling in its fullest form is a great deal more than states of feeling. It is a condition of the whole soul in which its content is fully gripped and entered into, so that the soul finds itself at one with its content. Lotze describes consciousness when it is a feeling consciousness as a place where the soul can enjoy the being of that which it perceives. The world of

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, sec. 58.    <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 63.    <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 64.

things thus resolves itself into a content which spirits can introduce into their lives. By so doing spirits create for themselves, and in their own lives, the instruments by means of which they can act in relation to one another and to God. Things and the world of things are thus merely instrumental to the realisation of an order within the life of spirits. Lotze says: 'It is a prejudice that the world exists, without the kingdom of spirits, ready made and completed in effective consistence of its own; and that the life of mental representation which spirits lead is simply a kind of half-idle appendage, by means of which the content of the world is not increased, but only its ready-made content copied once more in initiative. . . . Things exist *besides* (i.e. this mental representation), in order to produce by their influences that course of mental representation belonging to the spiritual beings, which, accordingly, has its value in itself considered, and in its own peculiar content, and not in accord with an objective matter of fact.'<sup>1</sup> Thus the world of facts exists for the world of spirits; true, things may have a certain being for self; they may have a certain consciousness of their own life, in which this being for self centres, but nevertheless value, with all that it involves, does not rest within this world.

It is God and spirits who stand in intimate personal relations one with another. God influences spirits by giving them the vision of a more perfect moral order. With this vision spirits set up within themselves new beginnings of spiritual movement. Wherever such new beginnings require a re-shaping of the world of fact so that this world of fact may contribute to their furtherance, the soul interacts with objects in this world, and brings it about that the world of fact becomes contributive to the furtherance of the moral order. What we want to know, however, is how moral endeavour grips into the nature

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Metaphysics*, sec. 85.

and being of an object, shaping that object to its own purposes. If we could see how this happens, then we should be able to hold within our grasp that moment in the reality of a thing which reveals that thing's deepest being as moral in character. Lotze, however, only takes us to that point where we can see that our purposes and our endeavour must be capable of shaping the world of real things, so that those things may form the basis upon which we can build up our spiritual life. He has not taken the further steps of showing us how our purposes grip deeply into the nature of reality and so reveal to us its deepest being.

We must remember, however, that Lotze was not able to carry out his intention of thoroughly examining our moral life, and its relation to the world of fact, in reference to which it moves. This was to have been the completion of his work, but he died before he could carry it out. We have, therefore, only indications here and there of some of the main lines of his thought in this direction, and these lack the consistency and careful working out which, for example, is revealed in his theory of the nature of thought.

We have seen Lotze seeking the reality of objects, first in the material world; here he finds, not full reality, but a certain moment in it, namely, the law of behaviour, which a thing must possess for itself, and follow before it can be considered as real. Next, we find him seeking the reality of things in that which our thought activity reveals them, as when it comes to shape them in knowledge. Here, another moment is added to the nature of reality, namely, the demand that the detail belonging to the content of objects shall be brought to unity through the medium of an authoritative principle which itself works within that detail. In the last place, he seeks to find the full reality of things, and also of the universe, in the purposes which things realise in relation to spirits

and to the Divine Being. He is convinced that our moral and religious consciousness rules in reality, and finds in the world a depth of character and of meaning which is hidden from every other side of our nature. This part of his work, which should have been its deepest side, remains sketchy, owing to the fact that he was not able to complete it.

## CHAPTER XIII

### LOTZE'S ACHIEVEMENT AND INFLUENCE

IN estimating Lotze's philosophy, the question we have to ask ourselves is as to the way in which he dealt with the ultimate issues raised by Kant. We shall find that Lotze has not answered Kant, but has deepened the issue which Kant raised; he has not healed the breach between nature and spirit, but has widened it. Kant sought to show that reality is given its universal character and unity by reason or thought. In its systematising function this thought prescribes principles which determine the fundamental nature of all that can be called real. Furthermore, the world of spirits is also ruled by thought, although thought takes a different direction here. The duty which is binding upon all; the principle that every individual must be considered as an end in himself rather than as a means; the contention that virtue and happiness shall be duly proportioned in respect of each other, are all principles of reason. We must notice that in the material sphere things must of necessity obey the laws which thought imposes upon them as being determinant of their being. In the spiritual sphere souls may refuse, and indeed often do refuse, to obey the dictates of reason.

The problem set by Kant's philosophy.

Practical reason, however, has not merely to rule in the world of spirits; it has also to guide these spirits in moulding the world of things so as to realise purpose. Things may thus be shaped, not merely by principles of theoretic reason, but also by those of practical reason. This fact at once raises several



questions of fundamental importance. In the first place, how does practical reason move within the texture of reality so as to grip it, making it subservient to purpose? In the second place, does the purpose which any object or group of objects is made to realise enter into the being of that object or group of objects and determine its nature? In the third place, which is the more fundamental to the reality of an object—the law which it obeys or the purpose which it fulfils in relation to the life of spirits? Kant does not answer these questions. He maintained, indeed, that in our aesthetic judgments we give expression to the fact that purpose is being realised in things. This expression of a fact, however, does not in any way explain it. Lotze maintains that it is not enough to reveal the different moments involved in reality; philosophy must go a step further and show us the way in which these moments actively condition one another.

Hegel's  
solution  
of the  
Kantian  
problem.

Hegel had taken up the same point of view as Lotze with regard to the problems set by Kant. What Hegel tried to show was that objective thought is a single process moving within the whole of reality and actively shaping all its content. This process of thought, however, swallowed up everything in one gigantic thought movement. Things lost all reality which they may have been considered as possessing in and for themselves; the freedom of the individual soul in shaping the world to its purposes also became of none effect. Two of the fundamental moments in reality were thus done away with rather than explained. What was more damaging still, was that the course of thought as portrayed by Hegel was in nowise to be identified with the real course of the world. Lotze saw that it is in the real course of the world, not in the logical course of thought, that things come to take on the particular nature and character which are determinant of their reality.

Hegel's solution of Kant's problem made Lotze dissatisfied with the Idealist conception of what is involved in the reality of objects. That conception identified the fundamental conditions of reality with the *a priori* principles involved in our experience of it. Things became nothing in and for themselves. Lotze saw that that which is real demands an existence in and for itself independently of whether it is experienced by anyone. It is this element of reality that he considers the Idealists had not sufficiently explored. What then, he asks, is involved in this demand? In order to answer this question he adopts an empiric and realistic, rather than a critical, point of view. He therefore commences his examination of the nature of reality by taking the concrete things of life, and examining their natures as these natures are manifested to us when we come to experience them. In his examination of the nature of a real thing he arrives at two conclusions of fundamental importance: first, that a thing is real only in so far as it manifests certain characteristics of uniform regularity in change; secondly, that a thing is a mind, and therefore experiences its own content. Although he tries to discover the nature of the reality of things in the characteristics which they manifest in our experience of them, and although by so doing he seems to connect himself with the critical idealists, who sought for the reality of things in their subsumption under certain *a priori* principles dependent upon the nature of experience as such, yet by maintaining that a real thing must be a mind or an individual soul, Lotze was forced to find the fundamental principles through which reality moves, not in intellectual principles of order, but in moral principles of action. Reality is thus made to move through those principles which bind mind to mind, rather than through those which bind sense content to sense content. Undoubtedly the latter have their function in the movement of reality, but it is a

Lotze's  
empiric  
and  
realistic  
starting  
point

subordinate one; they are the instruments through which minds unify their contents in order that they may enter into a moral union or Kingdom of God in which the final meaning of reality comes to expression. Could Lotze have sustained and developed this view, then he would have found a basis from which to move to a solution of Kant's problem. If he could have shown that the unity of a thing's being, and therefore its reality, is bound up with the place that thing occupies in respect of a moral union of souls, then he would have been able to reveal to us how the moral and religious life of spirits conditions the reality belonging to existence. But he fails to do this.

His  
pluralistic  
attitude.

Having found the active principles of reality as those which bind mind to mind, Lotze is forced to adopt a pluralistic attitude. His pluralism, however, is not by any means thoroughgoing. He adopted a very great deal from Leibnitz, but he could not disregard the idealist development which had made it clear that things are what they are in consequence of the relations in which they stand to one another. Hence Lotze does not, like Leibnitz, make each member of his plurality self-contained and possessing within itself the source of all its activities. At the same time, however, he seeks to give to things a contingency which will break their absolute dependence upon thought principles. When he comes to consider the way in which movement can take place in the world, and the necessity, if the world is not to stand still, for a principle which will renew the face of reality, then he finds the need for a freedom of activity which is altogether independent of mere system and order. He postulates this freedom when he maintains that minds have the power of introducing new events into the mechanical scheme. He is not willing, however, to give this freedom to mere things; he is, indeed, willing to give it to human beings or to spirits, and to hold

that through the medium of this freedom spirits can realise their purposes in a world where mechanism has supreme sway. But thus to rob things of freedom is to take away from them that existence for self which constitutes a fundamental moment in their reality. Furthermore, before a spirit can influence a material existence in such a way that that existence shall respond to the influence, there must be a community of nature running through both spirit and thing; the spirit must be able to call forth a free source of movement in the thing's being. The problem is brought up for Lotze when he comes to consider the relation between the universe as a whole and its constituent elements. He is forced to recognise that the disturbance of the universe which results in change issues from a free source in things as individuals.

Both of Lotze's contentions, namely, that things are of the nature of minds, and that each real exists in and for itself, fail to give him a new standpoint from which he can advance beyond Kant's position. From the position that things are minds we should expect Lotze to move to the further position, that the minds of things are united with those of persons in such a way that they form a universe of minds. But he does not insist upon this. He strives to keep the world of nature a merely mechanical scheme, forming nothing more than a basis upon which spirits can stand, as it were. By standing upon this basis, and by acting in relation to it, souls, Lotze holds, develop their lives in community and constitute themselves a moral union. But from this moral union Lotze cuts off the minds at the basis of things in the material world. The fundamental position that things are minds, which was to secure for material reality a measure of moral principle as being constitutive of its nature, Lotze quietly gives up. He tries in another way to introduce a moment of morality into reality as it manifests itself in

Lotze's  
metaphysics  
not a basis  
from  
which to  
answer  
Kant.

the material world. He identifies the unity of that world with the life of the Divine Being, and he maintains also that the activity of the Divine Being reveals itself, through the whole of the material world, as mechanical. This, however, is a leap into the unknown. Furthermore, to describe all activity and all determination in things as proceeding from God does not thereby give to that activity and that determination a moral, as distinct from an intellectual, character. Things would have to be shown as taking up God's purposes, and as shaping their natures through the medium of these purposes. But to show things as doing this is impossible.

Lotze's  
followers  
as regards  
his idealistic  
and  
empirical  
attitudes.

Lotze has many followers in respect of the empirical method and the realistic attitude which he took up. Much of present-day empiricism, and also the fundamental principles of the school of New Realists, are directed against Idealism from the point of view of Lotze's criticism of it. The position of the New Realists is that mind, as mind, does not possess any determinant authority over existence. Things exist, and their nature is revealed to us in knowledge. Minds also exist, and their nature is revealed to us in the same way. It cannot be said that Lotze was a realist to this extent. The critical idealists had tended to identify mind as such with thought, and Lotze in striving to place real things beyond the power of thought was seemingly placing them beyond the power of mind. He is more concerned, however, to break the power of thought than the power of mind in relation to reality.

Another direction in which Lotze's influence has been very largely felt is in his attempt to unite the material world and the spiritual through the medium of the life of the Divine Being. Much of his metaphysics was designed to show that God is both the ontological and the teleological unity of all the minds going to the constitution of the universe. Such writers as Ward in England, who studied under

Lotze, and Varisco in Italy, have been very largely influenced in this direction by Lotze.

Having broken the power of thought as determinant of the nature of the real, Lotze brings forward a theory concerning moral judgments and their relation to reality. This theory places moral judgments in the same position as that held by intellectual judgments in Critical Idealism. He maintains that moral judgments of value enable us to grip the creative principles which move through reality, and to see them actively at work in shaping it. Through the medium of value judgments, he tells us, we see a thing fulfilling the law of its being, and at the same time realising the purpose of its existence. In order to sink value in things, making it objective there, he makes the law of a thing's behaviour the principle of its reality, and places the creative principle of this behaviour in a life belonging to that thing. But when he comes to determine what value is, he is forced to describe it as a state of blessedness existing throughout a community of spirits. This, however, leaves him with the old antagonism between a realm of nature and a realm of spirits; and he is never able to heal the antagonism.

Value judgments and their relation to reality.

It is from this position as to the function of value judgments in determining the nature of reality that Lotze's influence has been most felt. On the one side, Ritschl and the theologians who regard themselves as belonging to his school have taken over this principle, that in value judgments we come to grips with the full reality of things. They have applied it to religious matters, and have sought to determine the relation between God and the world by means of it. On the other side, there is the serious attempt to discover the logical structure involved in the historical sciences. In these sciences it is value judgments that are of supreme importance, and it is here where their nature and significance can be fully investigated. One of the most successful

The influence exercised by Lotze's view as to the importance of value judgments

pieces of work in determining the place of value judgments in the historical sciences is Rickert's 'Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlicher Begriffsbildung.' Rickert holds that the mind deals in a twofold way with the manifold presented to it. On the one hand, it arranges it in a systematic unity to form an objective system of things bound down by the natural principles of cause and effect, and so on. On the other hand, it seeks to bind it together so as to form individual wholes moving through historical development. The nature, scope, and constitution of individuals in any historical setting are determined by our estimate of worth in reference to the detail that goes to form their being. This estimate, Rickert maintains, is guided by principles which are logical in character. His view is thus a return to the Kantian position that thought or reason rules both in the theoretical and in the practical spheres. He does not seek to base a system of metaphysics on these views, but rather to clearly define the principles through which practical reason moves. The various systems of metaphysics of individuality are attempts to base metaphysics on the implications of the historical point of view. These systems take two directions. On the one side we have those who hold that individuality proceeds from finite centres, and is determined by a contingency or freedom moving from these centres. This view has been developed by such thinkers as Ward and Varisco, and very largely under the influence of Lotze's metaphysic. On the other side we have the view that individuality is determined by thought which is cosmic in its nature, and which involves the existence of an absolute from which it proceeds. This view is a return to the Hegelian standpoint.

The  
theology  
of Albrecht  
Ritschl

The theological development from Lotze through Ritschl has been of profound importance. This school of thought took over Lotze's theory as to the primacy of value judgment, and applied it to

theological questions, without considering the nature of these judgments and all that is involved in them. Ritschl considers the problem of religion much in the same way as Lotze considered the problem of philosophy. Man's moral nature assures him that he stands above the world of nature and of things; hence there is the demand, on his part, that the values which rule his moral life shall enable him to make the world subservient to himself. But the principles which determine the nature and character of reality, as it manifests itself in existence, cannot be related to the values which rule in the moral life of man; there is no passage from the one to the other. Ritschl, therefore, like Lotze, postulates God as a bridge between these two realms. God he conceives of as a higher power who governs the world for the ends of the spiritual life. The question that at once arises, and which Ritschl set himself to answer, is as to how God rules the material world from the point of view of sustaining the welfare in spiritual communion both of Himself and of spirits. Historic Christianity had answered this question in its own way. It had made God the creator of the world and of man, and it had considered the world as having been so ordered by God that man had dominion over it. But the spiritual fellowship between man and God was not thought of as being sustained through their mutual relationship to the world. Christianity made Christ a Divine Mediator between God and man. It held, further, that the Holy Spirit constitutes itself a means by which souls can purify and fit themselves to become part of Christ's life, into which they must sink themselves if they are to be brought into communion with God. The Holy Spirit was thus thought to be the source of mystic influences which can penetrate into human life, giving it a purified spiritual character. Christ was held to be the one who could lift human life, when perfected through these influences, into a



spiritual sphere above the realm of mere nature. God the Father was considered as accepting such spirits and bestowing upon them eternal life enduring through endless aeons of time.

Ritschl refused to consider the Historic Christianity which had been developed both in the doctrine and practice of the Catholic Church as an adequate basis from which to determine the relationship between God and man. He held, with the members of the Tübingen School, that the early Church had derived its views concerning the person of Christ from Hellenistic thought. During the time when the Church was being formed Gnosticism played a very important part in the development of religious theory. Furthermore, Gnosticism ran into very great extravagances as regards its theory of the logos, and the identification of Christ with the logos. No one could seriously consider those extravagances as a contribution to sound doctrine. It is undoubtedly true that Gnostic influences were at work in the development of Christian thought concerning the person of Christ; but it is also true that the great body of this thought was formed through the formation of principles intended to refute Gnostic heresies and extravagances. Ritschl was not justified in throwing over Historic Christianity on account of its relation to Hellenistic thought. There was, however, a deeper reason for his disregard of Church doctrine. While Ritschl was content to accept Christ's revelation as to the nature of God, the extent of His goodness and loving-kindness, and so on, he would not accept any pronouncements concerning Christ's transcendent power and glory. And he would not accept these pronouncements because he could not fit them in with any reasoned-out and systematic philosophic view of the nature of reality. This is still the greatest of all difficulties that the Church has to face. Its Christology is a system of metaphysics, but a system entirely at variance with

all systems based on reason. It may be possible to hold to both faith and reason, but it has not yet been found possible to resolve them into something higher which will reveal each as complementary to the other, and both as being necessary moments a single whole.

We have seen that it is not possible to fit in the religious views of the Church with the Idealistic thought of Kant and his followers, or with the metaphysics even of Lotze. Since Ritschl set himself the task of fitting in theological conceptions with the prevailing philosophical thought of his time he had no alternative but to cut away the whole of what he called the metaphysics of religion. The question now arises as to what is to become of God, of Christ, of the Holy Spirit, of the life after death which is described as eternal, of the historic facts of Christianity wherein the miraculous and mystic relation between God and the world is revealed to men? Ritschl could not attribute existence to them as had been done by the theology he throws over. At the same time he could not violate our religious consciousness by denying reality to them. He takes refuge, therefore, in Lotze's theory that there is a realm of value to which reality belongs. The reality of value is not that of existence, nor is it that of validity as belonging to law. It is difficult to determine whether both Ritschl and Lotze regard value as a unique *form*, or a unique *sphere* of reality. The distinction, however, is of paramount importance. If value is a form of reality, then that which has reality through value must also have reality through existence. If, on the other hand, value and existence are different spheres of reality, then it may be held that there are realities determined by value which never take the form of existence at all. Ritschl tends very much towards this view. He tells us that Christ has the value of God, and that miracles have reality as values revealing to us the presence of God. If,

The development in Ritschl's theology of Lotze's theory of value judgments.

however, Christ is God, and if miracles reveal, in a special way, God's working, it is natural to assume that we should ask for historic evidence as to these claims. But Ritschl denies that Christianity can be based upon such evidence; indeed, even if it were forthcoming, Ritschl holds, it would be of no real value. This view means that the existence or non-existence of all these historic facts simply does not count. Christ, as God, rules in a realm of values and works upon spirits through that realm; His reality, therefore, is not to be judged by the principles making for existence, but only by those making for value. Ritschl rejects the traditional proofs of God's existence because they all aim at attributing to God a form of reality which has to be grasped by our theoretic consciousness; in fact, they prescribe to God the reality of existence rather than that of value.

Now Lotze, in considering the nature of God, had cut away from Him all attributes which determine existence. He held that the unity belonging to God is not to be interpreted numerically, in the sense that there is only *one* God although we may imagine many such; His omnipresence does not mean that He is present everywhere in space; His omnipotence does not mean that He can change the course of events in any way He pleases. Lotze did not altogether relieve God of existence, giving Him only the reality of value. Nevertheless, in considering the metaphysical attributes of God he went very far in this direction. Ritschl only goes one step further than Lotze. Again, Lotze insisted upon the reality of moments which influence and mould our lives, but which cannot be identified either with existent objects or with predicates of existence. 'It is obvious, however, that every single moral idea—for example, the idea of justice, kindness, etc.—as soon as it commands the spirit, is not merely bound to impart definite characteristics to our whole manner

of conduct; but also that, under its command, the interchange of different moods of mind and the habits of the mental train—in brief, the whole inner condition—may become habituated to definite forms of alteration.’<sup>1</sup> These moral ideas Lotze describes as the Beautiful, and he seeks to find a place for them in the things which influence our lives. But the difficulty lies in determining the form of reality which belongs to the Beautiful. ‘The attempt may, however, be made to apprehend that which *objectively*, in the things, lies at the basis of the beautiful impression, as a predicate significant in itself, inserted as of great worth into the entire structure of the world, and belonging to the world’s completeness; so that the impression of beauty is produced by something that is, apart from the world and even in itself, of absolute worth.’<sup>2</sup> The beautiful, however, cannot be given form through intellectual judgments, which merely prescribe existence to that which they determine. ‘Accordingly, we cannot apprehend “the beautiful” in the form of an intuition, which would only give us one definite image; nor in the form of the concept, which, in addition to a definite circle of marks, would give us an invariable law for their inner connection; but only in the form of an *Idea*. Such *Idea* furnishes the essentials of an object simply by means of the significance of the end to which it is called; and, on the contrary, does not include a definite form or combination of marks, but rather admits of an infinitely manifold determinableness, with the sole condition that in all these many forms the meaning of the end remains unchanged.’<sup>3</sup> Thus the *Idea*, although not an object, possesses reality just as much as does an object; and its reality is secured to it through the significance which it exercises in moulding our lives. Ritschl’s theory that Christ has the value of God for us, through the

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Aesthetics* (Eng. trans.), p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8. <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

significance He has in enabling us to mould our own lives so that we can be superior to our circumstances, is a direct following of Lotze on this point. Ritschl will not pronounce upon the metaphysical attributes nor upon the existence of Christ. In fact, it was impossible for him to have done so, for by doing so he would have made God and Christ entities whose nature and being are determined by those theoretic principles which determine the reality of mere objects. There are other vital points in connection with the Ritschlian Theology. In its view as to the nature of sin and guilt, the death and resurrection of Christ as propitiatory sacrifice, the union of the human and divine natures in the person of Christ, and so on, he puts forward theories which are totally at variance with those of historic Christianity. These theories all follow from his fundamental position, and we need not enter into them here.

Criticism  
of  
Ritschl's  
point of  
view.

Ritschl's overthrow of the whole metaphysical basis of historic Christianity is not by any means justified. It marks a failure, on his part, to relate the reality that belongs to value with that which belongs to existence. He has not examined the metaphysics of Christianity and found them wanting. It is undoubtedly true, as Harnack has pointed out, that theological views have very largely been influenced by metaphysical theories. These theories form such a large element in the traditional view concerning Christ and the Divine Being that it is difficult to determine where exactly the teaching of Christ ends and Greek metaphysics begin. Furthermore, throughout its whole course theological speculation has made use of metaphysical reasoning, and where its reasoning is false it cannot hide behind the assertions that to overthrow such reasoning is to overthrow the basis of religion. But Ritschl holds that it is altogether wrong to base religious theory upon metaphysics. Here, however, he is obviously in the wrong, for his own theories are manifestly

metaphysical. His polemic against metaphysics is directed against the views which seek to determine God's reality as being that of existence, and to establish an existential relationship between God and man. Undoubtedly, God cannot be considered as existing in the same way as an object or a system of objects exists. He is not determined by conditions of time and space, but must be superior to them. Furthermore, to consider God as a Person is not an adequate view as to the form of His reality. Personality, as we know it, is very largely conditioned by the principles of objective existence. As persons we exist in space and time, and the needs of our lives are very largely bound up with circumstances depending upon these conditions. None of these conditions can determine the reality of God, and Ritschl's attack on metaphysics is largely made in order to sustain this point of view. Religious influences come to us from a God who is real, yet the reality of God cannot be determined by any of the predicates which condition existence. This attitude, which Ritschl develops from Lotze's principles, is undoubtedly a justifiable one. But what neither Lotze nor Ritschl attempted was the task of seeing how value moulds personality and gives it power to shape circumstances to its own ends. Nor, again, did they reveal any form under which the reality belonging to the supreme values, namely, God and the soul, can be understood. These, however, are tasks with which present-day thought is very largely concerned.

It can now be seen that what Lotze has done is not to answer Kant's question as to how reason can be one both in the practical and the theoretical spheres. He has widened the difference between these spheres; he has made the gulf between nature and spirit much deeper. Such a widening and deepening of the gulf was needed in order to bring out in clearer relief what is involved in man's spiritual

The  
question  
not by  
Lotze.

life. In this life existence as such does not rule, it is value that guides and controls personality; it is in the medium of value that personality is built up; and it is from a realm of values, thought of as objectively real, that the influences which move through our lives proceed. But when we come to consider this realm of values that condition our spiritual life we cannot translate them into terms of existence. What, then, is the form of reality that must be assigned to the realm of ends? This is the fundamental question set by the philosophy of Lotze.

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